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ABSTRACT

GULF WAR OF 1991 AND THEORIES OF THE PRESS:
CONVERGENCE OF OBJECTIVES IN AUTHORITARIAN
AND LIBERTARIAN STRUCTURES

This thesis studies an anomalous situation that prevailed during the media coverage
of the Gulf War of 1991 when authoritarianism became the norm in the libertarian
press. The limited conflict offered journalists representing different press systems
an opportunity to work together, gather information, interpret events as they
unfolded and narrate a story of global significance. Ideally, the reports emanating
from the battlefield ought to have reflected the varying degrees of freedom with
which the journalists worked in their countries.

Yet this ideal was neither promised nor delivered. Journalists from libertarian and
authoritarian backgrounds were reduced to a common denominator, which was
determined by the media management policies of the Coalition forces which had set
the objectives of the conflict as well as the media coverage of the conflict. The
policy of media containment, which was articulated indirectly through the speeches
of national leaders, was largely a demonstration of the lessons learnt by the United
States during recent limited conflicts.

There was an anxiety on the part of the military authorities to keep the media on a
leash, leading to the widely perceived equation that a victory for the press would be

a defeat for the military, and vice versa. This equation was primarily expressed in
the statements by George Bush, who was President of the United States during the
conflict. In his speech on January 16, prior to the launch of air strikes against Iraq,
President Bush stated that this would "not be another Vietnam" and the military
forces "will not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back". The
implication was clear to the media that controls would be put in place and there
would be no "scoops" or stories which would surprise the military. The extent of
controls exercised by the military minders of the media resulted in a uniform
coverage of the war. The authoritarian and libertarian structures showed a singularity
of purpose, which, predictably, coincided with that of the military.

Media controls during the Gulf War resembled the peace-time media management
policies of authoritarian governments in the sense that the results were intentional.
Reports of consequence and the progress of war in the media - libertarian and
authoritarian alike - reflected the intentions of the military in much the same way as
authoritarian regimes control the flow of information within their nations.

This study compares and contrasts, through qualitative and quantitative readings, the
coverage of the Gulf War by television and print media. The reporting of Gulf War
is analysed in newspapers representing two systems of the press - the authoritarian
and the libertarian. The study also observes the limitations of television coverage of
the Gulf War. The study notes the convergence of objectives in the media during the
conflict as a deliberate effect created by a policy of media management.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Aim
The Gulf War of 1991, which brought together a number of nations led by the
United States to oust the Iraqi forces from Kuwait, was a war of claims for and
against the media. It was claimed to be the first television war, in which live
coverage of the outbreak of war affected the perception of conflict. It was also
claimed to be the war that exorcised the Vietnam Syndrome, which had dogged the
involvement of the United States armed forces in conflict situations abroad. As the
war drew to a close after 43 days of fighting - from January 17 to March 1 observers of the media were quick to point out that, apart from achieving the stated
objective of reclaiming Kuwait from Iraq, the US-led forces also won the war
against the media. In the proclaimed victory of the forces of authority was seen the
defeat of the media.

This last claim was based on the media's inability to perform an adversarial role
against authority during the war. The media's efforts to operate independently of
authority was curtailed by a news pool system, which selected a handful of
journalists to represent the over 1200 journalists who had assembled at the Saudi
Arabian military headquarters of the Coalition forces (or Allied forces, as the more
than 750,000-strong US-led forces were called, evoking the soothing terminology
used during the Second World War). The news pool journalists were selectively
exposed to news sources among the soldiers, pilots and other military officials. They
were allowed to access and experience aspects of the war under the strict guidance

of the military minders. The film and copy produced by these journalists were
shared by the other journalists, who were in the majority and who represented rival
organisations.

The news pool system was not merely a way of dealing with an unwieldy number of
journalists. It was also a method which had evolved from US and British experience
of past conflicts - the Falklands War, and the invasions of Grenada and Panama - of
"managing" the media and creating a controlled news environment. One of the
lessons of Vietnam for the US government in particular, and for the western
democratic nations in general, was that an unfettered media could create an
unfavourable perception of war by showing the casualties, brutality, the violence,
the errors, the follies and the apparent pointlessness of the conflict. Media
management was the result of experiments in denying access and exercising
censorship and delay over the release of information, leading to greater military
control over war details and the total picture of war. Denial of access to aspects of
war was also coupled with a selective availability of favourable information, which
could be termed propaganda. The overall effect of media management was the
media's total dependence on authority for information, which resulted in a partial
perception of war. The media's awareness of the overwhelming factors limiting its
coverage was unable to alter the situation or the consequences.

Yet, it was not a war which offered too little for the media. It was rich in visual and
.textual raw material, if volume was any indication. The television had ample
opportunities to demonstrate its mobility, actively engaging its cameras at various
locations on the globe and collating material from diverse locations and sources to

compile its reports. The print media showed diversity of coverage, merging reports
from different areas to produce a lively coverage of war.
The questionable factor was the quality of information. Crucial aspects of the war mainly its unpleasant aspects dealing with the destruction, the human casualties and
the tragic consequences of its mistakes - were neither seen nor known. It was not a
war which was "witnessed" by the media. The media saw the leaders of war and
heard their accounts of war. The media missed the chance to mediate. The war story
was told, but it was not told by the media, it was told by the authorities, who used
the media as hnes of transmission.
The forces of authority were able to forge the outcome of war on the battlefield as
well in the perception of those who vicariously "witnessed" it from their drawing
rooms, watching the descriptions of it on television and reading about it in
newspapers. If democracy is characterised by a free press, which brooks no
hindrance in its pursuit of truth, it was not a freewheeling coverage of war which we
got. The hand of authority shaped the coverage. If the media in different countries
could be classified as authoritarian and libertarian based on the freedom available to
journalists, the coverage of war cut across all distinctions. What we saw during the
war was the operation of a uniformly authoritarian "press" (used synonymously in
this study with "media" as a term describing both television and the print media).
This thesis aims to study the coverage of war seen on television and in the print
media. It compares and contrasts the coverage of war by the libertarian press (in
Australia) and by the authoritarian press (in the United Arab Emirates). It concludes
i
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that the Gulf War of 1991 produced an anomalous situation which led to the
operation of authoritarian practice within the libertarian press. The open-ended
inference that such a situation was the making of the authorities, who could create a
similar scenario at times of crises, is hinted at in the thesis.

1.2 Thesis outline
This thesis examines the coverage of war as seen through two newspapers, one
selected from a country (Australia) which enjoins a great degree of freedom of the
press, and the other from a country (the United Arab Emirates) which restricts the
workings of the press during times of peace as well as war. The newspaper selected
from Australia is The Sydney Morning Herald, a daily broadsheet English
newspaper published in Sydney. The newspaper from the UAE is the Khaleej Times,
a daily broadsheet English language publication from Dubai, a commercial port city
in the UAE. The author worked for four years, from October 1986 to October 1990,
as a journalist with the Khaleej Times, which made access to the newspaper easier.
The two newspapers exemplify the operation of the libertarian and the authoritarian
press, as one is allowed an adversarial role against the government and the other is
not.
The commonalities and the points of divergence in the two newspapers' coverage of
the war are observed in the thesis. Despite major differences, the newspapers missed
the essential details of war which could have led to a more realistic picture of war.
This study tests the hypothesis that the big questions that remained as the war ended
- the issues of casualties, intentions, methods of achieving war objectives, the theme

of villain and hero played out by the leaders on both sides of the war and the use of
propaganda in presenting the war as "clean" and "just" - were largely the result of
inadequate coverage.
This thesis also makes qualitative and quantitative readings on the war news
coverage on television. The 43 days of war are chosen as the time frame and the
channels chosen are the ones available in Australia. Only the evening news
programs are chosen for study. As the television did not "see" the war, due to denial
of access, its coverage was reduced to aspects of the war which were allowed to be
filmed. Though the coverage was plentiful, the television journalists did not raise
questions which would have explained the "unknowns" of this war. The quantitative
study attempts to find out if the television showed more of war reaction and
consequence than the war itself
The thesis also explains the differences between authoritarian and libertarian
structures, posing the question whether freedom of the press under the best of
conditions is an approximation of the ideal, conditioned as it is by the systemic and
individual limitations under which journalists work.

1.3 Methodology
This thesis makes extensive use of both quantitative and qualitative methods of
study. One of the arguments presented in this study is that despite the volume of
output during the war, the coverage suffered qualitatively, in not being able to
unravel the key questions of war - of intent, effect and perspective - and therefore,
an extensive use of qualitative readings into television and print media coverage was

deemed inevitable.

Quantitative studies were undertaken in both print and television coverage. The
television study assesses the content of approximately three hours of war coverage
broadcast on Channels 9, 10, and the ABC in Australia during the evening news
bulletins of the first seven days of war, starting from January 17. The chapter
containing the study outlines the methodology in detail and describes the encoding
procedure used.

In order to compensate for the limitations of content analysis as a method of
obtaining results of a comprehensive nature, the television coverage was also
analysed for its quality, examining the issues related to war which were covered well
by the medium as well as those which were not covered well. The nature of
television as a medium is outlined, with a brief examination of its strengths and
faults, to inquire into whether television fulfilled the expectations it created as a
mediator of war news. Volume of coverage was not a major issue during the war,
and the failure of television lay in what it did not show, rather than in what it did.
Therefore, the qualitative study is conducted in some detail. Most of the study is
conducted without reference to studies undertaken by others, the conclusions being
drawn directly from what was obtained from television. But some references are
made to conclusions drawn in other studies, particularly in relation to censorship,
denial of access and propaganda. Journalism derives its strengths and weaknesses
from practice rather than theory, and the practical restrictions faced by journalists as
narrated in other studies were considered relevant in establishing the conclusions
drawn from the analysis of television coverage.

The print media study draws a great deal from the author's experience as a print
media journalist for over 16 years, four of them with the Khaleej Times in Dubai,
which is one of the newspapers studied. Though the initial tendency in any study is
to discount the experiential inferences of the author, in this study the author's
background was considered a strength for two main reasons: (1) very few studies
have been done on the media in the Middle East, and (2) a multicultural exposure in
journalism was assumed to foster objectivity rather than detract from it and the
author's experience as a journalist in India (with The Times of India in Bombay, for
six years), in the Middle East (with the Khaleej Times, for four years), and in
Australia (with the Illawarra Mercury and the Wollongong Advertiser, for five
years) was an easily available resource. Personal experience was valuable in
describing the working conditions of journalists in the authoritarian set-up,
particularly in an Islamic nation where the rules of practical conduct are largely
unwritten. The author's Australian experience was invaluable also in clearly stating
the working conditions in The Sydney Morning Herald (a Fairfax group newspaper,
like the Illawarra Mercury and the Wollongong Advertiser, where the author
currently works as editor). However, the conclusions drawn from experience are
limited to situations where they are relevant. The qualitative and quantitative studies
of the newspapers' coverage rest on the content of the publications.

A content analysis of The Sydney Morning Herald was undertaken on a relatively
small sample and on a limited theme. The aim was to test a hypothesis of a limited
nature. The time frame chosen included the period before, during and after the
ground war. The newspaper issues dated February 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, March 1, 2,

4, 5, 6 and 7 were studied. The dates omitted in between were the days when the
newspaper was not published (being a six-days-a-week newspaper. The Sun Herald
issues (published on Sundays) were not included in the study as the tabloid nature of
the newspaper was outside the scope of this thesis. (Both the Khaleej Times and The
Sydney Morning Herald are broadsheet dailies.)

The author also undertook a trip to Dubai to collect relevant material for study and
to talk to the journalists who covered the war from the newspaper. One of the
reporters, George Abraham, was interviewed at length and his observations are
included in the study of the Khaleej Times's local coverage during the war.

1.4 Limitations
A study encompassing two vastly different regions and two complementary media
on a theme which is as vast as a global conflict must be embarked upon with an
awareness of its potential limitations. Exhaustivity was an obvious hurdle: it was not
feasible to consider all the aspects of war coverage in the chosen media in the
selected time frame. Lack of published resources on the Middle East press was
another. Studies of the Arab press have been done but their applicability to the
working conditions in the Khaleej Times, an English language newspaper utilising
the services of a large contingent of expatriate staff, mostly from England and the
Commonwealth countries, was low. Particularly, previously published observations
on traditionalism and militancy in the Arab press were considered irrelevant in the
context of this study.

The study of television had to be narrowed, for reasons of availability of material as

well as for a sharper focus. Television coverage during the initial days alone ran into
several hours, much of it repetitive.

However, some of the precautions against perceived limitations included narrowing
the scope of the thesis. Cross-media studies and cross-regional observations,
however arguable their validity, could have led to other directions, but they were
considered beyond the focus of this study.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE SURVEY
This study thematically combines the theory of journalism with its practice during
the Gulf War of 1991. Any investigation of authoritarian practice within the
libertarian press involves terminological definitions which could lead to a
satisfactory conclusion. Some of the terms, such as freedom of the press, objectivity,
and authoritarian and libertarian practice, could be discussed at great length in an
effort to arrive at definitions which would satisfy rigorous theoreticians, yet this
study has sought only a working familiarity with the terms.
Relevant literature for this study included books and journals relating to theories of
the press, media research techniques, politics of the Middle East, history of media
coverage of past wars, nature of print media and television, experience of censorship
during recent limited conflicts and media coverage of Gulf War of 1991. This
chapter briefly looks at some of the research material which provided the
background for this study.
The Sydney Morning Herald and the Khaleej Times issues which were the subject of
quaUtative and quantitative analyses in this study constituted the main body of
published material used in the relevant chapters on the print media. The chapters on
television made extensive use of video footage of the Australian channels' coverage
of the war.
The book which laid the foundations of categorising the press. Four Theories of the
Press, co-authored by Fred S.Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm
(1962), has been improved upon marginally by others, but the main framework

established by the work has stayed intact with some variations. Dividing global
media as conforming to the four theories of the press - authoritarian, libertarian,
social responsibility, and Soviet communist - has proved sufficiently flexible to
retain its applicability in recent times. For simplicity, a variation of this four-fold
division has been utilised in this study, dividing media into authoritarian and
libertarian.

Theories of Mass Communication (Fifth Edition, 1989), co-authored by Melvin
L.DeFleur and Sandra J.Ball-Rokeach, offers a number of paradigms which could be
useful to a media researcher. Another invaluable compilation of media theories is
Communication Models for the Study of Mass Communication by Denis McQuail
and Sven Windahl (1981). Both these books offer an insight into the limitations of
all media theories, including the compartmentalisation of authoritarian and
libertarian media structures.

Media research methods are outlined in Mass Media Research: An Introduction,
co-authored by Roger D Wimmer and Joseph R. Dominick (1987). The book
provides an excellent first approach to methods of conceptualising and designing
media research topics, with separate chapters devoted to the different kinds of
methodology: survey research, field research, case studies, content analysis and
longitudinal research, with three detailed chapters offering the basic statistical tools
necessary to minimise errors in research. Three concepts fundamental to content
analysis - that it is systematic, objective and quantitative - are emphasised in the
book, which formed the foundation of content analysis undertaken as part of this
study. Other useful books on methodology include Media Research Techniques by

Arthur Asa Berger (1991) and Content Analysis in Communication Research by
Bernard Berelson (1952).
Anyone aiming to study the media coverage of a limited conflict in recent times will
do well to begin with a reading of Phillip Knightley's book, The First Casualty:
From the Crimea to the Falklands: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist
and Myth Maker (1989). A study of the media cannot be divorced from the
collective experiential observations of media practitioners, and Phillip Knightley,
who was the special correspondent for The Sunday Times for 21 years, is a good
case in point. Familiarising with the media's war experiences requires delving into
the history of recent limited conflicts and the role at times usurped by the media and
at times assigned to it by the authorities. It is also a history of censorship and
propaganda and how the media has learned to work within the military constraints of
covering war. War And Television by Bruce Cumings (1992) starts with the
assumption that "the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War was our first 'television war' " and
takes up the theme from where Phillip Knightley left off, though concentrating
exclusively on television.
War Report: The War Correspondent's View of Battle from the Crimea to the
Falklands by Trevor Royle (1987) is similar in scope to Phillip Knightley's book.
Another post-Falklands War book which offers useful insights into the workings of
the media is War And Peace News by the Glasgow University Media Group's
authors Lucinda Broadbent, John Eldridge, Gordon Kimmett, Greg Philo, Malcolm
Spaven and Kevin Williams (1985). The book has a refreshing section on the
Falklands conflict, making a number of observations which have become truisms

since: "Defence news is highly sensitive and tends to be conservative, especially at
times of crisis. Where defence is an issue in a news story it may override normal
journalistic values. For example, television, operating as it does from within
generally liberal and social-democratic principles, has a positive commitment to
'democracy'." (Page 5)

The core literature of relevance to this study pertains to published analyses of the
Gulf War of 1991. John R Macarthur studies a pairing of negatives during the
coverage of the war in his book. Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the
Gulf War (1992). Philip M Taylor offers a qualitative understanding of the media
coverage of the war through his work. War and the Media: Propaganda and
Persuasion in the Gulf War (1992). Australia's Gulf War (1992), edited by Murray
Goot and Rodney Tiffen, assesses the Australian perspective, while 43 Days: The
Gulf War (1991), by Ian Bickerton and Michael Pearson, gives a narrative rundown
of the war as seen on ABC television in Australia.

A discriminating choice has to be made when including books on the Middle East in
the reading list. The Middle East has undergone changes in the perception of
European and American scholarship, first through a period British "Orientalism" the stereotyping of Oriental culture and cultural objects which was characteristic of
colonial times - and second through the ebbs and flows of American and European
political (through Israel) and economic (through oil exploration and trade)
involvement in the region. It is a kaleidoscope of ever-changing patterns, with the
US and other western powers trying to balance the power equations in the region,
initially by supporting Iraq against Iran and later, during the Gulf War, by putting

Iraq in its place. Western scholarship has kept track of the emerging policy shifts
while simultaneously noticing the new spirit of anti-western cultural independence
being proclaimed by the Middle East intelligentsia in its quest for breaking ties with
colonial perceptions of its own strengths and weaknesses. Keeping track of the
shifting sands of policy making in the Middle East could be a demanding exercise.
A broad spectrum of reading on the politics of Middle East is a prerequisite for any
study. A good starting point is Edward Said's groundbreaking work, Orientalism
(1978), and its follow-up study by the same author. Covering Islam: How the Media
and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World
Theory, Politics and the Arab World: Cntical Responses (1990), edited by Hisham
Sharabi, includes essays outlining paradigms of cultural perception evolving among
the new Arab intelligentsia. Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War
(1993) by Mohamed Heikal attempts a view of the war from within. The Gulf
Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (1994) by
Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh tackles the widely prevalent 'Washington
bias'. Desert Shield to Desert Storm : The Second Gulf War (1992) by Dilip Hiro is a
close study of the political threads of war.
Works seeking to define news and describe the language of news are too numerous
to mention, yet a selection ought to include Culture, Media, Language by Stuart
Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe and Paul Willis (editors) (1980). The
Language of News Media by Allan Bell (1991) also discusses the discourse of news
writing. Other views of news, for example news as myth making and story telling,
are offered by Media, Myths and Narratives: Television and the Press, edited by

James W.Carey (1988).
Various works outline the limitations shown by journalists in the practice of their
profession, but this study benefited extensively from News: The Politics of Illusion
(Second Edition, 1988) by W Lance Bennett.

CHAPTER 3: BINARY MODE OF UNDERSTANDING THE MEDIA

3.1 Freedom and control

Categorizing journalistic practice into compartments based on the freedom available
to it is a common method of understanding the diversity of world media. Linking the
media systems closely to the kind of social, political and economic systems
prevalent in a country usually provides a conveniently small number of categories.

Thus it is not uncommon to encounter descriptions of the "press" - a term which has
expanded in meaning to include the television and any news disseminating system as a distinct function oscillating between "freedom" and "control", between
"democracy" and "authority" or between "independence" and "subservience".

A layman's understanding of the terms is the general guide in the use of these terms,
with media theoreticians arriving at definitions through examples. Broadly speaking,
the press in most nations either follows a "libertarian" or an "authoritarian" system.

The libertarian press is usually regarded as following an "independent" or
"freewheeling" line of inquiry, taking advantage of the leeway provided by a
democratic (in political terms) or First World (in economic terms) system to pursue
the production of news. The government is only one of the factors limiting content the audience, the free market-place of ideas, the profitability of news production and
journalistic ethics being others. The journalist has the right to view the government
critically, and often claims the responsibility to a watchdog role, leading to a
modified theory of the press known as the theory of social responsibility.

Under authoritarian conditions, the press is enjoined to function as a tool for the
"good" of society and advance common goals of the government, which is usually in
the hands of a few who derive their authority to rule through means other than
democratic. The government is usually the source and the content of news and
disincentives often limit the critical line of inquiry to an "underground" or
"revolutionary" press. The communist press is a variant of the authoritarian press,
with government ownership of the media instead of private ownership.

The Third World nations (politically post-independent and post-colonial, and
economically impoverished countries) are understood to be practising a
developmental concept of the press, with an informal acquiescence in governmental
ideals for the "good" of society. It is described as a formal alternative to the
libertarian concept in its willing suspension of the "excesses" of individual liberty.
Nevertheless, in practice, it displays overtones of the authoritarian press, with the
government playing a dominant role as a source and subject of news.

Thus the binary division of the press as authoritarian, and libertarian is the operative
principle in a descriptive understanding of world media. Points of divergence are
mapped on a line with "libertarian" (meaning "most free", "capitaHst") and
"authoritarian" (meaning "least free", "undemocratic") marking the two poles. This
binary mode of discussion is acknowledged to be a simplified view, with
generalisations being qualified with exceptions and at times allowing for variants of
the two systems of the press.

Nevertheless, its operational effectiveness has been accepted without serious doubts,

especially since it facilitates categorization and promotes a comparative view of
world press systems.
The idea that freedom of the press has to be tempered with a sense of responsibility
- a realisation by the media of their commitment to the community to accurately
publish or broadcast the "intelligence of the day" - evolved as an Anglo-American
concept. It now prevails as a reminder to journalists that they are "answerable" to
their readers or viewers for their failures.
A code of ethics describes the ideal conduct for a journalist and prescribes duties.
The critics of the media - whether academic or merely aggrieved - expect answers.
However much these limits might act as a kind of benign censorship of journalistic
practice, they are largely self-imposed. Publishers and broadcasters acknowledge the
public's "right to know" and accept that the media industry is an enterprise
(determined by profit) as well as a service (determined by duties). In spreading
viewpoints and facts, there is fair play - enough room for the good and the bad - with
the belief that the good will prevail, more or less in ways prescribed by John Milton
in the Areopagitica. (The 17th century poet believed public opinion will separate the
chaff from the grain in course of time.)
Official censorship of news as a curtailment of what is believed by the governing
authority to be "undesirable" violates the principle of social responsibility. Under the
libertarian concept, external force has no place in the practice of journalism.
Production of news is circumscribed by internal forces - by the use of freedom and
by a sense of responsibility, both exercised by the journalist of his or her own accord.

At least, this is the theory.
3.2 Systemic and individual limitations
In practice, freedom of the press as it is ordinarily understood is an approximation to
the ideal. The conditions under which news is produced are often cited as leading to
a less than perfect situation.
Although it is not a stated aim of official policy to control the production of news,
the factors governing news production tend to control, curtail and distort it. One of
the reasons for the diversity of news sources is that news acquires its legitimacy
through various modes of presentation. There are more than a few ways of
presenting the world to the audience. Despite the variety of news sources, the world
as perceived through the media is nowhere near a perfect reflection of the real world.
Factors limiting journalistic practice act as controls. The existence of some of these
factors have been acknowledged.
(1) Media as business: It is not often viable for the media to seek the truth and act as
a watchdog for economic reasons. Lack of advertising support for certain programs
(the coverage of the Gulf War was widely claimed to be a losing proposition for the
television networks despite increased viewership) discourages the pursuit of
information. The profit motive is partly the driving force behind the kind of fair play
that ensures no single company or product gets a run which disadvantages other
companies or products, thus precluding the dissemination of biased commercial
information. However, this does not prevent the media owners' other business
interests from occasionally getting a favoured treatment.

(2) Power elite: Critics of media practice cite indirect controls exerted by a power
elite, comprising the politicians, the business class and the media owners, whose
interests run counter to journalists' pursuit of news. These controls are tangibly felt
by the media when the power bases of the elite are challenged, threatened or
endangered.

(3) Journalist's bias: W Lance Bennett (1988) summarises four types of biases which
distort the presentation of news. They arise from the journalist's tendency to
personalize, dramatise, fragment and normalise news.

Rather than explaining the power structures and political processes behind a new
development, the mass media tend to focus on the prominent people involved. The
issues are treated as secondary to the main "players".

Dramatizing events compounds this tendency. As news unfolds like a dramatic tale,
the actors are deemed more important than institutions, the progress of their fortune
assumes a greater significance than a perspectival understanding of events. The
essence of a dramatic presentation is over-emphasis on certain elements of a news
story at the expense of others, resulting in an obvious distortion of the relative
importance of the issues concerned.

These two tendencies, in Bennett's view, can cause the loss of the "big picture" as
news becomes fragmented. Fragmentation is aggravated by space and time limits
imposed by the media processes.

Thus the news comes to us in sketchy dramatic capsules that make it difficult to see
the connections across issues or even to follow the development of a particular issue
overtime. (Bennett, 1988,p.24)

News also draws on popular belief in official capability to restore normalcy and
tends to be presented in images and stereotypes of problems, according to Bennett,
The security of authority and the comfort of accepted values are reinforced in the
organisation and presentation of news. The sprinkling of the bizarre among the news
items offered for everyday consumption reinforces the picture of order and normalcy
with which every reporting of crisis is rounded off

It seems somehow "normal" for there to be political upheavals in
ungovemable little Banana Republics, just as it seems normal for the
United States to step in and help restore order before our enemies do.
(Bennett, 1988, 51)
The standardized formats of news programs on television and news pages in
newspapers encourage these tendencies so that the public has a remote chance of
getting a true picture of reality.

(4) Dependence on news sources: News is not always witnessed by the journalist, it
is narrated by the news source. The credibility of news derives from the placement
of the news source on a scale of authority. This creates a dependence on government
sources for verification and ultimate publishability of news. It leads to a situation in
which propaganda could be disguised as news by the news source. Propaganda
rarely occurs in a format which is recognizable as such. Propaganda is synonymous
with lies in popular understanding, but it can also be a selective disbursement of
facts.

(5) The news narrative: The origins of news-making process could be traced to
ancient times when story-telling was the primary mode of communication of events
in society. The narrative of the news story could be seen as a direct descendant of
the myth-making process that existed prior to the invention of the printing press. The
news story, if its antecedents were to be traced, is a story in the literal sense of the
term.
Journalists fmd themselves poised uneasily between what they see as
two impossible ideals - the demands of "reality", which they see as
reachable through objective strategies, and the demands of narrativity.
They face a paradox; the more "objective" they are, the more unreadable
they become; while the better storytellers they are, the more readers will
respond, and the more they fear they are betraying their ideals. So
journalists do some chronicling, some story-telling, and a lot that is
something of both. (Bird and Dardenne, 1988, 78^

(6) The cultural limitations of the journalist: The education of the journalist and the
values which are perceived to be normal within the culture of the journalist's
upbringing constrict the understanding of another culture. This limitation becomes
particularly noticeable in the coverage of other nations and cultures. It aggravates
stereotypes.

All these limitations operate on a journalist trying to present a total picture during an
ongoing series of events, such as a war.

33 The nature of television

The theory of social responsibility works despite the operational hindrance of
controlling factors. The journalist's educational and social background, which
contributes to the biases listed above, the broadcasting and publishing industry's

dependence on news sources, the agenda- setting power of the elite, the nature of
news narrative, and the conflicting business interests of the news industry Hmit the
journalist's ability to construct reality, often leading to an alternative reality.
Because of the effectiveness of these controlling factors, news is imbued with a
perennial deniability, an instant credibility for an equal and opposite point of view.
This is despite the fact that the spread of television and the ubiquitousness of
television networks have, in the best of times, earned it the reputation of being the
eyes and ears of the public. The dictum "seeing is believing" has assumed a new
significance since television cameras have trained their attention increasingly on
news. And the high seriousness that print media journalists derived from providing a
"window on the world" has become a natural preserve of television as well: it has
the ability to make its consumers "see".
But the visual power of the television has to be weighted against the negative factors
that have accrued to television's capability to reconstruct facts for viewers. Among
these is its selectivity: the television can only show what the camera has been
directed at. Television cameras are not as mobile as unencumbered journalists and
cannot reach places as easily. They normally reach places where they have been
allowed in.
Also, they cannot provide a full picture, a 360-degree vision without appearing to
waste television time: the television camera is a compulsive focusing machine,
revelling more in close-ups than in perspective shots. While it may not be any more
selective than the print journalist, the camera's power to provide lingering images

(accentuated by the studio's tendency to rerun good shots, much like the "action
replay" of a football goal) promotes stereotyping a situation, a place or a person. A
memorable scene could thus become an additional source of bias, twisting the reality
presented as separate from the outer reality.
The construction of alternative reality isn't the only limitation of television.
The television is an entertainer and critics of the medium have dubbed it a helpless
provider of sitcoms. The visual narrative must keep the element of surprise and
emotional twists that sitcoms provide in order to keep the viewer's attention. The
script writer's habit of leading the viewer up to the commercial break (where the
revenue is) is a part of the television journalist's brief as well. Every news story must
have a beginning, a middle and an end, all within the allotted time limit, counted in
seconds. If television journalism evolved from newspaper journalism, it is also
known for the qualities it inherited from its other parent, the feature film industry,
which in its turn can trace its ancestry to the opera, the comedy of situations, the
comedy of humours (a stereotyping of human personality traits), and the Elizabethan
stage, where every character enters and exits on cue.
If the print media distort reality by personalizing, dramatizing, fragmenting and
normalizing it, the television slices through the real world, refming and editing out
the big picture until it arrives at the very essence of it and presents a representative
image.
The television and the newspaper journalists together present a picture of the world
which is, despite the faults accrued from the news production process, the closest

that we get to an understanding of outer reality, outside of the immediate community
in which we live.

3.4 War coverage

During war, the controls under which journalism is practised acquire a fresh
legitimacy. The war correspondent is not only covering unfamiliar territory, he is
also reporting sensitive issues, and often the "five Ws and how" of his professional
quill completely miss the mark.

The military is waging a war to quell the enemy, not to enable the journalist to keep
media audience informed. The sense of emergency during war creates a special
situation when official interference in the flow of news becomes as justified as
moving the troops to vanquish a murderous enemy. It is a time when explanations
for official control of news are rendered superfluous. Nevertheless the compulsion is
to carry on, and lead stories are written and prime time broadcasts are still made, the
information flow getting new body and volume from military officials monitoring
the progress of war.

The Gulf War of 1991 demonstrated, if anything, that an organised public relations
effort by the military officials can fill in almost unlimited newspaper space and
television air time. The quantity of coverage during the war was probably
responsible for earning the epithet "media war" for this war. From the beginning of
the air strikes which marked the start of the war till the end of the ground war, the
television stations were busy updating their coverage.

In tenns of the number of foreign correspondents the war was ostensibly a show of
media power.
But neither the volume of media output during the war nor the number of journalists
allowed into "war territory" (a term which could be interpreted in many ways since
the journalists were within air strike distance but not within witnessing distance of
combat) was any indication of the variety of coverage. In fact, the precise opposite
could be averred, that the war coverage was notable for its singular absence of
variety. There was very little evidence of different perspectives on the war (with
CNN's disputed coverage from within enemy territory being the only exception).
Variety of war coverage was missing in three crucial aspects: location of journalists,
news sources and perspectives.
The journalists were, without exception, confined to a small geographical location.
Those who saw "action" in the war had been escorted to designated areas by the
military officials. There was very little "Vietnam-style" freewheeling movement of
journalists.
There was only one source of news during the war: the official briefers. Since the
journalists did not see any combat or its effects on war victims first hand, the
dependence on military officials for information was total. The officials were the
primary sources of news as well as the confirming sources.
Lastly, the absence of multipKcity of perspectives served as another reminder that
the Gulf War of 1991 was a war by consensus, in which the media had, by

conviction and through a forced denial of choice, relinquished the "mediating" role.
Perspectives and interpretations were absent (except the perspectives which were
offered in a ready-made format by the spokespeople of those engaged in war)
because the media did not command the information gleaned from alternative news
sources and locations.

Just as television served as a direct link between the military and the audience, the
newspapers were reduced to their most primary function: that of committing the
official word into print. The media became a useful tool. If the military had any fears
- and if the media had any hopes - of technology being able to circumvent external
controls, of satellite television cameras beaming the news over the heads of the
military commanders directly into the drawing rooms of the audience, they were laid
to rest quickly.

The Gulf War of 1991 proved that satellite technology has not brought about a
quantum leap for the media in its task of enlightening the audience about the
"intelligence of the day" from around the world. It's far easier to pull the plug than
stop the human messenger who carried the news on horseback in ancient times. But
then, of course, managing the media is not a simple exercise: it's not a process of
unwiring the media machine. Media is managed, as the Gulf War showed, within the
behavioural codes of democracy.
But a democratic government cannot afford to be as crude as that. It
never goes in for summary repression or direct control; it nullifies rather
than conceals undesirable news; it controls emphasis rather than facts; it
balances bad news with good; it lies directly only when it is certain that
the lie will not be found out during the course of the war. (Knightley,
1989,434)

Phillip Knightley's observations were directed at the British media containment
policy during the Falklands War in 1982. The continuing relevance of his comments
illustrates the progression of the history of western policy of media containment
since the Vietnam War.

3.5 Period of experimentation

In the history of modem reporting of war, Vietnam marked a triumph of sorts for the
media. It was not a high watermark for the media in terms of excellence of coverage:
there was neither the perspective reporting, the overall big picture coverage, nor the
right method for making reporting accurate or safe for the journalists.
In a sense, the failure of the media to report the Tet offensive objectively
and accurately sums up all that went wrong in the press and television
coverage of the war. The correspondents failed to understand US
strategy and showed a lack of knowledge about the military operations
in Vietnam; in this failing they were not helped by the reluctance of the
military to divulge essential information ...The press coverage of Tet
may have quickened the nation's desire to get out of Vietnam but it also
showed that both the media and the military had a lot to learn about the
coverage of modem war and especially about the intmsion of the
television camera into the battlefield. (Royle, 1987, 210)
But the media in Vietnam had the freedom to "hitch a ride to Da Nang". It was a war
in which the joumalists could report the negative aspect of the battlefield as much as
the positive side. The victories, the follies, the heroes and the villains were, in a way,
decided by the joumalists. The fact that they were not armed with adequate
knowledge of the motives and policy decisions on the war did not prevent the media
from gaining access to details of war which were not thrown on their path by media
minders from the military.

It is an exaggeration to claim that the media helped bring the war to an end. The

media could probably claim victory in a limited sense of having performed an
adversarial role during the war whenever it chose to. The media made the war an
unpleasant memory for the returning soldiers, for the American public and, more
importantly, for the American government. It was a war which quenched the media's
thirst for "combat footage", providing plenty of action for the cameras, which had a
field day.
Pictures of aerial bombardment, of napalm raids and defoliation, of
savage firefights in which young Americans were being killed not only
brought home the reality of the war into a domestic setting, they also
showed what could be happening to fathers, sons and husbands. Families
began to understand what their men were going through and as the level
of permissible violence on the screen began to escalate, so too were
sections of the public alarmed by what they saw. (Royle, 1987,209)

The Vietnam bogie was an unpleasant media experience for the US government and
President George Bush was keen to purge the Vietnam Syndrome, which was an
albatross the media had strapped on to the US government.

The limited conflicts of the 1980s - the Falklands war and the Grenada and Panama
operations - saw the government's iron hand dominate over the media. They were
information wars in which the antagonist on the homefront - the media - was
perceived to be routed as thoroughly as the enemy on the battlefield.

During the Falklands War, the British government set aside the norms of democracy
and the public's "right to know" as less important than winning the war. As Britain
and Argentina fought over a group of islands in the South Atlantic - 8000 miles from
Britain and 500 miles from the nearest land mass - it became evident to the media
that the Vietnam days were truly over. The media's first response to the British

government's severe restrictions on reporting - which included the power to select
only British reporters to accompany the task force to the Falklands, to choose just a
small number of correspondents to cover the war, to delay and suppress the release
of information and ultimately to vet the copy and the visuals reaching the audience was one of disbelief. The media blamed the government for its "failure" to inform
the public without realising that the government had set out to exclude the media
from the war operations.
In fact, the MoD (the British Ministry of Defence) achieved exactly what
its political masters wanted it to do, and its role in the Falklands Islands
campaign will go down in the history of journalism as a classic example
of how to manage the media in wartime. (Knightley, 1989,434)

3.6 Denial of access and delay: two weapons
The Americans, apparently, watched the media management of the Falklands War
with some admiration. The invasion of Grenada in 1983 gave the authorities the first
chance to put into practice what they had seen the British do to enforce the
post-Vietnam information order.
In terms of news management Grenada was a resounding success. There
simply wasn't any news; the invasion was kept secret even from the
press offices at the White House and the Pentagon until an hour after it
began...When reporters finally were allowed on the island, they were
able to refute one of the rationales for the invasion - that Grenada had
become a supply dump for Soviet and Cuban weapons, a veritable
staging ground for subversion. But by then so many newspeople had
repeated Reagan Administration's lie about warehouses stacked to the
ceiling with sophisticated Soviet weapons, and hordes of Cuban military
advisers roaming the island, that the truth had little impact. As for the
number of American, Grenadian, or Cuban casualties, no one could say
for sure. (Macarthur, 1992,141)

Denial of access was proving to be a formidable weapon for the authorities in their
battle to win the media war. It ensured that : (1) the casualties of war were not

known to the media; (2) the cause that provoked the war was not established as a
fact but was obscured by contradictory "theories" ; (3) the news perspective on the
war did not evolve as a total picture in which the authoritarian role of the power that
suppressed the news could be known to the outside worid; (4) the conflict was not
seen as an act of brutality or violence; and, (5) the facts relating to the conflict
emerged slowly and much later, after the "propaganda" issued by the authorities had
had its effect.

The overall picture that the news media got as a result of poor access did not reflect
the geopolitical reahty of the conflict, thus creating an atmosphere in which the
perspective imposed by the authorities took roots easily.

But total denial of access was not the answer. It hardly amounted to any media
management, as the media was nowhere near the combat zone to manage. Lack of
information gave rise to speculation and, the material and moral victories of war - if
there were any - remained a rumour, not having the imprimatur of media witness
reports to authenticate them.

As a result of media protests arising from the heavy-handed treatment from the
authorities during the Grenada invasion, a national media pool was created, whose
role was to provide access - or a limited form of it - to the area of conflict for the
media. This was the next logical step in the evolution of media management
techniques and it proved to be a functional tool for the authorities as well as for the
media. The media saw the prospect of access in the formation of the pool, and the
authorities perceived in it a sufficiently strong lever of control over how the access

was to be accorded and when.

Prior to the Gulf War, the invasion of Panama in 1989 was the last conflict situation
which gave the evolving media managers the opportunity to hone their skills and
develop a working method. Panama was an experiment of another sort: the
"weapon" during the conflict against the prying media was delay.
This time the Pentagon simply delayed the departure of the National
Media Pool until just two hours before the fighting started, and then
upon its arrival in Panama the government held the reporters captive on
a US base for another five hours. During this time, the media missed the
heaviest action of the operation. Outside of Pentagon pictures spoon-fed
to journalists, little real information reached the American public...
(Macarthur, 1992, 143)

Delay worked through heightened expectation. There was a perennial uncertainty
that the moment of exposure to events could arrive any time, and the media's light of
truth could be allowed to shine on the reality of conflict. Yet the results achieved by
delay were similar to denial of access as a method of dealing with the media. Very
little beyond the official version reached the public.

The information vacuum that followed these three conflicts - the Falklands War and
the invasions of Grenada and Panama - was achieved through successful application
of the new-found methods of media control: denial of access and delay.

In a worst case scenario where the authorities were unsure of the outcome of conflict
- whether in terms of casualties, brutality or a victorious resolution of the problem these two restrictions would lead to the most desirable version of the conflict as far
as the authorities were concerned. Significantly, democratically elected leaders of
political parties in power and the military authorities achieve a convergence of

interest in times of war. Neither of them tolerates a democratic press in a crisis.
Censorship would be an additional factor impeding the operation of the free press in
times of conflict. In addition to delay and denial of access, the media management
could now deal with the production process of the media, suggesting changes to
copy and omissions in fihn footage. The media could be made to consider the
political and military sensitivity of information in the conflict situation. The age-old
argument is that information has to be tailored to create a favourable impression to
home audience and strategically insulate the true picture from being relayed to the
enemy. The media does not need further persuasion than the slightest hint of
patriotism. Beyond this is the pale of unexplained force of authority, which could
also be invoked in aid of censorship, when faced with a defiant press.
When denial of access is rationalised, delay has been clamped on to make news
sufficiently scarce, and the threat of censorship hangs over the heads of journalists,
the perfect atmosphere is created for propaganda to work well. In a controlled news
environment, journalists are reluctant to scrutinise the truth value of what is made
available to them in good faith: propaganda in the guise of news.
Propaganda has the connotation of evil intentions, but this is being simplistic.
Propaganda is always a rational presentation, an attempted persuasion, to enable the
information recipient to look at facts selectively and with a particular perspective in
view. During war, "our nation" deals in facts and "the enemy" deals in propaganda.
Or at least, this is the common perception. But as the fog of war clears, it becomes
clear that both sides have sought the aid of propaganda to communicate a particular

view of war. Propaganda is aimed at both the home audience and the enemy. The
vehicle is both cases is the media.
Propaganda is simply a process of persuasion. As a concept, it is neutral
and should be devoid of value judgments. Propaganda is one of the
means by which the adherents of a particular cause seek to engender
such views in an audience which would induce a desired perception of
what is actually going on, and lead to them acting in a desired way,
involving amongst other methods the deliberate selection and omission
of accurate information as well as falsehoods - the more effective
propaganda being that which is unlikely to be identified as such at the
time. (Taylor, 1992, 18)

In order to retain their credibility with the news media, it is essential for the
authorities to manage their propaganda machinery in such a way that the
disbursement of information does not get labelled as propaganda until well after it is
assimilated by the end-consumer of news. Media management is a serious
preoccupation for the authorities during war.

3.7 Media management during the Gulf War

The limitations of the journalist earlier outlined in this chapter have to be viewed in
conjunction with the special restrictive conditions imposed during the war: denial of
access, delay, censorship and propaganda. Consequently the picture of war reality
which was received was severely affected.

During the Gulf War, the authorities, who had during earlier conflicts experimented
with a restrictive style of news management, exercised a degree of control which
was adequate to allow a reasonable volume of news to flow through while
qualitatively curtailing the kind of news which filtered through. Essential areas of
war reality were still shrouded in mystery and the volume of news was sufficiently

gratifying for the media to fail to raise the question of casualties, and who was
responsible for how much of war damage.

For the more than 1200 journalists who had been transported to a new terrain to
"witness" the war, the values of a democratic press faded quickly on arrival Not
only did they have to contend with the media managers of the Coalition forces, but
they also had to remind themselves that the terrain in which they were striving to
practise the tenets of a free press was surrounded on all sides by nations which knew
no other kind of media except the authoritarian kind. The milieu of authoritarianism
in which the journalists found themselves was a hidden persuader, pushing them
further towards docility. Thus, there were few reports during the war about issues
which were deemed sensitive by the authoritarian regimes of the surrounding
countries. Specifically, the Islamic way of life, the status of women, the presence of
women soldiers, the sensitivity of Arabs to the presence of Western soldiers in Saudi
Arabia, the lifestyles of the rich Arabs, crime and punishment in the Arab nations,
the plight of poor expatriate labourers, the contradictions in society arising from
viewing any mention of sex as a taboo were some of the issues on which the
Western media did not pause to reflect and report. Among other issues which were
overlooked was the bonding among the oil producing nations and their
condescension towards the other Muslim nations, the status of Palestinians in Saudi
Arabia as the war progressed, and the defence capabilities and battle readiness of
Arab soldiers.
The day Iraq invaded Kuwait, Saudi Arabia's news media assumed a
traditional pose: they ignored it. They were silent the next day, even as
Saudis huddled by short-wave radios or, if they lived near the borders,
watched television news from other Arab nations. By the third day some

newspapers were writing about "Iraqi aggression" but they offered few
details. Others were not so gutsy, referring only obliquely to "tensions in
Kuwait". Jasr al Jasr, managing editor of al Jezira, recalls feeling quite
comfortable with his paper's decision to wait until the third day - and a
statement from the government - before telling its 100,000 readers what
the rest of the world already knew: that Saddam Hussein's armies had
swept through Kuwait and were parked five to ten miles from the Saudi
border. (Franklin, 1991, 24)

To explain the style of media management in Saudi Arabia in terms of censorship
and self-censorship is to seek to understand the "otherness" of cultural and political
differences through familiar and limited terms.
The understanding is this: the media will not report on sensitive affairs
until the government has formulated its policy on them; journalists are
not independent voices; the news they produce must not break the rules
by challenging the government, questioning friendly nations, casting a
bad light on Islam, or mentioning sex. (Franklin, ibid, 24)

For journalists covering the Gulf War and facing the media management policies of
military minders, the most striking feature of their new surroundings must have been
the fact that they would have to be transported across a few time zones to fmd
echoes of an independent, inquiring media.

But from the military authorities' point of view, the conditions could not have been
more perfect. The ideals they were to set for the press were matched by the
surroundings.

3.8 The melting point of media freedom

The degree of control achieved by the military minders of the media during the war
closely approximates the mind-set of journalists working within authoritarian
regimes. Self-censorship took over before censorship and punishment (withdrawal

of accreditation, being shipped back home or excluded from the news pool) were
invoked. In an effort to avoid being punished by lack of access or delay, the
journalists faithfully transmitted news as it was given to them. The commentary for
television footage was carefully worded and the news reports were guarded in their
value judgments. General Norman Schwarzkopf had complete authority over the
media.

The war created an anomalous situation for the media when authority was allowed to
prevail within a democratic press. The media's total dependence on authority for
news and access to news created a situation which was not unlike the authoritarian
press. The fear and the punishment were less severe, yet the results achieved by the
authorities were similar.

The journalists, whose perception of reality was already curtailed by systemic and
individual limitations, now had to contend with situational restrictions imposed by
the war. The reporting which was seen as a consequence bore the hallmarks of
authoritarian press: the volume of reporting did not necessarily reflect a depth of
inquiry.

CHAPTER 4: AUTHORITARIAN PRESS
A reading of the Khaleej Times from January 17 to March 1,1991
4.1 Resources of the Khaleej Times
The Khaleej Times is a broadsheet daily published in English from Dubai. It has
between 24 and 32 pages average everyday, and prides itself on local and
international coverage of events. The Khaleej Times subscribes to the major news
agencies of the world: AP, Reuter, AFP, UPI and eight other regional news services.
It also has rights to use news stories and features from Newsweek, The Wall Street
Journal, AP Dow Jones, The Guardian, The International Herald Tribune, The New
York Times and The Times ofIndia, among others.
The newspaper subscribes to the photo services offered by the major American and
British news agencies, like Reuter and UPI, as well as the local news agency Wam.
There are at least six full-time photographers on the staff based at the centre of
production of the newspaper.
The Khaleej Times also has ten staff reporters based in Dubai, covering various
beats including business.
The four sports sub-editors double up as sports reporters. Other nations of the Arab
region are covered by staff reporters based in Abu Dhabi (UAE's capital city),
Muscat (Oman), Bahrain, Doha (Qatar). There are no staff reporters in Saudi Arabia,
which is strategically an important region, but not a major circulation region for the
newspaper.

From the newspaper's financial management point of view, basing reporters in Saudi
Arabia would not yield results commensurate with cost. The nation is well-serviced
by its own English language newspapers. Circulating newspapers originating from
outside Saudi Arabia is fraught with difficulties as well, given the nation's relatively
stricter controls on news flow. The few copies of the Khaleej Times which do reach
Saudi Arabia are often subject to censorship at the hands of the government's clerical
staff dedicated to the purpose.
4.2 Working conditions of journalists
The editorial and advertising offices of the Khaleej Times are located in Dubai,
about 10km from the centre of the city, on the Dubai-Abu Dhabi highway. The
printing area is at the back of the editorial office. The factory-like appearance of the
building merges well with the landscape which is dotted with similar buildings,
where expatriate workers are busily engaged in the production of goods ranging
from building products to soft drinks to newspapers. The laws of the country require
employers to provide accommodation, medical facilities at a local hospital, air
tickets to Dubai from the worker's home town and daily transport to the office
during working days. These facilities are accorded to the journalists at the Khaleej
Times, though at varying degrees of comfort depending on the journalist's position in
the hierarchy and negotiating ability at the time of joining work. Most joumaUsts are
given family visas, which allows the journalist's spouse and children to stay with
them.

Journalists, including reporters, translators, sub-editors, assistant editors, editors of
various sections and correspondents stationed outside the centre of production
number 60. They come mainly from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Great
Britain, Lebanon, Egypt, and Sudan. As is normal practice with all employers, the
Khaleej Times sponsors and provides all employees with their working visas, issued
by the government and without which expatriate workers will not be allowed to
work in the country. The newspaper's administration department also "keeps" the
passports of all workers, including journalists'. (Spouses and children are
"sponsored" by the workers and therefore are not required to hand over their
passports to the company which has sponsored the workers.) As a mark of
identification, all workers are required to carry with them a "labour card" issued by
the government. When an employee goes on leave, the "labour card" is surrendered
to the administration department so that worker's passport could be issued against it.
This enables the employer to ensure that the worker is, at any given time, carrying
either the passport or the labour card, but not both. The reason given to the workers
for withholding their passports is that the government holds the employer liable for
the employee's misdemeanours or criminal offences (if the worker commits the
offence and leaves the country).

The fact that the employer holds the journalist's passport (which is "released" only if
the worker goes abroad on vacation or under special circumstances which require
the passport as a form of identification) alters the equation between the journalist
and the newspaper management. Though it's rarely that the employer would refuse
to "release" the passport when the journalist needs it, the journalist surrenders a vital

piece of identity as soon as he or she starts work and is never in doubt as to the
might of the organisation. Secondly, the union of workers in any form is banned by
law. The journalist in democratic countries, though an individualist while gathering
information and writing a news story, is also a "battler" who fights for workplace
rights through a union. In the absence of a union, negotiations take place on a
one-to-one basis between the employer and the journalist, which results in a
substantial power advantage for the employer.
Having lost the power game right from the start, the journalist starts work in Dubai
without any illusion of power, or idealism to change the order of things. As the
journalist goes out to gather news, he or she encounters the third major inhibiting
force: government censorship of news.
4.3 Authoritarian press
To understand the press in the Arab world, it will be useful to summarise the
geopolitical structure of the oil-producing Arab nations. Generalisations about Arab
society quickly fall into an "OrientaUst" trap, leading to perspectival errors and
stereotypes which reinforce "received wisdom" and traditional scholarship in the
west relating to the Arab world. Statements such as, "There is a high degree of
authoritarianism in the personal make-up of Arabs", are easily made and just as
easily questioned or falsified by readings from within - ie, Arab interpretations of
Arab society.
While it would be advisable to exercise caution in formulating a picture of Arab
politics and society from without, certain obvious statements could be made.

(1) Arab society has undergone a great deal of change since the discovery of oil
brought wealth to the region and the Arabs "jumped from the camel to the Cadillac"
(a common expatriate view of Arab wealth). (2) As part of the changes brought by
wealth and mass scale consumerism, the wealthier Arab nations have been
increasingly exposed to "western" products, from British traffic systems

to

air-conditioners and carpets to cars, mobile phones, televisions and Hollywood
films. (3) The resident population of the wealthier Arab nations has changed, with an
increasing influx of expatriate workers, so much so that in nations like the United
Arab Emirates over 75 per cent of the population consists of expatriates. (4) The
rulers of the oil-producing Arab nations have invested a great deal on western
technology and western goods, including investments in western property market.
This has brought with it a commitment and an endorsement of sorts in western
values, if only to ensure their investments do not result in a loss. The western media
has often mistaken this endorsement as a step taken by the rulers towards western
political ideals, especially towards democracy. (5) Arab rulers have felt the need to
reinforce their Arabness and conmionality of religion as a means of exercising
control over the changes that their wealth has brought. This has meant a "return" to
Islamic values, which has served the rulers to (a) appease fundamentalist reaction
within their countries; (b) fulfil their traditional role, being close to the birthplace of
Islam, as paragons of Islamic values; and (c) reverse to some extent the changes that
threaten to merge the Arab world with the west.

These socio-political changes are by no means complete. They continue to take
place, and what appears through the western media as a unchanging monolith is in

fact a diverse region which is still adapting to new forces of change. Every Arab
nation has coped with and adapted to changes in its own way, producing marked
differences in living conditions for the residents. Saudi Arabia, for instance, has
reinforced Islamic values in the face of changes, forbidding women to be seen in
public without a veil, whereas in the United Arab Emirates, which shares a border
with Saudi Arabia, women are a part of the work force, drive cars and wear clothes
which are appropriate to working women elsewhere in the world. Saudi Arabia
disallows the celebration of non-Islamic religious festivals, whereas in the UAE,
Christian and Hindu expatriates are allowed to worship at temples and churches. The
government attitude to the consumption of alcohol too is vastly different from one
Arab nation to another, varying from the very strict Saudi Arabia to the relatively
liberal UAE and Bahrain.

The media in the Arab world reflects the changes that are sweeping through the
society. The English language newspapers are a relatively new phenomenon in the
Arab world, their inception and growth coinciding with the arrival of expatriate
workers in large numbers from the 1960s. The Khalee] Times was started in 1979.
Its rival, Gulf News, also published from Dubai, was started soon after. Both
newspapers claim to sell around 60,000 copies mainly in the UAE (of which Abu
Dhabi is the capital city and Dubai the chief commercial city), Oman, Qatar and
Bahrain. There are other English language newspapers produced from Abu Dhabi,
Muscat (Oman), Doha (Qatar) and Bahrain, as well as Arabic language newspapers
from these cities.

The Khaleej Times and Gulf News compete vigorously to be the primary English

language newspaper in their circulation areas and claim to be the number one
circulated newspaper. In their effort to compete with each other, they have both seen
a transformation in government media policy. Though the UAE government
continues to exercise media control, particularly in matters relating to local
government, law and order, crime. Islamic traditions and taboos, Israel, oil politics
and Arab heritage, there are no written guidelines. Both newspapers exercise strong
self-censorship and, when in doubt, consult the information ministry. Local news
which is not confirmed by the government is not published. However, the
newspapers continue to wrest new areas of freedom, with precedence alone setting
the guideline. Press freedom is restricted, but for the government as well as for the
newspapers, there is an increasing realisation that greater flow of information is
essential.
Unlike in a democracy, there is no responsibility on either side - the government or
the press - to keep the people informed. On the contrary, at moments of crisis the
government's silence is deafening. At times Hke these, the authoritarian view of the
government towards the media is unmistakable and the vast gulf that exists between
the media under a democratic government and the media in a place like the UAE
becomes cleariy visible to journalists and readers alike. For example, when the
sheikh of Shaijah (an emirate within the UAE) was about to be overthrown, the
newspapers waited for the official version of events. Although an edition of the
Khaleej Times went to the paste-up stage with the unofficial version, it was never
printed. What was printed was an official hand-out rather than a picture of events
that took place. In another instance of government intervention, a news story about

the formation of a political party among expatriates evoked an adverse reaction from
the government when it was published. Since the formation of political parties is
banned, the information ministry was keen to punish the newspaper which reported
on a banned activity. The usual punishment for breaking unpublishable news is a
ban order on the newspaper for a short period of time, from two days up to a week,
resulting in loss of revenue for the newspaper. The newspaper's management, in a
personal meeting with the information ministry, apologised for the error and was let
off with a warning.

In another instance, the federal government of Abu Dhabi objected to an article
written by a school student in the children's magazine of the Khaleej Times. The
offending article said the Arabs still rode camels across the desert. The editor of the
newspaper had to meet the information ministry officials to apologise and point out
that the author of the article was below 10 years of age and could not have known
how the Arabs have become more modem in recent times and how Abu Dhabi is no
longer a desert but a modem city of skyscrapers.

The Middle Eastem governments also routinely censor foreign newspapers coming
into the country, ripping off offending pages, blacking out tourism advertisements
relating to Israel, uncomplimentary references to the rulers of the Middle East,
pictures which show women in revealing costumes, and anything that they wouldn't
have the newspapers in their countries publish. Considering this exercise is carrying
out in every printed publication in every language which is sold in the UAE, Saudi
Arabia and other Middle Eastem countries, one can imagine the gargantuan
governmental effort that goes into censorship of intellectual material. The number of

Staff required to read, assess and black out text in newspapers, magazines and books,
including the small print, on an everyday basis must be considerable.
Instances of intervention are frequent and encounters with the ministry of
information have enforced a strong tendency to self-censorship among the
journalists working in the newspapers of Dubai. Though copy is not often submitted
prior to publication for clearance from the authorities, the onus of publication rests
on the newspaper and mistakes could lead to a temporary closure of the newspaper.
Journalists are used to the practice of erring on the safe side and wording their
reports on the side of caution.
4.4 The Gulf War parallel
The military management of news during the Gulf War was, for the journalists of the
Khaleej Times, an extension of everyday life. The procedural paperwork to get the
working visas in the war zone in Saudi Arabia was not new. Though the submission
of copy for clearance by the military was new, it was merely an extension of routine
self-censorship exercised by the Khaleej Times. In fact, official censorship and
clearance of copy made the process easier.
For journalists from the democratic press, the management of news was a frustrating
experience. But it brought their level of working on par with the daily experience of
journalism in the Middle East. When the publishers from the major US media
negotiated with Saudi Arabia for more visas for journalists at the beginning of war,
their experience had a direct parallel in the frequent bargaining for more freedom "to
get away with it" that Middle East newspaper editors do with the information

ministry authorities. Saudi Arabian style of restricting the flow of news during the
war turned out to be a great leveller, reducing the democratic press as well as the
authoritarian press to a common platform of negotiating for the journalist's right to
print what was seen and heard.

Saudi Arabian and UAE style of censoring text and pictures being sent by journalists
from the war zone must have been an appealing option for the Allied forces in their
effort to "manage" the flow of news. The Middle Eastern precedent in censoring
news flow was an example whose success was proven, and although the western
journalists were appalled by the thoroughness with which the military minders from
democratic countries adopted the authoritarian practice, its effectiveness could not
have been in doubt. The Middle Eastern newspapers were living proofs that
journalism could be allowed to flourish while the authorities still maintained a strict
control over what was published.

4.5 News sources of the Khaleej Times

The Khaleej Times relied mainly on news agency reports for its coverage of the Gulf
War. Several stories, especially lead stories on Page 1 were credited to "Agencies",
indicating they were compiled from various agency reports. Major reports,
emanating from various places, were put together by the desk, sourcing them within
the copy. Colour pieces - human interest stories and descriptive stories giving
sidehghts - were also mainly from the news agencies. Some colour pieces were
contributed by staff reporters who attended media briefings in Saudi Arabia or
visited air bases "somewhere in the Arabian desert" (venue was concealed for

security reasons).

Staff reporters did not provide hard news stories which could be used as a lead story
on Page 1. Nor were staff reporters able to provide any ground-breaking stories on
local government reaction. This could be because there was no official word on the
war from the rulers of the UAE. Staff reporters joined the US news media pool three
days after the outbreak of war. The first staff report carrying a byline (also
announcing "US Pool" below the reporter's name, in a separate line) from the war
zone appeared on January 20. Reports filed on later days of the war from Saudi
Arabia (or "somewhere in the Arabian desert") at times carried a source line, "US
Media Pool", to indicate the local reporters of the UAE were in the thick of media
action. These reports were, however, not many in number, averaging less than one
per day during the 43 days of the war.

Staff reporters of the Khaleej Times visiting air bases were allowed to talk to pilots
returning from sorties and file "reaction" stories, witness mid-air refuelling
operations, file stories from minesweepers, get details on military hardware like
missiles, planes and tanks. Within Dubai, they reported on the possible effects of oil
slicks and government plans to combat them in a worst-case scenario, health risks to
residents in the Gulf emanating from living close to the war zone, the reaction of
residents to the news of war breaking out, and their hopes of swift and victorious
end (for the Allied forces). Staff reporters also filed stories on war effects on
shipping and trade.

4.6 Experts and editorials
Articles from non-joumalist special sources were not as many as one would expect
for an event so close home to the newspaper. A special article bylined Douglas
Hurd, British Foreign Secretary, with a strap line announcing "Special to Khaleej
Times", appeared on January 18. The article pleaded the case for war, and appeared
among news stories.
In the issue dated February 15, Lt Col Pushpinder Singh (Retd) assumed the role of
armchair war expert and described "the scene about to unfold", predicting the course
of impending land war. Nearly four weeks into the war, this was about the time that
speculation about the duration and course of war had engaged the attention of the
media, which had by now found the initial appeal of war news waning. Lt Col
Pushpinder Singh predicted an amphibious attack on Kuwait, an event which was
widely predicted by war analysts but which never took place. It was later believed to
be disinformation fed to the media to preserve the element of surprise in the land
attack that followed.
News agencies provided the bulk of the anal5^ical articles which appeared in the
Khaleej Times during this period, many of these articles appearing with bylines as
well as with agency credit lines. Obviously this is a practice more observed in
newspapers which suffer from paucity of resources. There were no staff-written
backgrounders or analytical articles on the tactics of war or the management of war
information by the media minders on either side of the battle. The staff reporters
were, by all indications, more inclined to perform the simple task of news gathering

rather than provide perspectives.

Perspective articles which appeared on the editorial page or other news pages as
distinct features (with blurbs, bylines and feature article headlines) were largely on
the efficacy of military hardware employed by the two opponents. They also dealt
with the tactical manoeuvres of war as it appeared evident from the progress of war.
None of the articles delved into areas beyond the immediate drama which was
unfolding a few hundred kilometres from Dubai.

The staff editorial writers seemed to have forsaken, either for convenience or for
sparing the expense of intellectual exercise, two things which would have proved
invaluable assets to any journalist working far away from the constraints of the
allied news pools: foresight and hindsight. At the best of times, writing editorials in
the Khaleej Times is a tightrope walk in fleshing out the obvious. Since a critique of
the national or local government policies was not an option (however, it was
possible to applaud or even highly commend them whenever the government openly
stated them and this option was often exercised by the editorial writer), there was
often a tendency among the editorial writers to look for developments in Europe,
America, the Indian sub-continent or the Far East which could be commented on or
criticised.

However, it would be too dismissive to assume the editorial writer wasn't an expert
of sorts on Middle East affairs. Often, on key issues the governments of oil
producing nations choose not to spell out a clear response. Official poHcy is a matter
of conjecture at these times. Yet it would be a faux pas to make assumptions. The

pauses of the government do not make a statement of policy. It is the editorial
writer's job to observe the cadences of government orientation, the minute gestures
made by government officials and make an appropriate noise of approval or subdued
disapproval of foreign governments which interact with the government of the UAE.
At times a photograph of a visit by a foreign dignitary could be issued by the
government news agency and it could portend a policy shift, but then again
assumptions are unwarranted.
The oil producing governments of the Middle East, which depend a great deal on
western technological assistance for oil exploration and drilling and for the defence
of their territories, do not always respond to Arab nationalist fervour on the role of
western governments in Middle Eastern affairs. They have always maintained an
ambiguous stance towards the west as well as towards the fundamentalist Islamic
advocates among the Arabs.
The oil producing Middle East nations, which look up to Saudi Arabia as a patriarch
on policy matters, respond to situations with less consistency than pragmatism. Their
attitude to Israel (which, until the late 1980s, was referred to in the Khaleej Times in
officially correct terms as the "Zionist entity") and Iraq, for instance, have often
shown a marked divergence from a pan-Arab stance.
Saddam Hussein's tactic of attacking Israel and linking the Palestinian question to
the invasion of Kuwait did not provoke a predicted response from the oil producing
Arab nations. It was one of those times when Saudi Arabia and the UAE decided to
"pause" and respond with the ambiguity of silence. The editorial in the Khaleej

Times dated January 21, 1991, the day after Iraq launched a Scud missile attack on
Israel, seemed to chide Saddam Hussein for "thoughtless policies". Headlined,
"Does it serve the Arab cause?", the editorial argues: "Does it serve the Palestinian
movement or the Arab to strengthen Israel's military apparatus? The question is
prompted by the dramatic reinforcement of the Zionist war machine with Patriot
missiles as a direct result of Iraq's thoughtless policies." The morality of the attack
on Israel was never questioned, only the consequences which it led to.

For the rulers of the Gulf as well as for the media, the war posed a problem of
identifying the forces of evil from the forces of good. The good and the bad seemed
to have got mixed up. The traditional forces of "evil", with whom the Arabs have
waged war over land rights and religious hegemony, have been Israel (land rights),
Iran (religion) and western cultural influence (religion and culture). Yet in the Gulf
War of 1991, one of "their own", Iraq (a Sunni Muslim state), was the enemy and a
US-led alliance represented the "good". Israel, being a friend of a friend, was in the
shadows, and was imphcitly on the side of the "good". Iraq's transgression into
Kuwait was a direct threat to the ruling class of the oil-producing states. Their right
to rule had to be defended without any arguments being put forward in their defence.

Indeed such arguments would be highly questionable, considering the example of
the Shah of Iran and the opposition brewing in many of the Arab states among the
elite who accuse the sheikhs of self-interest and the pursuit of anti-Islamic
indulgences in their private lives. The rulers of the oil-producing nations did not
present a logical explanation in support of their stance in the war. Their air bases
were open to the Allied forces and their citizens were mobilised to support the

Allied forces, yet the only rhetoric of war came from the United States - from
President George Bush - and not from the sheikhs, who were content to echo his line
that it was time to punish the aggressor and right the wrongs.
In such a situation, the editorial writers of Middle East newspapers like the Khaleej
Times had a delicate task to perform. The logic of war rested with the United States,
but the involvement of the oil-producing nations of the Gulf was clear, though
undeclared. It would be unwise to state the obvious reason that the rulers of the UAE
had a personal stake in controlling the oil and in intending to perpetuate their rule.
Saddam Hussein had in fact pointed out that Kuwait and the UAE were the chief
offenders in undercutting the price of oil through the blackmarket. Like Saudi
Arabia, the UAE had all through the Iran-Iraq war tacitly supported Iraq and it
would be difficult to adduce sufficient power to the task of blaming Iraq as the
villain.
The obvious course of action was to blame Saddam Hussein personally for initiating
the war. This was the tack that George Bush pursued and it was a convenient path to
follow for the opinion columnists of the Khaleej Times. On March 1, 1991, as the
land war came to a close, the editorial in the Khaleej Times said:
Kuwait is liberated. The rule of law won. That it was imposed through
violence is testimony to the rigidity and myopia of one man.
A second editorial, published on another page, exonerated the people of Iraq while
blaming Saddam Hussein alone for the war:
The Allied force had a definitive cause to fight for, the cause of Kuwait's
sovereignty and independence, the cause of international law, the cause
of the United Nations. The Iraqi military had no such cause to struggle

for. Most of its soldiers did not agree with the political leadership's
decision to grab Kuwait. They knew it did not belong to Iraq. They did
not want to combat fellow Arabs for the sake of Saddam's ego and
ambition. All the dictator's rhetoric and repression failed to force them to
fight, while the legitimacy of the Coalition's mission spurred on the
Allied troops to hit the invader and crush the aggression. It's simply a
victory of a just cause over an evil plot. And Saddam alone is
responsible for Iraq's humiliation.

Citing Saddam Hussein's actions as the rationale of war was the basis of editorials in
the Khaleej Times throughout the period of war. It saved the newspaper the trouble
of explaining the intricate history of Gulf politics to the mainly expatriate population
which comprises the readership of the Khaleej Times. Not only was a historical
perspective a rarity in the media, it was also superfluous considering the temporary
nature of the Khaleej Times readers' interests in the region.
On 23 January 1991, the Khaleej Times editorial stated:
He (Saddam Hussein) has all along given the impression of being one
who acts even more viciously in frustration, like deciding to use the
POWs as "human shields" in blatant violation of the Geneva
Conventions. Saddam will continue to play the Israel, Vietnam and
hostage cards in his bid not only to divide the anti-Iraq partners but also
to manipulate public opinion in America, West Europe and the Arab and
Islamic worlds.

It is a matter of conjecture whether Saddam Hussein knew of his influence on public
opinion in America, Europe and the rest of the worid. It is quite possible he did,
because five years after the war, in 1996, Saddam Hussein continues to make
headlines, whereas his antagonists, including George Bush, are nowhere in the
picture.

The editorial in the Khaleej Times dated February 3 justified military censorship:
There should be no surprise at independent revelations that censorship
by both sides is suppressing the full horror of the war between the Allies

and Iraq. Various factors compel commanders and governments to give
out as little as necessary, and the usual argument about freedom of the
Press or expression cannot be pressed by anyone.

For a newspaper which has learnt to survive in a restrictive atmosphere, the rationale
for censorship seemed to be close at hand.

4.7 Choice of stories, layout, headlines and visuals

The Khaleej Times showed great diversity in the choice of news stories during the
Gulf war of 1991. Consistent with the composition of its mainly expatriate
readership, the newspaper consistently reported the stance of several Asian and
European countries towards the war. Apart from leading players in the war like the
US, UK, and France, notable among the nations whose views and decisions on the
conflict got regular space in the paper were Russia, Pakistan and India. Other nations
like the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Turkey, Iran, Italy got noticeable
coverage as well.

Dubai's government-owned television station broadcast CNN's "live" coverage of
the war, and it opened the floodgates for the more conservative print media. The
Khaleej Times published a range of articles which would, in the normal course of
events, have been subject to self-censorship. These included the "give peace a
chance" statements from Iran, India, the Vatican and Russia. Russia's initiatives to
bring Iraq to the discussion table received good play, as did Iran's peace plan. India's
neutral stance was reported, but the pro-Iraq demonstrations in Asian countries like
Pakistan were dismissed in reports quoting officials as minor events which had little
popular support. Iranian views were prominently displayed, particulariy President

Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's offer to talk to Saddam Hussein (reported in the
Khaleej Times on February 5), which was spread across seven columns. But the
headline dwelled on White House response: "White House cool to Iran's peace
initiative".

The Khaleej Times devoted at least five broadsheet pages on most days to the
coverage of war. The display of stories was impressive and stories were organised to
give priority to diversity. Stories emanated from a wide range of countries, as was
evident from the datelines. The source of news was a limiting factor, with Reuter,
DP A, AFP and AP providing most of the hard news stories. Feature stories, when
they were not commissioned locally, were supplied by feature agencies, such as
Compass.

Photographs did not, however, show a great deal of diversity, though they were
sufficient in number to add colour and variety to the pages. Photographs were
mostly supplied by Reuter wirephoto, with local photographs accompanying
Dubai-based stories supplied by staff photographers. Photos of local rulers were
supplied by the government news agency. Photographs mostly showed planes and
weaponry. White House officials, George Bush, John Major, leaders of other
nations, Saddam Hussein in aggressive postures, war simulation photographs of
Allied soldiers, or photographs of POWs. Occasionally photos taken from television
broadcasts were also used. There were no photographs of live war action.

4.8 Speculative reports

The lull in news during the last week of January and the early half of February,

before the ground war, saw reports on the Soviet peace plan and speculation on how
the war was likely to end. A number of reports which were published prominently
were obviously quick and convenient articles from news agency reporters based on
insufficient evidence: (1) "After Saddam Iraq may erupt like a volcano" (January 22)
; (2) "Soviets 'spying' on Gulf war" (Jan 22); (3) "For Bush, time factor crucial" (Jan
22): the article predicted Bush would win the domestic election battle if he won a
decisive victory in the Gulf Bush won the Gulf battle but lost the election; (4) "War
debut for US hovercraft" (Jan 22): the report predicted an amphibious attack on
Kuwait's beaches; (5) "Iran fears partition of Iraq" (Jan 24); (6) "Iraq getting arms
via Iran, says dealer" (Jan 27): the AFP report quoted Sarkis Soghanalian, "one of
the world's foremost private arms supplier", as saying Baghdad was receiving
supplies through Iran and that Iraq's war-tested weapons were superior under desert
fighting conditions to the high-tech weaponry used by the United States.

The Khaleej Times did not publish reports from staff "experts" on Middle East
politics and relied mainly on agency reports to give body and bulk to its coverage of
the war. Its local reporters offered no perspective on the war, being content to
witness and report on war machinery being used by the Coalition forces. Its rehance
on western agency reports made it easier to deduce where the speculative nature of
its published reports came from. One of the striking aspects of war reporting as seen
in the Khaleej Times was the number of reports filed by Reuter, AFP and DPA
reporters which proved to be baseless. The agency reports also showed a
disproportionately high dependence on White House officials and US army officials
for the angle of their stories.

4.9 The UAE angle

On January 20, 1991, the most notable report in the Khaleej Times was only three
paragraphs long and got a single column display with the headline: "Full support for
allied moves: UAE". Three full days after the air attack, the UAE government's role
in the war was reported for the first time. The report said:

The UAE government yesterday announced its support for the allied
operations against Iraq to liberate occupied Kuwait.
A responsible source at the foreign ministry said the multinational force
began its operations on Thursday with the aim of enforcing United
Nations resolutions, calling for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and
restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti government under the leadership of
the Amir, His Highness Shaikh Jaber A1 Ahmed A1 Sabah.
"The UAE, out of its firm stand which supports the causes of right and
justice and in line with the will of the international community, affirms
its full support for the moves taken to liberate Kuwait after all peace
efforts failed and the UN (January 15) deadline for Iraq expired," he
said. - Wam.

The Coalition forces had air bases during the war in the UAE. There was panic and
speculation among the residents of the UAE on whether the Iraqi forces would strike
targets within the UAE, since Saddam Hussein had named the UAE as an offender,
which along with Kuwait had deprived Iraq of a legitimate income from its oil. The
UAE's support for Iraq during its war with Iran was widely known and its shock at
the invasion of Kuwait was equally transparent. Yet, the official reaction in the
media was tardy, terse and bordering on near-silence. Having received the news of
official support for the war, the Khaleej Times underplayed it, just as the government
would have wanted it.

An equally terse report announced the local government's position as the war ended.
On March 1, a single column report with a 30 point headline announced: "UAE
backs ceasefire". The report said:
The UAE government yesterday welcomed United States President
George Bush's suspension of fighting between the Coalition and the
Iraqi forces.
An official source at the foreign ministry said the Iraqi acceptance to
abide by all UN Security Council resolutions worked as a firm base for
the ceasefire. The UAE would abide by the contents of Mr Bush's
statement, the source said.
Shaikh Khalifa bin Zayed, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy
Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, last evening contacted
the commander of the UAE Armed Forces units in Kuwait City.
Shaikh Khalifa conveyed the greetings and appreciation of the President,
His Highness Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan A1 Nahyan, His Highness Shaikh
Maktoum bin Rashid, Vice-President and Prime Minister of the UAE
and Ruler of Dubai, and Their Highnesses the Supreme Council
Members and Rulers to the UAE land and air force combat units which
took part with courage and determination in the battle for the liberation
of Kuwait.
"The UAE people, who believe in common destiny and objective, are
proud of their sons who performed their historic duty in the battle for
the liberation of Kuwait, sacrificing their lives and blood in order to
regain the usurped right and uphold intemational legitimacy," Shaikh
Khalifa said.
Shaikh Khalifa gave special salute to the UAE soldiers who were killed
while fighting so that right and justice could prevail.
Meanwhile, Shaikh Zayed donated $500,000 to A1 Maqased A1 Khairieh
hospital in Occupied Jerusalem.
The report, which was possibly a translation from an Arabic press release, once
again was an impersonal understatement. Compared to the hype with which
Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke and his Cabinet colleagues made known their

involvement in the war - which took place at a far greater distance from Australia
than from the UAE - the UAE government's feelings on the war were carefully
understated. Even reading between the lines could not have helped the residents of
the UAE know the mind of the rulers: there weren't enough lines to read between.

On February 15, about midway through the war, a two column five-paragraph
report, headlined "UAE support stressed", constitutes another statement from the
rulers of UAE on their position in the war. The report said:
The President, His Highness Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan A1 Nahyan, has
received a telephone call from Saudi Crown Prince, First Deputy
Premier and Commander of the National Guard Prince Abdullah bin
Abdulaziz. The call focused on the latest developments in the region in
the light of the continued military operations to liberate Kuwait. Shaikh
Zayed stressed the UAE's full backing to Saudi Arabia in confronting the
Iraqi aggression, liberating Kuwait and restoring its legitimate
government under the leadership of the Amir, His Highness Shaikh
Jaber A1 Ahmed A1 Sabah...

Between these statements, the rulers' views were a mystery. There was no news on
the rulers' whereabouts or their sentiments on key issues like the Palestinian
Liberation Organisation's support for Saddam Hussein or Saddam Hussein's own
about-face on his benefactors (Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had donated large sums of
money to Iraq throughout the 1980s).
4.10 Media war
The media's role during the war was widely reported. The Khaleej Times reported on
the media's performance at the warfront prominently and without any effort to
withhold details. An AFP report, published in the Khaleej Times dated January 21,
stated:
Action film released by the military to date, including stomach-churning

shots from the nose camera of a bomber, showed a series of directs hits
on Iraqi targets. No one mentioned any misses.
The unreality of war, as seen on television, was further underscored by
the virtual absence of casualties.

The report mentioned how the television had become the leading force:
"It's no longer the power of the press. It's the power of television that
counts. But television has a greater responsibility than ever before, and
I'm not sure it's ready," a veteran TV producer said.
The report outlined television's errors:
Unfortunately, some of the news proved to be wrong: contrary to
network reports, there were no nerve gas casualties in the missile attack
on Tel Aviv on Thursday night, nor was Israel preparing for immediate
retaliation.
On the face of receding importance of the print media, the report said:
Newspapers were often defensive: Newspapers Getting It Late But
Right," the Washington Post headlined Saturday.
"If the morning papers can't match the drama of Cable News Network
anchor Bernard Shaw describing how he hid under his bed in a Baghdad
hotel room, they can offer a bit of perspective, a historical record..." the
Post said.

4.11 The missing bits

Though the Khaleej Times did not spare its readers the comparative insights into
media performance on the warfront, the "bit of perspective, a historical record" that
Post attributed to the print media was not significant in the Middle East newspaper.
The historical claims of Iraq over Kuwait, the history of Kuwait's ruling family, the
opposition to Kuwait's undemocratic method of electing members of the ruling
family to the cabinet, and the perspective on non-Arab Muslim outlook on the war
(many Muslims in other countries were against western intervention in the Middle
East, arguing the dispute must be settled locally) were missing in the Khaleej Times.

Reports and photographs of peace marches in the west and Australia were noticeably
absent. Compared to The Sydney Morning Herald, which gave the peace marchers
an importance which was, although disproportionate to their numbers, helpful in
presenting another view on the war, the Khaleej Times, being much closer to the
warfront, had no illusion that the peace marches deserved to be publicised.

Perspectival reporting was confined to western viewpoints on the lessons of war
reporting, comparisons with the Vietnam war and desirability of the new world order
which George Bush had ushered into the discourse of war. There was no Arab
perspective on the war, nor an Islamic one. There were reports on the statements
made by Arab leaders criticising Saddam Hussein's efforts to divide Arab opinion
and bring an Islamic angle to the war, but analytical articles from a local perspective
which The Washington Post claimed were the prerogative of the print media were
missing. For instance, what did the new world order mean for the Arab region?
What would be the future of PLO after the war? What could be a possible Arab
attitude towards Saddam Hussein after the war? Were there any lessons for Kuwait's
ruling family from the war? Would Kuwait take a new political direction if the
ruling family returns to power? Were western expectations of democratic values in
the oil producing nations unreasonable? Some of these questions were asked and
answers were suggested from a western point of view, but the Arab viewpoint was
missing.

4.12 From the enemy side

The Gulf war of 1991 was a one-sided war for the media: all the reporters were on

the Coalition side, reporting for newspapers produced in countries backing the
Allies, and drawing their information from Allied sources. The exceptions were the
television and print media reporters who were still in Baghdad, courtesy of Saddam
Hussein. Peter Amett's interview with Saddam Hussein and his reporting on damage
to Iraqi bridges and civilian casualties provided interesting sidelights, which, in
retrospect, indicate the absence of credible reporting from the enemy side. The wide
audience that CNN reporting from Iraq drew was mainly due to the paucity of news
from the "other side". The media's urgent necessity to get to the other side led to, on
the one hand, instances of bravado with journalists setting out across the desert on
their own, and on the other hand, to complaints of censorship and lack of access
during the war. There was considerable media introspection during the war on its
own performance, and an unprecedented feeling of inadequacy about the facilities
provided to the media, despite the fact that the flow of news was uninterrupted. The
media grabbed every opportunity to give an account of how Iraq was faring during
the war, even though the media was handicapped by censorship and propaganda on
both sides. With Iraq, lack of access was compounded by the risk factor: Iraq was
being bombed and it was unsafe for reporters. Iraq's statements on the progress of
war came from western monitoring of Iraqi government-owned media and from
Iraqi officials who spoke on behalf of their government. Assessments of Iraqi losses
or gains in the war also came from Allied officials and mihtary sources and, less
authoritatively, from expatriates returning from Iraq.

The Khaleej Times prominently displayed reports on Iraqi losses, suffering in
Baghdad, and damage to facilities in Iraq. On Feb 6, the lead news on Page 1,

carrying the headline "Iraq running out of fuel", quoted Baghdad Radio as saying the
sale of all fuels had been halted "until further notice". There were no other quotes
from the Iraqi side; the rest of the quotes were from British Group Captain Niall
Irving (who "reported" that one-third of Iraq's key bridges had been destroyed),
General Norman Schwarzkopf (who claimed Saddam Hussein longed for a
"head-on-head, eyeball-to-eyeball, nose-to-nose slugfest"), the Iraqi defence
ministry newspaper (as saying the Iraqi army was waiting for a major land battle to
destroy the armies of Bush and his allies). Major Bob Baltzer of the US air force
(who said the ground offensive would be signalled by the destruction of half of
Iraq's forces from the air), a Saudi Arabian military spokesman (as saying Syrian
soldiers opened fire on Iraqi soldiers for the first time), and US spokesmen from
Saudi Arabia and Washington (claiming 10 Iraqi planes fled to Iran and Iraq was
about to use chemical weapons). The quotes and claims together made up a report the lead report for the day - on "the other side".
Another report on January 23, headlined "Baghdad has been devastated...", quoted
western peace activists returning from Baghdad.
An inside report, published on February 17, gave an AFP reporter's eye-witness
account:
Escorted by Iraqi information officials, this correspondent has travelled
4000 kilometres throughout Iraq during the past two weeks - from the
Jordanian border to Basra, Iraq's second largest city in the south, less
than 60km from the Kuwaiti border. Everywhere the country's
infrastructure appears devastated. Telephone links have been severed,
running water supplies and electricity lines have been cut...
Eye-witness accounts like this one were few. They suffered from a credibility gap:

the reporters obviously saw what their escorts wanted them to see. As with the
Allied accounts, the Iraqi version of war, whenever it was available, was riddled
with propaganda.

4.13 Other states in the region

The Khaleej Times has correspondents in Muscat (Oman's capital), Bahrain and
Doha (Qatar's capital). Their reports kept a finger on the pulse of these nations
during the war, but did not give the rulers' views on the war. Like the rulers of the
UAE, these Arab nations too gave little away officially, leaving it to Saudi Arabia to
be the sole spokesperson in the region. The Khaleej Times had several reports from
Jordan and Syria, two nations whose position in the war was watched with interest
by observers. Jordan's support for Saddam Hussein notwithstanding, Amman was a
favourite vantage point for western observers. The refugees spilling into Jordan, the
popular King Hussein's peace moves even after the beginning of war, the Jordanian
people's stance against the west, and the presence of western journalists ensured
Jordan was in the news. The Khaleej Times reported Jordanian government's moves
almost everyday during the eariier days of war. King Hussein and PLO chairman
Yasser Arafat's call for a ceasefire cast a doubt on every nation which claimed to be
pro-peace. Syria's support for the Allies, despite its enmity with Israel, offered
another counterpoint in the war.

Egypt's pro-Coalition role in the war was reported in the Khaleej Times in detail.
The UAE draws on Egyptian resources for cultural sustenance, with Egyptian
journalists, linguists, translators, and bureaucrats providing essential government

and semi-govemment services in the UAE. Egyptian movies, music, writing and
theatre constitute the staple diet of television and cultural pages of publications in
the Middle East.

Predictably, Hosni Mubarak's contribution to war efforts made headlines. Anthony
Hyman, in an analytical article in the Khaleej Times dated February 21, recounted
the losers and winners of the Gulf War and estimated Egypt stood to gain:
Egypt's economy has gained by the writing off of $14 billion of its
massive foreign debts, and Cairo has received promises of new aid
amounting to billions of dollars. It will continue to benefit because its
help is badly needed by the region's states. With its 36,000 troops, Egypt
is the main Arab contributor to the multinational force and keeping Cairo
satisfied is vital to the Americans and their allies.

4.14 Bush and Saddam

From day one of the war, with his quote, "The liberation of Kuwait has begun" , till
the last day, when he said, "Kuwait is liberated. Iraq's army is defeated. Our military
objectives are met", US President George Bush emerged as the unquestioned leader
of the 43 days of Gulf War, as reported in the Khaleej Times.

As the rulers of the Middle East nations were reluctant to make themselves
accessible to the press, Bush filled their places, speaking with authority, bluster and
confidence on the war. Bush was credited with rallying the US-led Coalition forces
to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Excerpts from his speech at the start of the war
were displayed across six columns with the headline "The battle has been joined:
Bush".

The prominence accorded to Bush was a reward he had earned: Bush identified for

the press the two sides of war, the forces of evil (which he nominated were
personified in Saddam Hussein) and the other the forces of justice (for which banner
he elected himself). Bush added fuel to the process of identification of the hero (the
Coalition) and the villain of the war (Saddam Hussein), and the media took to the
classification with gusto. However, there were moments of clarity in the media,
when the US President's claim to the fruits of victory was analysed closely.

The Khaleej Times followed the media trend in other countries in realistic portrayals
of Bush's role in the war. As early as January 19 - two days into the war - a report
(not credited but presumably from news agencies) headlined "Bush clinches spot in
history" speculated on the personal outcome of the war for Bush. According to the
report:

Some analysts say Bush is no longer a sure thing for re-election in 1992
even if the Gulf War - the fifth large scale war for Americans in this
century - goes well for him...After a few months of a "honeymoon glow"
from a war victory, [University of Virginia professor Larry] Sabato said,
attention would shift to the "much more important issue of the
(domestic) economy, that's the key."

Bush was a leader of the primary contributor to the Coalition, he was accessible and
he had quotes for the media on every occasion. If Bush had chosen to stand for
election in the Middle East, instead of the US, he would have won.

On the contrary, Saddam Hussein was largely inaccessible to the media, his quotes
were few and his whereabouts were secret. Nevertheless, these facets of his
character added stature to the "villain" of the war, and made him a larger-than-hfe
personality. Hussein gained visibility not from a personal appearance but from

speculation. From Bush to General Schwarzkopf to the editorial writer of the
Khaleej Times, everyone was willing to hazard a guess on the thought processes of
the Iraqi President. On January 21, the front page lead report in the Khaleej Times
said:

The general (Schwarzkopf) said he had heard that Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein, who has not been seen in public since Thursday, had
taken refuge away from military targets... He said Saddam "is probably
in a state of semi-shock" wondering what to do next.

On February 3, a report in the Khaleej Times, headlined "Saddam is enemy of
Muslims, Arab world" and bylined Douglas Hurd, British Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, said:
Saddam Hussein thinks he is a clever man. But all he has done is inflict
great damage on the Palestinian cause.

Not only did major world leaders think they knew what Saddam was thinking, he
was a subject on whose character and desirable fate anyone could pass comment and
expect to be reported. A feature article in the Khaleej Times dated Feb 7 reported
comments from Americans of Arab descent. According to the report:

There are few apologists for Saddam Hussein. "This guy has been giving
me nightmares for 12 years," says an Iraqi now living in New York city
whose father was imprisoned and fatally poisoned by Saddam's security
forces. "There is not a single Iraqi who likes Saddam."

A Reuter report in the Khaleej Times dated Feb 13, headlined "Where children wait
for Saddam's death", had this intro:

Three-year-old Abdullah asks his uncle, an officer in the Saudi Arabian
army, whether he has killed Iraqi President Saddam Hussein each time

he telephones from the war front.

Another report, in the Khaleej Times dated Feb 10, headlined, "Saddam support
sinks at home", had this intro:

A British journalist fresh from Baghdad reports that he had seen clear
signs of dissent emerging against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

The reporter was quoted as saying he saw anti-Saddam graifiti in Iraq and heard
people on the streets criticising Saddam.

The more inaccessible Saddam Hussein got, the flimsier became the grounds of
speculation and mind-reading. Reading feelings into a man who was rarely seen and
heard became a habit with the news sources as well as with the media. It would be
hard to tell if the media encouraged it or if the news sourced initiated it.

On Feb 27, a report headlined "Thus ends Saddam's occupation" described the
conclusion of the war:
In a voice thick with emotion the man who strove to become master of
the Arab nation, bowed to the firepower of US-led allies hammering at
the gates of Kuwait City. He announced the end of his iron-fisted,
207-day occupation of the oil country which he had repeatedly vowed
never to leave.

Another report on the same day, headhned "Despair, anger in Jordan", described the
feelings of people who had backed Saddam:

The mood outside the mosque turned ugly when a man told a reporter:
"Saddam has destroyed us. We backed him, but he deserted us. We were
willing to sacrifice our lives, our sons for him, but he deceived us."

4.15 Local reports

The Khaleej Times claims to be an "international" newspaper. The lead news stories
on Page 1 are often foreign news stories. During the Gulf War, though Dubai was
close to the war zone, local stories did not make the lead on Page 1. From a close
reading of the content of the Khaleej Times, there appeared to be two main reasons
for this:

(1) Local reporters did not have access to crucial war news, and they did not have
access to the Cabinet or the rulers of the UAE.

(2) Local authorities, including the rulers of the UAE, wanted a low profile during
the war, and local decisions, like the granting of airbases to the Coalition forces,
were not made accessible to the media.

Local reporters visited Allied bases in Saudi Arabia, in the UAE , in Bahrain and
offshore and wrote "colour pieces": interviews with technicians about the
capabilities of war machinery and with pilots, ground officials and officials on
warships about their predictions on the outcome of raids and battles.

George Abraham, one of the Khaleej Times reporters who covered the war, said his
war reports, though they were datelined "somewhere in the UAE", were from bases
which were not far from Dubai. In an interview with the author of this study, he said:
There was nothing official that Bahrain, UAE and Qatar were providing
bases. Still there were US bases there. There was no official word on it...
There was total US hegemony of operations. No UAE personnel was in
sight at the airbases. Security of airbases was manned not by locals but
by US service personnel. Major movements were all made by the US.

It was an American Coalition, not an Allied Coalition. There was token
presence from the Gulf fighters. The action was almost entirely executed
by the US fighters. Total flying missions undertaken by the Gulf pilots
were less than three per cent. Solo missions were rare. The US played
the key role. The Arab nations like the UAE were bystanders.
The Americans did it, the others rode with them. It was the only practical
way to do it. They followed them like children.
The rulers of the local governments were not quoted even once during
the war. The strength of army and aircraft presence in the UAE was
never disclosed. The ordinary Dubai dweller would hear sonic boom
early in the morning. F-16s were taking off from outside Dubai. About a
hundred F-16s would take off at about the same time and take to the
clouds in seconds. The take-off would be at about 5am and they would
return after 9pm.
During press conferences, there was always an American briefer present
who answered questions. Difficult questions would be referred to
someone else not present in the room. Despite the presence of 15
different people (officials at the press conference), they wouldn't give
you an inch. The copy of the report had to be faxed to them. Location
could not be specified.
There was no differentiation among the media from the different regions.
Reporters from the Gulf were peripheral. The media was taken up by the
total novelty of the experience: gas masks, the possibility of chemical
warfare etc.
The fear felt by the people was not reflected in the paper (the Khaleej
Times). A newspaper run by news experts couldn't judge local (Arab)
thinking. They were obsessed by the fact that over 75 per cent of the
population consisted of expats.
Saudis feared pork (which is taboo in Islam) was being brought in by
Allied presence. And liquor was available. Both these constituted haram
(sin against God).
Jingoism was conspicuously absent, as authorities were unwilling to be quoted. On
February 27, as the war ended, the UAE's role in the war was described in a
six-paragraph report, supplied by the government news agency:
The UAE armed forces played a heroic role in the war to liberate
Kuwait, an official source at the General Command of the Armed Forces
said last evening.

"The UAE contingent has undertaken its obligations and duties fully and
in line with the plans drawn in collaboration with the brotherly and
friendly states taking part in Operation Desert Storm to end Iraq's
occupation of Kuwait," he added.
"Our land and air forces launched a liberation battle in Kuwait's
territories with steadfastness and high efficiency," the source stated.
He pointed out that the UAE Air Force carried out 173 sorties against
the Iraqi invaders so far and was still continuing its missions without any
losses.
The source also pointed out that the UAE land force captured 1370 Iraqi
soldiers, including 15 officers, in ground battles and were evacuated to
rear positions behind the front lines.

4.16 Conclusion

On the plus side, the Khaleej Times scored with a diversity of coverage. It was
comprehensive, covering all nations and viewpoints. It included features, interviews
and hard news stories. Photo coverage was impressive, and the design of the pages
eye-catching. There were a number of colour pieces and sidebar stories to add to
variety. It devoted at least five broadsheet pages everyday to stories on the war,
which dominated the front page on most days. The number of war stories averaged
about 40 everyday during the days under study: from January 17 to March L

On the minus side, the Khaleej Times did not cover local issues adequately. On top
of censorship imposed by the military minders, which affected media coverage
throughout the worid, there was insufficient access to authorities locally. The low
profile adopted by the UAE rulers and officials did not help either. Local reporters
did not have the expertise to gather or interpret hard news of significance.

CHAPTER 5: LIBERTARIAN PRESS
A reading of The Sydney Morning Herald from January 17 to March 1,1991
5.1 Working conditions of journalists
Journalists in The Sydney Morning Herald work with a greater degree of personal
and professional freedom than their counterparts in the Khaleej Times. They are free
to change their employers, participate in unions, air their views through the
newspaper within limits of accepted journalistic standards and observe, report and
criticise the activities of the government. They do not necessarily have to endorse
the policies of their employers or the government.
The Sydney Morning Herald is published in a democratic country with a
democratically elected government. There are few visible restraints imposed by
external authorities on the journalist. The theory of social responsibility enjoins the
journalist to adhere to professionally accepted canons of journalism, which include
fair play, objectivity, good taste, giving a hearing to the other side, and reporting
without comment on socially relevant issues.
Though a journalist's training and education impose "value-added" readings in
reporting, there is a conscious effort to withhold views from news. The attainability
of total objectivity and value-free reporting is questionable: one might argue that
there are systemic biases which are unavoidable. The encoding and decoding of
news events in newspapers is subject to "ideological" readings, with ideologies
"providing the frameworks of understanding through which men interpret, make
sense of, experience and 'live' the material conditions in which they find
themselves". (Hall, 1980, 32)
However, it is generally agreed that the theory of social responsibility is on a higher
evolutionary scale and is a refinement of the other theories: authoritarian, libertarian

and communist. Since it is published under conditions which are freer, The Sydney
Morning Herald has to fulfil a higher expectation, and meet a more stringent
standard of audience gratification before it can claim to have achieved excellence.
Naturally this imposes a more rigorous process of news writing and news selection.
A study of the newspaper will have to consider the fact that acceptable journalism at
The Sydney Morning Herald is at a higher level, and that it has a tradition of
competing for a position among the best newspapers of the world.

On the debit side, the study will have to take into account a location specific: most
newspapers in Australia do not face effective competition, and therefore are not
compelled by market forces to enforce the highest standards. Tl%e Sydney- Morning
Herald is the only broadsheet newspaper focused on Sydney and its suburbs. The
Australian has a more diffused focus and does not address the same market segment.
The Telegraph, being a tabloid, is not in a comparable category of newspapers. It
places a different emphasis on news and therefore creates its own readership. The
absence of relevant competition could lead to a watering down of standards as well
as to a complacency with available resources and performance of journalists. It is
debatable whether The Sydney Morning Herald has succumbed to its position as the
"lonely leader" in its market.

But the safety valve for a democratic press is the self-criticism of the media. The
readers of The Sydney Morning Herald might lack a comparative yardstick with
which to point out its faihngs, but the media's own scrutiny of its shortcomings helps
it evolve constantly. The criticism of the media by politicians is reported in the news
columns, the reports are criticised by the readers in the letters to the editor column,

the systemic failures of the media are pointed out by media observers and
columnists, and the evolution of the media is critically analysed in books and
journals and evaluated by academics in universities, which in turn is reported in the
media. The media's full circle of introspection is a refining process which has a
tempering effect on journalists working in a democratic set-up. The media's
self-analysis, a distinguishing feature of the democratic media, led to a perspectival
shift during the Gulf War of 1991. For the first time, the media produced an
analytically sound critique of "media management" during the war while the
information was still flowing across to the end consumer, and it became an integral
part of the media coverage of the Gulf War itself

The Sydney Morning Herald, in fact, offered an excellent example of the media's
ability to reflect on its performance during a crucial event.

5.2 Local news

Coverage of news related to the impact of war in Australia showed a diversity which
was not in many ways present or possible in overseas reporting on the war. The
decisions of the Cabinet, the Prime Minister's keenness to show Australia's
commitment in the war, the opposition to the war among the politicians, the protest
marches by those supporting peace, the racist attacks on schools, the reaction of
Arab Australians and Jewish organisations in Australia, Australians returning from
Iraq, the soldiers and their famihes, the media coverage of the war, the controversy
over the ABC's use of "Middle East experts" who opposed the war and the
government's threat to withdraw funding for the ABC - these were the main issues

in the local coverage of war-related events.

News from the warfront dominated the war coverage on Page 1. Local news was
mostly relegated to the usual local news pages (Pages 2, 3, 4 or 5), except when
there was picture story which added "colour" to Page 1, like the picture story of a
boy playing war games on computer which appeared on Page 1 on February 12. On
the first day of war, January 17, local news related to war appeared on Page 3. The
"politics" of war - the movements of politicians, their views and debates - was
reported with emphasis on both pro- as well as anti-war perspectives. The
newspaper's coverage from Canberra tempered Prime Minister Bob Hawke's fervour
to join the war against Iraq with the views of politicians who disagreed with him.
The newspaper's correspondent Tony Stephens, writing about the views of MPs who
spoke against the resolution supporting the war, reported on February 23:
(Independent MP Ted Mack) said Saddam Hussein was a thug and a
tyrant but that there should be a cease-fire, at least for a while.
"The vast majority of Australians are not prepared to die for what is
supposedly at stake in Iraq," he said.
"It is unthinkable that any Australian should die for the restoration of the
despotic, obscenely wealthy Sabah family."
Mr Mack said the war was being fought primarily because the area
contained 40 per cent of the world's oil reserves.
"Saddam Hussein is a Frankenstein monster created over the last decade
by the USA, USSR, China, UK, France, Germany and other European
countries (because he was) supplied with billions of dollars of
armaments..."
Saddam Hussein is a monster who is now out of control and must be
stopped by those who created him. Not one Australian should be asked
to die to achieve this purpose."

The report was an example of libertarian press in action. Presenting a point of view
which vehemently opposed the government's would have been unthinkable under
any other system.

For The Sydney Morning Herald, the war was a distant phenomenon, enveloped in
American political perspectives interpreted largely by the American media. The
media around the world was exposed to various aspects of the war, such as the
politics of oil, the religious and political facets of sheikhdoms and totalitarian
"republics" like Iraq, the taboos, traditions and regional differences in the practice of
Islam, and the "justice" of countering Iraqi aggression with the combined might of a
number of countries. But the rhetoric of "Vietnam Syndrome" and "new worid
order" was gathering momentum from the White House. The easiest option available
to world media was one of capitulation to the interpretations of war imposed by the
US. It was also the most overwhelming option, considering the US media's volume,
reach and economic input in covering the war.

Even though The Sydney Morning Herald had its own correspondents in the Middle
East and the US covering the developments in the war, the news sources were
largely American and the perspectives were inevitably trans-Atlantic. In the midst of
this largely US-directed din of war, the newspapers and the television networks in
countries outside the US had to deploy their resources to add local colour to the
coverage of war.

For the newspaper, local events connected to the war provided sufficient access to
make this task easier. Besides, the events had significant "prominence" and

"consequence" - important news values deciding the choice of news stories - to merit
good coverage. Apart from the discussion of war generated by Prime Minister Bob
Hawke and the cabinet of ministers and the voices of dissent in pariiaments at the
Federal and State levels, there were other voices in the community which were
heard. There were also other events which took place as a result of the war, like the
reaction against the Arab community and peace marches in the cities. An important
development which helped gauge media performance and set the process of media
introspection in motion was the controversy over the Australian Broadcasting
Corporation's use of media experts who were allegedly sympathetic to Iraq or
opposed to war efforts.

All of these national "events" were prominently displayed in the paper. They gave a
local colour to the newspaper's coverage of the war and set the newspaper free, to
some extent, of its dependence on the American perspective emanating from the
White House and Saudi Arabia.

Independent of the television's use of "Middle East experts", The Sydney Morning
Herald drew on the strength of commentators. On January 21, a report in the Gulf
War wraparound in the newspaper provided an example of the non-American
perspective on war.

Quoting Dr Ahmad Shboul, associate professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies at
Sydney University, the report, headlined "Australians have been duped about war,
says Arab expert", said:

Dr Shboul says the Australian media has largely failed to address such
issues, possibly because it reflects "the American way of seeing things".
"Supposing suddenly we switch off all our communication with the
United States, what are we left with in terms of news?" he asks.
Dr Shboul says that not only will the war fail to solve the region's
conflicts, it will exacerbate them,
"I have been saying all along, as have many other observers, that the age
of victory by external powers in the Middle East is over," he says. "It
will backfire. If the Americans win militarily, they are going to lose in
the Arab world politically."
"Saddam Hussein appeals to a certain current in Arab political culture
that is angry about Western manipulation in the Arab world, about the
perceived blind American support to Israeli occupation of Arab lands,
about the denial of political rights for Palestinians, and about the
exploitation of Arab oil wealth."

The expression of points of view contrary to the rationale for war was clearly visible
in the newspaper's coverage of the war.

On January 23, Stewart West, MP, argued against the involvement of Australian
forces in the war in an article published on the op-ed page.

In the face of an increasingly racist community response, Australians of Arab
descent, particulariy the Muslims, were under pressure to make themselves
understood. The newspaper's reports, like the one headlined, "Just Aussies, right or
wrong..." (February 2), tried to fill the information vacuum:
There are more than 100 Arab organisations in and around Sydney,
many based on welfare clubs. Their positions on the Gulf differ from
one organisation to the next and even within individual groups. That is
not to say there are any more differences within the Arab community
over the Gulf than there are among Australians of other backgrounds...
At a religious level, there are differences between fundamental Muslims,
led by Sheikh Hilaly, and the non-fundamentalists, like those
represented by the Federation of Islamic Societies. Mr Ibrahim Attalla,

federation president, said before the US-led attack on Iraq: "Saddam is
ruining the image of Islam and it's hurting. Muslims know that the Ba'ath
Party has nothing to do with Islam."
Individually, there are Arabs who support Saddam's invasion and there
are Egyptians who support their country's stance with the US-led
Coalition and Egyptians who don't.
There is Mr Marsel Philip, of the Union of Iraqi Democrats, who hoped
Saddam would consider accepting the United Nations resolution to leave
Kuwait and said: "There is no argument. Our loyalties are to Australia."

The report was explaining a complex set of attitudes prevailing among a group of
migrants. The complexity arose mainly from religious, regional and ethnic
differences among the migrants supposedly originating from a non-descript
geographic location, "the Middle East". The issues were analysed clearly and
non-academically, with the possible intention of effecting a change of perception in
society about this group.

On February 25, a report, headlined, "Australian Muslims alarmed by offensive",
said:
Muslims approached by the Herald at a Sydney mosque yesterday were
at first afraid to voice their opposition to the ground war. They were
worried they would be misrepresented and that victimisation would
follow anything they said...
"We have been against the invasion of Kuwait, but now we find the
Americans are not interested in peace, that they intend to destroy the
Iraqi Army and Iraq", said the managing editor of The Muslim Times
newspaper, Mr Ziaul Islam Ahmad.

The report, which appeared on Page 2, was an "inset" story within a
Canberra-datelined report, which said Prime Minister Bob Hawke "strongly backed
the US-led Coalition's decision to launch a ground attack on Iraq's forces in Kuwait
and gave short shrift to suggestions that the Soviet-sponsored peace talks should

have been given more time."
Next to these two reports, the main picture story of the page showed a photograph
of Buddhist monks in Sydney praying for peace and reported:
The power of prayer radiated around Sydney as rehgious groups came to
terms with the escalation of the Gulf War. About 60 Buddhists gathered
in Victoria Park in the morning to meditate for peace...
The reports on the page exemplified the diversity of local coverage on war-related
developments that The Sydney Morning Herald showed in its coverage.
5.3 The ABC controversy
A local issue that assumed significance during the war related to the media coverage
of the war. As in the US and elsewhere, the media turned its gaze, in the absence of
major war scoops, on itself and reflected unforgivingly on its own performance.
While the news agencies and reporters from the warfront reported on how the media
briefings were conducted and how restrictive the information management was, the
television stations and newspapers became more "media sensitive" during the
conduct of the war. (Normally this is an exercise that the media indulges in after a
war is over.)
Australia's support for the US-led Coalition forces was a fait accompli, as the
government had long been rationalising its decision to join the forces of "good"
against the "evil" aggressor. President George Bush's rhetoric of war was echoed by
several other leaders of the Coalition nations, Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke

being the most noticeable in the Pacific region. A show of objectivity by the media
would invariably involve airing opinions which counterbalanced those of the
government, and particularly those which were so volubly expressed by the prime
minister. The ABC and the SBS (ironically, both were government-funded)
broadcast the opinions of "experts" which were at variance with the "establishment",
among them the views of Prof Robert Springborg and Dr Ahmad Shboul.

The TV and radio stations' efforts to present "an equal and opposite point of view" to
the government's were met with a strident response from the government as well as
from the "pro-war" media commentators. The print media was the vehicle for this
response.

On January 22, five days into the war, Gerard Henderson wrote in his column in the
paper, headlined, "For 8c a day, all the bias you can take":

Whatever the ABC might imply, Robert Springborg is not an
uncommitted, impartial observer on the Gulf and the Middle East.
As Dr Springborg himself recently conceded in a letter to The Age, he
was secretary of the Australian Iraq Friendship Association from the late
1970s until about 1984. Moreover, during the Iraq-Iran war, he visited
the front ~ from the Iraqi side.
Within an hour of the initial allied strike against Iraq, Dr Springborg
appeared on ABC Radio News condemning President Bush's action.
Some months eariier he had been even more critical of the decision of
the Australian Government to commit naval forces to the blockade of
Iraq. He accused the Prime Minister of "racism" and made the
extraordinary suggestion that Australia was "every bit as much of a
one-man show" as Iraq.
Dr Springborg has every right to take a public stance on issues of the day
and to have his views reported. But it is wrong for the ABC to present
him as an uncommitted expert whose views are of such moment that he
deserves to be heard on the ABC airwaves every morning, every night

and frequently during the day.
The same principle should apply to Dr Shboul, who is on record as
having described as "rash" the Australian Government's decision to send
frigates to the Gulf and who has accused United States forces (which
were invited into Saudi Arabia and are now fighting alongside the
Saudis) as "occupying" part of the Arab world.

David Hill, the managing director of ABC, replied to Gerard Henderson's article in
the newspaper on January 24 in an article headlined, "ABC chief detects substantial
beam in Henderson's blinkered eye". The article stated:
The ABC is not subject to censorship. It has a long tradition of
independent reporting that does not simply disseminate official opinion.
The corporation has attempted to report all sides of the current conflict
and from all points of view through the national television service and
through all ABC radio networks.
...The facts do not support this charge of a biased presentation of views.
The ABC has called upon hundreds of experts, analysts, and academics
and has interviewed politicians, community leaders and people in the
street. The guest list for programs runs into many scores of names and
on any fair analysis represents the spread of opinion across the nation.
Despite Mr Hill's spirited defence of the ABC's diversity of coverage of
the war, the Federal government was keen to communicate its
displeasure to the television station's management, with the implication
that funding could be cut as a "punishment" for its continued
belligerence.
Mr Hawke was critical of commentaries by Dr Springborg on ABC television,
particulariy as Dr Springborg had earlier criticised the Prime Minister and "attacked
his decision to send frigates to the Gulf.
The breakdown in relations between the Government and the ABC could
not come at a worse time for the corporation with its three-year funding
agreement due for renegotiation over the next few months and with the
term of five out of nine directors, including (ABC chairman) Mr (Bob)
Somervaille and Mr Hill (who is appointed by the board), up for renewal
in the next seven months. (ABC under scrutiny again after Hawke blast,
February 1, The Sydney Morning Herald)

The tone of threat and pressure to apply self-censorship in the interests of
self-preservation was unmistakable. The ABC controversy continued well beyond
the war with the government continuing to echo its misgivings, and the supporters of
the ABC (few of whom showed unqualified support) keeping the debate alive. On
March 1, the newspaper's columnist Peter Smark said:
...But pluralism of views is essential for the ABC. And it's not enough to
have a variety of views on separate programs: the ABC must have
pluralism on the same program. That's a point of view which seems
increasingly popular. It's not one I adhere to. The main problem I had
with Dr Robert Springborg in the early ABC Gulf coverage is that he
was sitting in a seat which should have been occupied by an ABC staffer.

Apart from the media's navel-gazing - an important ingredient of a socially
responsible press - the ABC controversy focused on a typical conflict situation in a
free press: the tussle between the government and the media for information control.
While the government was at pains to deny censorship was the issue, the media was
eager to withhold acerbic commentary on government statements, considering the
state was at war and critical viewpoints would be deemed "unpatriotic". The
freedom to criticise the government at a crisis point was what the ABC had
exercised, and the media did not press its rights further, spending its energies instead
on how this freedom could be used "responsibly", i.e. with self-imposed regulations
on it.
5.4 Censorship, propaganda and media reaction
Censorship was discussed on a global level during the war and The Sydney Morning
Herald presented its own version of discussion on the issue. The ABC controversy
touched on the issue, though the focus was more on a balanced coverage. The
government efforts to ensure a favourable coverage were construed as attempted

censorship, but the real issue was the censorship of news from the news
management team at the warfront. News was vetted at source, and, while the flow of
news was maintained, there was an "explanation" offered to the public about the
way news was being regulated. It is questionable whether the audience was indeed
perturbed by the management of news, since the newspapers and the television
networks had enough fresh outbreaks of news everyday to keep the audience interest
in Allied progress alive. The issue of audience reaction is beyond the scope of a
qualitative reading of the content of media, though it is not beyond the realms of
reasonable assumptions.

"Censorship" was a topic of news reporting for the news agencies as well as the
special correspondents of newspapers. Propaganda - the dissemination of favourable
"news" - is part of the conduct of war and the Gulf War of 1991 was no exception.
Both censorship and propaganda are conscious exercises on the part of authorities to
limit and direct the flow of information to the masses. The assumption of the
military authorities is that the media is a handy tool and an unthinking conduit for a
selective dissemination of information, and in a sense, also "partners" of a kind in
the process of propaganda. The media did not seriously thwart these assumptions. In
fact, the means by which these assumptions were translated into reality - through an
effective control of access to news and through a process of verification of news
which delayed its transmission - left little room for the media to chart an
independent course of action. The process of managing the news which was put in
place during the Grenada and Panama exercises was institutionalised. To add to
media control exercised by the authorities, it is reasonable to assume there was

self-censorship on the part of media enterprises and on the part of individual
journalists. The extent of self-censorship cannot be determined except where
declared by the journalists in their books on the war. It is certainly an arguable point
on the evidence of what was published during the war, and not clearly visible as a
role-player in the news process during the war.

However, what is visible is the extent of introspection the media indulged in during
the war as an aside to the coverage of events on the warfront. The quality of news
that was fed to them was, for the first time, a topic of discussion during the 1991 war
even while the information was being handed out.

The Vietnam Syndrome, which George Bush referred to as the war began, related to
the way the media behaved during that war. The widely held perception in the White
House was that the media had "lost" the Vietnam war for America, victory and
defeat being aspects of perception, which the media "manipulated". In sheer number
terms, the strength was on the side of the Allied forces (the combined might of so
many nations aligned to liberate a small nation) and victory was never in doubt. But
the cost of war was debatable while the war was being waged. The cost in terms of
human lives and in terms of money, resources and time was a source of obfuscation
and speculation and was seen as one of the ingredients that could alter the way the
war victory would be interpreted. Consequently, the cost of war was one of the
subjects of both censorship and propaganda.

The media tackled censorship and propaganda in two ways, first by exposing the
tactics of media management during the war as and when they encountered them,

and second, by building a theme of "truth and lies" around the questions which
remained unanswered. It must be mentioned the theme was more strenuously
applied to Iraq than to the Allied forces, if only because there was no access to any
alternative sources of information as far as the Coalition was concerned.

On Feb 23, Tony Walker writing in The Sydney Morning Herald (article headlined
"Don't ask too many questions about 'fight for freedom' "), summed up the
censorship debate:

Colonel David Hackworth, the US's most decorated living warrior, who
has been reporting the war for Newsweek magazine, says that restraints
on reporters not only stifle the flow of information but also increase risks
for joumahsts in the field who try to do their job outside
officially-designated combat pools.
"The Americans say they are fighting for freedom," observed Colonel
Hackworth, who has lived in Australia for the past 20 years, "but the
very basis of America is the freedom of the press, and that's being
violated here."
Mr Nicholas Horrock, a veteran correspondent of the Chicago Tribune
and the man designated by his colleagues as the 'pool co-ordinator' for
US reporters in Saudi Arabia, describes restrictions on access for
newspapermen as "the most serious defeat for the American print media
I've ever seen."
The Pentagon-managed media circus in Saudi Arabia is a product of the
now mythical belief that is was not miscalculation and stupidity that lost
Vietnam, but the diabolical machinations of a non-patriotic press who
turned the US public against the war.
Taking their cue from the British Ministry of Defence, which
successfully orchestrated favourable press coverage of the Falklands
War in 1982, the Americans, by trial and error, have evolved a highly
restrictive system of media management.
The Pentagon applied the 'closed-shop' pool system to manage coverage
of Grenada and Panama as dress rehearsals for the war in the Gulf And
it has further compounded problems for print journalists by weighting
membership of'combat pools' towards the electronic media which, by its

very nature, is less critical and analytical than print.
Add to this an overlay of military 'public affairs officers'...whose job it is
to 'baby-sit' pool correspondents, and you have a recipe for sterile and
managed war coverage.

Tony Walker's report was an indictment of the newly evolving practice of media
management, which to the chagrin of journalists, worked so well during the Gulf
War. It was a war that effectively exorcised the bad memories of the media coverage
of the Vietnam War. The report also stated:
There was another problem, he (Colonel Hackworth) says, and that is
that a number of correspondents actually believe they've joined the
Army. Dressed in flak-jackets, helmets and other military paraphernalia,
they have become almost indistinguishable from the men of the combat
units to which they are attached.
The 'thought police' from the JIB (Joint Information Bureau) and the
MOD (Ministry of Defence ) approvingly refer to this process as
'bonding'.
The clarity with which the media's tethered predicament was analysed in this report,
published while the war was still being waged and far from being won, indicates the
timely use of one of the few privileges still available to the media in the democratic
world: enlightened introspection.

Viewed from the other side, Iraqi propaganda - the Iraqi government's media
management - appeared axiomatic. To the media reporting from the Allied side of
war, it was only natural that Saddam Hussein would "control" his media at least as
much as the Allied military forces "managed" their media. Propaganda was a natural
extension of the censorship apparatus. It was the "letting go of disinformation" side
of the "denial of information" process.

On Jan 21, a report, headlined "It's 12 o'clock, and here are the Hes", from The

Washington Post reproduced in The Sydney Morning Herald, said:
Israeli forces, disguised as Americans, are part of the multinational force
fighting Iraq. The Pentagon has sent thousands of Egyptian women to
the Gulf to serve as prostitutes for US soldiers and sailors. US forces
have been dumping nuclear waste in the Saudi desert. All of these
"facts" have come from Baghdad since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. US
officials say that since Wednesday the government of Saddam Hussein
has accelerated its disinformation campaign planting false reports picked
up by news media outlets throughout the Islamic world, especially
Pakistan, Algeria, Syria, Egypt, Yemen and, of course, in Iraq. Other
"facts" put out by Western sources seemed more believable, but were
proven incorrect: 10 Iraqi jets downed in dogfights early on; 50 Iraqi
tanks and crews defected to Egyptian troops; and the "defection" of six
Iraqi helicopters even before the war began.
In war, distilling truth amid the confusions, distortions and deliberate
lies is always difficult...
The report suggested the profusion of "lies" at wartime could be worsened by a
"24-hour-a-day demand for answers by competing networks and newspapers, a
competition that increases the likelihood that some of the news reaching the public is
not thoroughly checked".
From the beginning of war to the very end, media monitoring of the quality of news
was a constant factor, even though the newspapers and the television networks did
not hold back their quest for news to feed the consumers. Nor did they show any
evidence of having subjected news, as it arrived in their hands, to the verifiability
test which is normally applied. Though it was apparent to the joumalists that the
authorities whom they quoted as reliable were the source of propaganda and
censorship, news which was deemed questionable was not held back. Dubious
statistics and quotes which seemed stage-managed and reports which came from
sources whose stake in propaganda was high found their way to the consumers.

Apparently, the "demand for answers" was being overtaken by the demand for
anything that had the verisimilitude of news.

Hard news stories rarely questioned the news sources, and front page stories were
often pool stories which emanated from news sources (the Pentagon, General
Schwarzkopf, General Colin Powell, the Iraqi television quoting Saddam Hussein
and Iraqi officials) which were deemed suspect in the analytical articles in the inside
pages.

In "Lies now suit Iraqis as much as truth suits US" (Feb 26), Tony Walker wrote:

Baghdad propaganda denies that the allies have taken thousands of
prisoners when television footage available in Baghdad via CNN shows
the truth with long lines of Iraqi POWs trudging in single file across the
desert under the guns of their captors...
The allies, too, have engaged in their own media manipulation. The US
Defence Secretary's announcement that a news blackout was being
imposed to protect operational secrets was only half the story. In truth,
the allies wanted to control the media flow until they were sure they
would have a palatable story to tell...
If things had not been going well, there would have been no sign of
General Schwarzkopf or any of his other staff officers in the reporters'
room in Riyadh saying that the "American people" had a right to know
about developments in the first hours of the ground war.
Camouflage is a useful tool in war, and it suits news management as well as it suits
soldiers. Neither side was exempt from the art of camouflage.

Iraqi propaganda is still giving no hint of reverses on the battlefield, no
sign that things are going anything but well at the front...In war the gap
between fact and fiction is often very great. It has become a cliche now
but truth is invariably the first casualty, and the US and its allies have
been far from blameless over the years. In the Middle East, perhaps
more than anywhere else, illusion and reality often get confused.
(Walker, SMH, Feb 26)

The Coalition could not have based their briefings at a site more symbolic of the
frustrations of a journalist than the Saudi Arabian capital of Riyadh, where the
monarchy has, in times of peace as well as war, extended the long arm of the law in
muzzling the reporting of "unpalatable" facts, whether they related to affairs of the
state, the conduct of religion, the social structure or personal lives of the ruling
family. The media in Saudi Arabia, as in most of the oil-producing Arab
monarchies, was accustomed to both censorship as well as self-censorship, and there
was no history of "people journalism", where a "person-in-the-street" would
volunteer a quote on events happening in and around the nation.
The complete absence of a free press in Saudi Arabia meant that the hundreds of
visiting journalists had nowhere to turn to except the military authorities, who by
now had set a pattern of news control which had been successfully tested during the
Panama, Grenada and the Falklands operations. In effect, the Western media was as
much at the mercy of government sources of news as the Iraqi journalists were in
their country. War had broken through the compartments in which they had been
cocooned, merging the libertarian West and the authoritarian Middle East. The only
difference was in the voices of exasperation which were heard in the analytical
reports. The media, though aware of its predicament, was in no situation to escape it.
To the credit of The Sydney Morning Herald must go the numerous reports which
questioned the policy of censorship and selective handing out of news by the
military authorities on both sides of war. On February 7, Tony Walker's report,
headlined "Press headed off at the pass", questioned the policy of media
management:

The Iraqis themselves are engaging in their own form of news
management: crude, restrictive and self-serving. But, each side is trying
to win the propaganda battle that has become almost as important as the
war on the ground....In Riyadh and Dhahran in Saudi Arabia's Eastern
Province, the allies have evolved a fairly sophisticated system of news
management based on a series of briefings throughout the day,
culminating in an American briefing in time for European and American
newspapers and television. The fact that people are dying on the
battlefront is not being reflected in the images beamed via television. It
is going to be quite a shock for viewers when the land war begins and, if
the media are allowed anywhere near the action, they start seeing
corpses piled on the battlefield.

The shock was probably the journalists' when the discovered they were not allowed
to see corpses strewn around the battlefield during the ground war. When they got
to cover the land battle, the war had already been won, and the bodies removed from
their paths. The media minders thoughtfully paraded for the cameras a few
surrendering Iraqi soldiers as symbols of defeat.

5.5 Editorials and experts

The Sydney Morning Heralds editorials during the war showed a studied analysis of
emerging information. From very early stages in the war, the opinion pieces never
wavered in their support of the Allied cause. There was no momentary consideration
of pacific opinions or questioning of the war objectives. The line of argument was:
Accepting the Allies are doing what they should be, are they going about it in the
right way?

There were three factors which limited the range of opinions which could be voiced
on the progress of war: (1) The memories of Vietnam Syndrome which had been
successfully invoked by George Bush and the Allied leaders and officials who spoke
to the media were a warning presence. The media had been made sufficiently guilty

for "losing" the war in Vietnam and now was the time to make amends. It was as
though the media had a responsibility to see the Allies through this war. But the
orchestration of opinion in favour of the Allies, at this late stage when the war was
in progress and the television was already covering it "live" throughout the day, was
not a matter of urgency, nor was there any need for a conscious and visible
bolstering of the Alhed cause. (2) The Australian government was participating in
the war by sending ships and soldiers. The sign language from Prime Minister Bob
Hawke (who vigorously opposed the "independent" coverage of the war by the
state-funded ABC) and his team of Ministers made it clear any other attitude
towards the war would be deemed unpatriotic. (3) The information which was
coming from the warfront did not warrant a swing towards the "opposition" or even
towards neutrality in the war. The media management policy by the military officials
did not permit the flow of war news (photographs of the effects of combat, negative
images of war, statistics or interviews which could support another view of the war)
which could be pieced together to form a contrary opinion.

The writing of editorials in a newspaper is driven by a formula: first sum up the
latest available facts, then add historical perspective from the archives and conclude
with the opinion which could now be made to "emerge" from the facts marshalled.
Literary flourish and a flair for words were allowed but not so much as to make the
unsigned editorial highly individualistic. The opinion column writer is dependent on
the emerging picture from the newsroom. The opinion presented, in other words,
must be in tune with the news reports from correspondents and local reporters. The
facts presented must not be out of place, and the opinion emerging should not swim

against the tide and appear brave and lonely. Endorsing common sense - the most
conspicuous opinions of the most authoritarian news sources - or what was likely to
be received wisdom would be preferable.
On January 19, as news of Iraqi Scud attacks on Israel dominated the front page, the
editorial said:
The political damage by the entry of Israel would be enormous. The
alliance would be seen as a Western intervention on the side of
unpopular, corrupt Arab monarchies against a leader who has come to
represent the aspirations of many dispossessed Arabs, including many
Palestinians.
The tone was even verging on "objectivity" with the mention of "unpopular, corrupt
Arab monarchies", though it would be out of place to mention why the Allies were
supporting "unpopular, corrupt Arab monarchies".
The editorial, a long essay covering the space usually devoted to at least two opinion
pieces, harped on what was now a familiar theme from the White House: the Allies
must be seen to be eradicating a formidable and evil enemy, not swatting a bug with
a hammer.
Iraq's military strength is to be found on the ground. It has more than one
million men under arms, and although many of those troops are pooriy
equipped and pooriy trained conscripts, the best units in the Iraqi army
comprise well-equipped and battle-hardened soldiers. (January 19)
The pursuit of the myth of the "mighty" enemy went further, to the likelihood of a
tough battle, not a one-sided war.
Winning the air war over Iraq and Kuwait was always regarded by allied
commanders as their easiest task in this campaign. Dislodging 500,000
Iraqi troops from Kuwait will be another matter entirely. (January 19)

Did Iraq deploy one million troops? Were there half a million Iraqi soldiers
crammed into Kuwait? Were the soldiers battle-hardened or battle-weary or were
they fresh recruits? The picture of the enemy was being painted by the Allied media
managers in Saudi Arabia and the enemy wasn't holding press conferences in
Baghdad to confirm or deny any of it. The conclusion:
Short of a sudden capitulation by Saddam, a coup in Baghdad, or mass
desertion among Iraqi troops - all of which seem unlikely developments
at this stage - we may have witnessed only the opening shots in a vicious
and complex contest. (January 19)
The war, as it turned out, was neither a vicious attack from the Iraqi side nor
complex for the Allies. But editorials have a life span of just one day and are neither
referred to nor quoted in future editorials.
As oil was being pumped into the sea, the editorial on January 29 made a case for
waging a world war against a "dictator who threatens its fragile eco-system". The
editorial, headlined "Iraq poisons the well", opened rhetorically but quickly adduced
as support recent "facts" quotes from US President George Bush:
The first thing to be said about Iraq's decision to pump oil into the
Persian Gulf is that the move represents a heinous act that will result in
environmental carnage. The second thing to be said is that we risk
drawing the conclusions if we see the oil slick as nothing more than that.
President George Bush says that releasing millions of gallons of oil into
the sea "doesn't measure up to any military doctrine" and he has
described President Saddam Hussein's behaviour as that of a "sick"
person.
However, dismissing Saddam Hussein as mad or pathological would merely be
strengthening the hands of the pacifists that the Iraq needed "help" or therapy rather
than war. He was evil and the world had to come together to eradicate him.

That Saddam would resort to such extreme measures to frustrate his
enemies' plans demonstrates a ruthless mind, not necessarily an
unbalanced one. (January 29)

The editorial, in line with current thinking voiced by "experts" on the Allied side,
predicted the retreating Iraqi army might set Kuwait's oilfields on fire, adopting the
medieval convention of "leaving the diseased carcasses of horses in the water wells
of the enemy". It went on to conclude:

The argument that the environment can no longer sustain such conduct
deserves much more serious attention than it has received...But it does
not follow that the world should allow itself to be held to ransom by any
dictator who threatens its fragile eco-system. Sometimes, unfortunately,
war is necessary to prevent even worse disasters in terms of disorder and
brutality. Once again, Saddam has shown that his invasion of Kuwait is
one of those occasions.

Contrary to the editorials' mild nationalism substantiating the war, there were
colunms and byline articles which presented the flip side of the logic of war. On
January 17, the day the beginning of war was reported, a byline article from Martin
Walker in Washington argued:

The strategic bungle of our time is unfolding. America's leadership is
poised to deliver the massed energies of a mobilised world in the wrong
place and in the wrong cause.

The report was symptomatic of the diversity which characterises the democratic
press:

...like a man in the jungle ignoring the charge of the rhino to pluck a
leech from his flesh, the attention of the White House has been fixed for
months on the lesser target.

The article argued that Iraq was a petty target compared to the global help that could
be rendered in restructuring the economy of the Soviet Union.

Perestroika could sink or swim; the Soviets were to be left to their own
devices, while the US turned its attention to the bully of the Gulf and his
threat to the West's oil supply.

A commentative article by Edward Said, reprinted from The New York Times, on
January 17, was another voice against the war, accusing America of imperialism and
the Arab rulers in whose support America was waging the war of totalitarianism.

No Arab president or king is accountable to his people; this is as true of
Hussein as of the others.

The Arab people were being ignored in the war, and the people of Iraq were being
reduced to "military assets" to be demolished from a great height. Sanctions - the
economic isolation of Iraq - would have been a better solution. The war was a waste
of lives and an imposition of US hegemony, the article concluded.

The publication of articles presenting the case against the war, or outlining the folly
of war, gave an impression of plurality of voices in the newspaper. The "experts" the writers who wrote about the war with some knowledge of the history of the
region - brought a dimension to commentaries which the editorials failed to provide:
that facts could be marshalled for both sides of an argument and that events which
were unfolding were not inevitable but were the handiwork of individuals.

On January 26, a full page article in The Sydney Morning Herald, headlined "Why
we must stop the dealers in death", graphically identified the nations which have

armed Iraq in the recent past and named the companies which supplied ammunition
to Saddam Hussein. The article, carrying the combined bylines of Tom Ballantyne,
Peter Smark and Eric Ellis, and the accompanying artwork detailing the arms
supplied by each nation to Iraq was produced specially for the paper. The amount of
research that must have gone into it and the timeliness of the article - published
during the height of war hysteria - established The Sydney Morning Heralds
position as an independent newspaper which viewed itself above the tabloid
sentiments of jingoism, paranoia and parochial analysis. Though the article
specifically blamed the arms dealers for making the war possible, it also directly
pointed a finger at the Allied nations who were crying justice.
And if our own worst nightmare is realised and an Australian warship in
the Persian Gulf becomes the victim of a sea-skimming Exocet missile,
its crew will hardly have time before it becomes an infemo to discuss the
fact that it was put together by French factory workers...
Aircraft from France, the US and Italy, main battle tanks from Britain
and the US, missiles and rockets from France, Germany and Brazil,
artillery from South Africa and Austria, ships from Italy: the litany of
shame. All were sold under the thin excuse that "if we don't sell them,
someone else will". It is merely an echo of the drug dealer's
justification...
Western manufacturers' avarice and their governments' blind-eye
tolerance to their murderous cynicism have been so blatant in Iraq that
there seems little chance history won't repeat itself there and in the
nations around after a brief pause to bury the dead. The oil floods out,
the arms flood in: that's the way of the Middle East.
5.6 Saddam and Bush
Prominent people make news and prominence is an acknowledged news value, a
determining factor in the selection of news for publication. But Saddam Hussein and

George Bush, unlike other prominent leaders involved in the Gulf War, had a greater
significance in the news stories during the war. They were closely associated with
the rhetoric of war, and the rationalising process of the war was incomplete without
a mention of either or both the leaders. They were the chief rivals, the hero and the
anti-hero, the cop and the robber, the hound and the hounded, the bull and the
bull-fighter of the war. Images of defiance, defeat and triumph that accompanied the
mention of the two leaders signified the men became not merely the symbols of the
warring nations; they often became the conflict.
A quantitative study of all the war stories in The Sydney Morning Herald between
February 22 and February 28 - the days leading to and covering the ground war found that a high 75 per cent of all the stories (of a total of 225) mentioned either
Saddam or Bush, though the stories did not always relate to them. Stories often
mentioned the two leaders in the same breath, as though it was a war of personaUties
and as though there was an urgent need to pitch one leader against the other as often
as possible. Though the The Sydney Morning Herald had its own correspondents in
the Middle East, the US-organised media briefings in Saudi Arabia and Washington
had a decisive hold on crucial aspects of the perception of war. One of the key areas
was how Saddam Hussein was viewed.
Saddam Hussein was built up to be a worthy opponent who required the combined
might of several nations led by the president of a super power to vanquish. In this
boxing match, Saddam was the challenger and Bush and the Coalition leaders were
collectively the champ. The war objective appeared to be to put the challenger in his
place. As in the lead-up to a sporting event, the opposition was presented as a

mighty but mean force.

On February 6, The Sydney Morning Herald correspondent Tony Walker's report
from Riyadh, which was the lead story on Page 1, said:

Briefing American reporters as the air war against Iraq intensified,
General Norman Schwarzkopf likened the Iraqi leader to Goliath "out
there storming around...saying come on out here and fight me."

The report also quoted Bush in a later paragraph:

Addressing State governors, President Bush said the US was determined
to keep to its own timetable, and not be rushed into a premature ground
offensive.
"It's going according to plan. We are going to set the timetable for what
lies ahead and not Saddam Hussein," Mr Bush said. "There have been no
surprises and there will not be any quick changes."

Apart from the interview with Peter Amett and the voice of Saddam Hussein
monitored through Baghdad Radio, there were few quotes from the Iraqi President.
Yet speculation about his motives, his war plan, his military strength, his
propaganda aims, and the kind of personal traits in him that could pitch his nation
against the world took the place of quotes. "What could Saddam be up to?" was a
frequent preoccupation of commentators and columnists.

On February 2, in an analytical report headlined, "Saddam's tactics befuddle the
West", The Sydney Morning Herald correspondent Tony Walker wrote:
...the Iraqi leader's tactics, which may make no sense militarily , are
entirely consistent with his approach to the Gulf crisis since the
beginning. For Saddam Hussein, political considerations have always
been more important than military ones. So when he despatches his
warplanes to neutral territory in Iran out of harm's way he is sending a

political signal; and that signal is that he wants to be sure, if he survives
the war, that he has his best planes at hand to continue to bolster his
position. For he understands well that in the Middle East, more perhaps
that anywhere else, a leader without military clout carries very little
weight at all. Saddam has taken a gamble in placing much of his air
force effectively in Iranian hands...
The correspondent took a gamble in trying to read the Iraqi leader's mind. But it's a
game the media plays well: if a leader can't make himself available for quotes, there
is no chance he is going to deny any speculation about his moves.
Penetrating the thought processes of the antagonist, attributing motives,
understanding his psyche, and reading patterns in the sands of the desert was also
extended, particularly on days when little war action took place, to predicting the
course of war. On January 31, Peter Smark wrote, in a column headlined,
"Nightmare: Saddam could live to fight another day".
What if Saddam sucked the allies into a ground war in Kuwait, sustains
but also inflicts heavy casualties and THEN (capital letters in original)
sends a message to the UN saying: "I am prepared to withdraw now"?
On January 29, a report from The Guardian reproduced in The Sydney Morning
Herald, headlined "Muslims want Saddam to face Islamic justice", said:
A debate is beginning within official and religious circles in Saudi
Arabia over whether the Western allies or the Muslim worid should have
the right to try President Saddam Hussein if he is captured. Sources close
to the Saudi ulama (Muslim clerics) say that Saddam should be tried by
an Islamic court. As an Iraqi-bom Muslim he must be subject to Islamic
justice and the secular codes of Western justice cannot be accepted, they
say.
Added to the report was another report on the same subject from the newspaper's
correspondent, Deborah Cameron in New York:

War crimes charges against Saddam Hussein would "make a martyr out
of a very disgusting human being" and would be difficult to bring,
according to a spokesman for the world's leading Nazi-hunter.
"Saddam Hussein has absolutely nothing to lose and he will simply fight
to the end or stay in the bunker like Hitler and maybe even die of his
own hand," Mr Aaron Brietbart said yesterday.
Towards the end of the report, Mr Breitbart was quoted as saying:
"I would be very surprised if Saddam were to come out alive from this
war," Mr Breitbart said.
Saddam Hussein's character was becoming a rich tapestry (of "evil", one might add)
to which Muslim clerics, war pilots, Nazi-hunters, presidents and prime ministers of
nations contributed with their own imaginative and colourful versions.

Western media's obsession with justification and rationalising turned Saddam
Hussein into a villain of great stature who ought to be put down by the collective
might of several nations.

5.7 Hard news from the warfront

News from the warfront dominated the newspaper during the Gulf War. There was a
steady stream of reports from the pool reporters in Saudi Arabia as well as from
Washington, where the war of words was being waged. Except for the lull in the war
during the second and third weeks of February, hard news which brought reports of
events happening on the warfront found a prominent place on Page 1 and the special
pages inside devoted to war coverage.

Though the display of news created an impression of breadth of coverage, as well as
intensity of inquiry into issues related to war. The Sydney Morning Heralds war

action coverage suffered on two different counts, first from the factors which also
affected television coverage - quirks of the pool system, lack of access, delay,
censorship of copy, and propaganda by the military authorities - and secondly, from
the primacy of television.
On February 7, a report in the paper by Tony Walker complained:

In the meantime, hundreds of foreign reporters gathered in Saudi Arabia
continue to grumble about restrictions placed on movement, and the fact
that we seem to be caught in the coils of an elaborate system that favours
the television networks and American newspapers and news magazines.

With a few exceptions, major outbreaks of news were despatched by the
newspaper's staff correspondents. On the first day of war, all the four major reports
on Page 1 were byline reports from staff writers. The two major reports were from
Washington, the third one was a colour piece from Paul McGeough in Baghdad and
the fourth a story about the families of Australian soldiers at the warfront. Page 2
carried a detailed report on US peace protesters, with other reports from Moscow,
Tokyo, Bahrain, and Israel - all of them byline reports. Byline reports, apart from
enhancing the prestige of a newspaper (announcing to its readers that it carries
exclusive reports which cannot be read elsewhere), bring style, insight and local
relevance to a newspaper, and they certainly did to The Sydney Morning Herald.
For instance, the report from Bahrain, an oil-producing country which was very
close to the war zone and which feared Saddam's wrath, revealed the kind of
paranoia that existed in the region in a manner that the Middle East newspaper {The
Khaleej Times) surveyed in this study failed to do. (The author of this study heard,
during his stay in Dubai, from boastful pro-Palestinian sources that Saddam could

take over Kuwait through a phone call and Bahrain through a fax message.) The
report gave an insight into the tiny nation's war frenzy:

Hundreds of Bahrainis queued at shops selling plastic and masking tape
and collecting gas masks...Despite statements by Government officials
and diplomats about the low risk here, there are real fears, especially for
children who cannot be fitted with military issue gas masks...Many
Bahrainis have left the emirate, along with expatriates, and more will try
to today.

Despite subscribing to all the major news agencies and placing its correspondents in
vantage points around the world to cover the war as it unfolded, The Sydney
Morning Herald's, news leads mostly originated from the media minders in Saudi
Arabia or from Washington. The Scud attacks on Israel were covered in greater
detail than the major battles in Kuwait and Iraq. The air bombardments were
covered entirely through the media minders. The ground war was no exception.
General Schwarzkopf took over as the ground war began, and though the lead report
announcing the beginning of the ground offensive managed to avoid mentioning the
only source of news for the first few paragraphs (which, incidentally, were also from
the same source), the general made his presence felt soon enough and kept his
ground until the news was nearly exhausted. Page 1 lead story began:
Allied forces were at the edges of Kuwait City as the United States-led
Coalition continued its massive ground, air and sea assault against Iraqi
troops to liberate Kuwait, senior military officials said early this morning
Sydney time.

About three paragraphs down, General Schwarzkopf emerges:
The commander of the allied forces. General Norman Schwarzkopf, said
the ground assault had begun with dramatic success, achieving all its
objectives for the first day.

The newspaper's chief news provider, along with his fellow military officials, was
"witnessing" the battle for the media. As the ground war drew to a close, the
newspaper's Page 1 lead on February 28 announced in the headline: "Saddam's elite
in tatters". The source of news was once again the US military spokesmen.
The climactic attacks on the Republican Guard followed the reported
destruction of more than half of Iraq's 500,000 frontline troops trapped
south of the Euphrates River. "We're pounding the hell out of them," a
United States military spokesman told reporters in Riyadh shortly before
the allies, led by the Kuwaitis, rolled triumphantly into Kuwait City...
If 250,000 frontline troops had been "destroyed", how many of the bodies did the
journalists get to see? As a matter of fact, none. The newspaper was, at the moment,
listening to the military officials' narration of war, not witnessing it. There were no
scoops for the newspaper from Kuwait, Iraq or Saudi Arabia. The Baghdad datelined
report on the Amiriya shelter bombing, for instance, was not a byline report. The
next day's (February 15) byline reports on the bombing incident were from Amman
and Dhahran. For the newspaper, the war had to be won at home, on the subbing
table and at the artist's desk. The newspaper's war zone coverage derived its strength
from the diversity of locations from where the reports emanated, and from its
analytical articles, which raised the issues of media management, casualties and the
Middle Eastern political scenario during and after the war.

CHAPTER 6: BUSH vs SADDAM
Content analysis of 12 days of war in The Sydney Morning Herald

This content analysis of two weeks of The Sydney Morning Herald attempts to
unravel the treatment of two leaders as a news value.

Prominent people make news and prominence is commonly acknowledged a news
value, a determining factor in the selection of news for publication. The Gulf War,
however, was not a workaday foreign story for the media. It was already loaded with
other weightier news values, like conflict, consequence, nationalism, ideology and
economic concerns. The selection of news stories generally gets reinforced with a
combination of news values, and the addition of prominent people, as the content
analysis shows, enhances the printworthiness of foreign news stories.

Saddam Hussein and George Bush, unlike other prominent people involved in the
Gulf War, had a greater significance. They were closely associated with the rhetoric
of war, and the rationalising process of the war was incomplete without a mention of
the two leaders. They were the chief rivals, the hero and the anti-hero, the cop and
the robber, the hound and the hounded, the bull and the bull-fighter of the war.
Images of defiance, defeat and triumph that accompanied the mention of the two
leaders signify the men became the symbols of the two forces at war.

This content analysis selected a time frame which was crucial in the war, the period
before, during and after the ground war. Twelve issues of The Sydney Morning
Herald wQTQ analysed, from February 22 to March 7, 1991, Sundays excepted. The

Sunday edition {The Sun Herald) is different in format, style and emphasis and
hence is not included in the analysis.

The total number of news stories on the Gulf War was 225. In counting the news
stories, a set of briefs filling less than a column was counted as one story. The
rationale for this was that a tiny news flash, often an intro without details, could not
be treated on par with a regular news story in a conventional news format. The other
option was to leave the briefs out altogether, but since they were news stories on the
Gulf War competing for space and audience attention, they had to be accounted for
collectively as a news story if they were clubbed together as a set of briefs.

Of the 225 stories, the majority - 163 - were written in the conventional news
writing style, the inverted pyramid style, which presented the most important point
in the story as the introductory paragraph or the intro and dealt with the rest of the
details in decreasing order of importance.

Stories were classified as hard news, analysis, interpretation, colour piece and
side-bar. Hard news stories were necessarily inverted pyramids, they quoted news
sources in authority and they did not offer any comments from the journalist.
Analytical stories were those written by the correspondents offering a kind of
interpretation from the location of news event. Interpretative stories were
commentative articles written by journalists and experts back home, away from the
news event. Colour pieces were descriptive or narrative stories, with or without
comments, usually giving a visual description of an aspect of war. Side-bar stories
were reactions, usually popular reaction stories.

Of the 225 stories on the Gulf War, 142 were hard news stories. This constituted 63
per cent. These were the stories which conformed to the traditional view that news
and views ought to be in separate compartments and that news must not reflect the
private opinions of the journalist. Without comparative figures, it is difficult to judge
whether this is a high percentage or not. War is a situation that demands a high
degree of commentative reporting. This is particularly true of a conflict situation in a
faraway land. The pressure to interpret and comment on events is sufficient to
convince the journalist that events ought to be pre-digested in order to "inform" the
audience better.

Predictably, one in five stories was commentative. Out of 225, 49 stories - or 21.8
per cent - carried the viewpoints of journalists. These 49 stories included analyses,
interpretative stories and colour pieces.

Of the two leaders, Saddam Hussein found a mention in more stories than George
Bush, with 121 stories mentioning Saddam Hussein and 83 mentioning Bush. One
can only surmise why Saddam was mentioned oftener than Bush. The possibilities
are: (1) The leaders stood for their countries and since there were other newsworthy
US personalities (such as the army chief of staff, army generals, White House staff
and others), Bush had to share the platform with them. (2) The war was perceived as
Saddam's fault. This reading is strengthened by the fact that the colour pieces and
side-bar stories tended to de-link the suffering of the Iraqis from the ivory tower
defiance of Saddam. The villain in this plot was an individual, whereas the hero was
at times a consensus and at other times Bush (especially when he spoke against

Saddam).

Between February 22 and 28, a high 75 per cent of the stories mentioned either
Saddam or Bush. Only 30 out of 120 stories in this period (which is half the time
frame under study) did not mention either Bush or Saddam. This was the period
leading up to and during the ground war. That it was perceived as a war of
personalities gets confirmed when we look at the ratio of the number of stories
mentioning Saddam and Bush. Converted to percentages, it is 54:37. Stories often
mentioned the two leaders in the same breath, within a few paragraphs of each other,
revealing an anxiety to pitch one against the other.

Despite the media's easier access to Bush during the war, Saddam Hussein was
mentioned more frequently than George Bush. Saddam was mentioned 476 times in
121 stories, as against Bush, who was mentioned 230 times in 83 stories. But access
was probably the reason why quotes from Bush outnumbered those from the elusive
Saddam. Fifteen stories quoted Bush, whereas only eight quoted Saddam. The
quotes from Bush amounted to 1353 words, and quotes from Saddam amounted to
435. Two full speeches of Bush were quoted, and this accounted for his
disproportionately high total. In spite of Saddam's near-disappearance during the
war, the media took an effort to quote him, monitoring his radio speeches.

Of the 225 stories, negative images occurred 79 times when Saddam's name was
mentioned. This was 17 per cent of the total number of times Saddam's name was
mentioned. While Bush was always introduced in stories as President Bush or as Mr
Bush, Saddam Hussein's status in the reports appeared somewhat dubious. Out of

121 stories mentioning Saddam, 44 did not bother to introduce him as President
Saddam Hussein, He was merely Saddam Hussein or Saddam throughout the story.
Lack of formality in newspapers is usually reserved for sportsmen, entertainers or
criminals.

Images of defiance were also associated with his name, with the use of words such
as "scoundrelism", "Saddamism", "instabihty", "aggression" and "dictatorship".
More stories, however, acknowledged his status as President after the ground war
was over, his defeat was confirmed and the Allied forces' intentions to leave him in
his post were made known.

The conclusions of this content analysis are:

(1) The war of personalities, and the perception of the Gulf War as a Saddam vs
Bush battle assumed a larger media significance than warranted. A war which killed
thousands of Iraqi soldiers and hundreds of allied soldiers appeared to be dominated
by the rhetoric of two leaders. The media obsession with the theme of the victor and
the vanquished seemed to have overtaken other, more significant, considerations of
the tragedies of war.

(2) The image of Saddam Hussein, as reflected in the newspaper reports and
commentaries, was loaded with a moral dimension. The censure of the Iraqi leader,
which was the main thrust of George Bush's rhetoric against him, was apparent in
the news stories. To this extent, the journalists uncritically assumed the truth value
of the US President's assessment of his opponent. The demonic character of the Iraqi
leader did not need any explanation. His defeat and the utter rout of his army were

seen as a fitting finale, the only rational conclusion to the war.

CHAPTER 7: TELEVISION WAR
A study of Australian television channels' coverage of war from January 17 to
March 1,1991

7.1 Television as a medium

The television was responsible for the Gulf War of 1991 being dubbed a media war.
It gave the impression that the war was unfolding before the eyes of the viewers.
The length of coverage, its intensity during the initial days of war and the
ubiquitousness of the camera - its ability to switch from one nation to another within
the same report - made television the ultimate "weapon" in the media arsenal. Its
capability to give a "comprehensive" coverage appeared proven for the first time,
even though doubts about the quality of television coverage were being voiced,
particularly in the print media, while the war was in progress.

For the first time, the technical capabilities of television as a medium of transmission
of information were fully utilised. The combination of image, sound and text,
coupled with the advantage provided by the time factor made television unbeatable
and an unequal competitor for the print media.

Just as aerial bombardment with laser guided missiles preceded the limited though
essential phase of land war, the television cameras picked the top stories of the day,
leaving a secondary role to the print media. In a war which drew participation from a
number of countries, audience interest throughout the world was high, and television
images reached the audience first. The war was covered "live" - a term which was

ambiguously defined and understood, as television footage was neither from the
battlefront nor was it immediately transmitted as the events unfolded - and there was
little scope for a print media scoop as far as photographs were concerned. Print
media and television media journalists were working under the same controls and
limitations. Independent access to news sources and places of action without
military mediation was the greatest impediment to war coverage and it affected both
print and television journalists equally. In this scenario, television was able to
capitalise on the time factor, transmitting the images it had on hand faster to the
target audience.

Television was also better prepared for the war, with an array of analysts. Middle
East experts of sorts, graphics, textual interpolation and artists' recreation of war
strategies illuminating a complex situation, where terrain, race, religion, politics and
people were different.

It would be reasonable to state that the newspaper reading habit alone provided the
print media with a well-defined role during the first few days of war, when
everything that could possibly be classified as "news" - information which was new
- was being scooped up by television.

Having stated the obvious technological advantage that the television enjoyed during
this war, it would be fair to mention that television was overwhelmingly responsible
for the "down" side of war coverage. Television coverage created the "Nintendo"
effect of war, the images creating an illusion of war as a video game. The television
also paraded a seemingly endless procession of academic and pseudo-academic

experts, creating an impression of deja vu, impeding the perception of war as a
catastrophe affecting real human beings. Repetition of images and the constant focus
on those in positions of authority - powerful political and military leaders - also
camouflaged the war as a boardroom event or, at times, even as a mere war of
words, rather than as a war which inflicted suffering and killed people. It could be
argued in its defence that the television crews were prevented from covering the
human side of war by access restrictions and were forced to rely on the limited news
sources which were available.

Despite its failings, television coverage set the benchmark for war reporting,
presenting the overwhelming images of war and the visuals of war reporters at the
scene of action, or as close to it as any civilian could get.

It is, therefore, essential to look closely at what television was able to report and
analyse the qualitative aspect of what we saw. The quantitative magnitude was
beyond question: it was a Scud attack in the living room. (The comparison with the
Scud attack could be extended to the limited range and the imprecision of television
coverage as well.) A quantitative analysis - or even a series of quantitative studies is possible, but its conclusion would be limited, considering the question marks that
hung over the quality of much of what we saw. The more important issue is the
identification of what television coverage achieved in qualitative terms.

7.2 The television narrative
War news as received through television assumed a distinctive narrative style which
emerged from the very first day. The physical components of the narrative fell into

place as the war was an anticipated series of events. The studio anchors at the local
television stations and at the network headquarters in the United States, the reporters
in various cities and the political and military news authorities who provided the
sound bites were as prepared for the war as the soldiers and the pilots were.
The progression of events was reflected through a chronological sequence of faces,
with the Australian television network presenter appearing first who then ushered in
the reporter in a national capital or at the war zone. Up to this point, the style of
presentation adopted the usual format of television stories, but the variations during
the war were notable. The reporter in Amman or Washington or Saudi Arabia now
took over the role of an on-site studio presenter and other reports were tagged on to
his or her commentary. The reporter now had the option to switch locations as well
through other reports. This double encasement of news with layers of presenters was
necessitated by the way news was managed during the war.
Essentially, all television stations were broadcasting fihn footage shot by a small
core crew which was part of the news pool. This film was subjected to clearance by
the military authorities (it was essentially an exercise in censorship), and released to
television networks (mostly US or UK based) who then sent it to subscriber stations
throughout the worid. Channel 10 in Australia, for instance, subscribed to CNN
reports.
While this practice made it easy for the military authorities and the core distributor
networks in the United States, the local stations in countries like Australia had to
devise more innovative ways of making their own presence in the war zone felt. It

was important for the image of the local stations to be seen to be covering the war
from an Australian perspective and drawing on the perceptions of an Australian
reporter on the scene. (However, this was not essentially an Australian dilemma other nations which subscribed to US television network coverage of the war faced
the same problem.) This was one of the ways in which competing television stations
"scored" over each other.
Partly because the stations could not predict the aseptic nature of the television
footage that was in store for them during the war, they could not anticipate the
overlapping role which their own reporters were to perform at the scene of action.
There were few exclusive interviews to be had, few scoops to be scored, and almost
no battlefield reporting to be done by the stations' reporters. The best they could do
was to station themselves as close to the press briefer as possible for a
piece-to-camera commentary to be followed by news pool footage or press
conference coverage. The result was a great degree of uniformity in the coverage of
war by the various television stations, with few variations in the headlines, news
sources or action footage.
But uniformity was not what the stations were striving for in their competitive
struggle for audience rating. The result was a double packaging of "local
Australian-specific and station-specific" coverage for every report. The station
anchor was the first layer, and the reporter on the spot constituted the second layer.
Encased within was the pool news footage or what was generally shared information.
The only exception to this style of presentation was from CNN reporters in

Baghdad. The CNN crew, who were ensconced in Baghdad when the other network
reporters were not, had a more informal interaction with their studio presenters, ever
mindful of the fact that their exclusive presence within enemy territory was in itself
controversial.

The CNN reporters' every move and every observation was potentially newsworthy
for the network's headquarters, and hence a considerably longer time was allotted to
them as they observed the skies of Baghdad, wore their gas masks or spoke to the
camera from outside their hotel. It was quite possible that, having realised their
unique observation post in the war, the local stations - Channel 10 in Australia - did
not feel the need to mediate their reports further or camouflage it with an Australian
wrapping. The studio presenter often switched to CNN coverage "live", without
crossing over to a "local" reporter in the Middle East or Washington.

The mobility of the camera did not get much play in the war narrative. (Here again,
the CNN was occasionally an exception, with the camera following the movements
of the reporter in Baghdad.) The main reason for this was of course the limited
access (which was often a euphemism for censorship) which the camera crew had.
War has traditionally been a situation in which the reporter proved his or her
capability to move from one scene of battle to another, picking up the pieces of
action to be put together later at the headquarters of the news organisation. But the
news management of the Gulf War made this an obsolete practice. The camera, for
all its capability to move about, was stationed at fixed locations - in Saudi Arabia, in
Amman, in Washington, in Baghdad, in Tel Aviv, in London, and in Canberra,
Melbourne and Sydney in Australia, among other locations - where news sources

addressed a pool of reporters. It was not an opportunity missed as much as an
opportunity denied. In Israel, for instance, the reporters and the cameras moved
quickly to the locations where the Scud missiles struck, only to be denied closer
access to the damaged areas. The battlefront was a location that only existed in the
imagination of the reporters and the television audience. There was no camera
presence when the planes took off for bombing, or when they were flying on their
missions or to assess the damage.

The only evidence of the moving camera came from the pilots, who brought back
video recordings of bombings, some of them purportedly showing the accuracy of
the hits. The military authorities provided the networks with what they wanted: film
from the battlefield. Hand-outs thus furnished a vital aspect of camera work during
the war. However, the military was pursuing a different agenda, in trying to prove
the technical advancement of the weaponry used.

Apart from the physical attributes of the television narrative, the "plot" of the war
stories was "scripted" in much the same way that non-war stories are usually told.
The interest of the viewers was kept alive in the "headlines" - the main events as
perceived by the newsroom. The television newsroom had the primary
responsibility, during the Gulf war, of "copy-tasting", of assessing the material in
hand for newsworthiness and prioritising before it reached the target audience. It
could even be argued that the print media was following the lead provided by
television, merely reasserting the television news headlines with more details. This
would in effect mean that television had a story to tell, and the print media retold it.
Television news crew, therefore, had the major task of storytelling, of embedding

film footage with news values, adding relevant commentary to it, and of arranging
the headlines in a coherent manner to provide continuity to the "plot". This first
opportunity to encode news - the preferred reading of meaning in the news events as
seen through the film and as narrated by the reporters in their commentaries - was
one of the main reasons the Gulf war was seen as a media war or a television war.

This first privilege was not, as sometimes interpreted by media commentators, a
statement of triumph for the television coverage: the news management policy of the
military saw to it that the media did not "win" this war in the same way that they
won the Vietnam war. However, the primacy of television in the task of storytelling
during the war must be acknowledged.

The television rose to the occasion, putting all its resources and powers of
innovation to tell an epic tale. There were several editions of news during the war
when the headlines were updated with reports from the battlefront, "experts" were
called in for their opinion on the progress of war and the Australian angle of the war
- government decisions and popular reactions - was enmeshed into the narrative.

Watching the war through television, particulariy through a selected news program
like the ABC news report at noon or 7pm or Channel 9 news at 6pm, provided all
the headlines of the day during the war. All the news reports from a particular
edition from the beginning of the war to the declaration of ceasefire taken together,
it could be argued, offered a self-contained war story. The narrative was not
flawless, nor was it told in the most engaging manner. Repetition as a narrative
device was used on many occasions, as in any narrative, but it seemed to find a place

both out of necessity (due to paucity of fresh material) and to create an intended
effect in the narrative. And as in any narrative, there were times when the storyteller
(television news crew considered as a single entity) could be seen to dwell upon a
perceived protagonist of war, be it George Bush or Gen Schwarzkopf or a POW
being paraded on Baghdad television. Was the television objective, was it covering
the war adequately from both sides and was it equipped to tell the story from the
other side effectively?

The certainty of a negative answer to all the important considerations of news
reporting probably enables us to stack all of them together. The supreme effort at
times seems to have been to ensure there was a report at all, a fresh news angle to
reveal, rather than to ensure adherence to the basic tenets of reporting. The source of
war news footage was highly one-sided often, and the television's reliance on the
Coalition and the Iraqi military authorities to hand out the news - videos of
bombings, preparations for sorties, scenes of environmental damage, a military
guided tour of "bomb-damaged" areas in Iraq -

seemed to indicate a severely

crippled news gathering facility. It is debatable whether, if allowed to gather news
on its own, the television would have done the job differently. The nature of war
itself has changed so much technologically that the old-fashioned roving storyteller
was out of place, out of sorts and chronologically a misfit. In a war which was
fought over the air through much of its duration (except for the last 100 hours of the
43 days), it was hard to pick a safe and objective observation post for the war except
where the military authorities on either side of the war "thoughtfully" provided it.

The war narrative was, it appears, doomed to be what we saw and heard. Another
story, another way of telling it, probably existed, but it was not for the television as
it existed during the war to tell it, even though the television was the most
technologically advanced storyteller there was.

7.3 Local coverage

The Australian television stations had a clear and consistent focus on local news
throughout the war. Because the battlefront footage had to originate with US
media-dominated news pools, the local angle to the war was important for the
televisions stations: it was a totally Australian-made media contribution.

It was a war of consequence for all the Coalition partners and Australia had
committed its armed forces personnel as well as naval vessels and equipment to the
war. There was an overriding patriotic necessity for the media to follow the fate of
Australia's commitment to the war. Popular reaction to the war was sharply divided
and the media had the responsibility to reflect it. The Australian government made a
number of decisions and kept in constant touch with other Coalition partners and its
level of involvement was an unportant news value for the media. Australia had a
multicultural population, which had migrants from the war-affected region and
which, coincidentally, also mirrored the complexity of religious and racial mix of
the warring factions. The Arab vs non-Arab, the Jewish, the Muslim, the pacifist, the
oil and agricultural trade business sections of the community had various outlooks
on the war and the multiplicity of perceptions was a factor which the media had to
acknowledge.

For all these reasons, the everyday coverage of Australian events related to the war
was an important part of the war story for the Australian television stations.
The Australian government was committed to supporting the United States' efforts in
bringing a Coalition of forces to free Kuwait from Iraq. The high degree of
commitment stemmed not merely from the bonding that existing between two
English-speaking democratic nations, but also, admittedly, from a personal
camaraderie between the two heads of state, George Bush and Bob Hawke. The two
leaders kept in touch with each other during every phase of the war, as Mr Hawke
was keen to let the media know. There was some anxiety on the part of the Mr
Hawke's government to make the Australian position appear unanimous, even
though dissidence within the ranks of the Labor party was more obvious than from
any other source. The Opposition, the Liberals, were supportive of the government
with regard to the Gulf war. A section of the left wing of the Labor Party, however,
was openly hostile to the idea of going to war.
Outside of Parliament, peace had its demonstrative advocates who gathered, notably
in Sydney, Melbourne and Canberra, to air their views. The Muslim community's
position was not so clear-cut. The leaders of the community were at pains to
publicise the view that the religious factor did not automatically win them over to
the Iraqi leader's side. It was not a crusade. Besides, there was no question of
undivided religion-based loyalty to Iraq because Saudi Arabia, in whose direction
every Muslim male faithful has to turn during his daily prayers (the Muslims have to
face the direction of the holy city of Mecca while they pray), was at war with Iraq.

From the strongly religious Muslim point of view, while Saudi Arabia could not be
the enemy, there was reluctance to morally boost a foreign army which was aiming
to thwart a Muslim leader. (Both Iraq and Saudi Arabia are led by Sunni Muslim
leaders, who appeal to the sentiments of the majority of religiously-minded Muslims
throughout the world. The other faction of Muslims, Shias, are in a minority among
the Muslims. Also significant is the fact that Iraq has the holy city of Karbala, which
again appeals to the religiosity of Muslim leaders.) There was also the Palestinian
question, which Saddam Hussein had linked to the Kuwaiti invasion. The Palestine
sympathisers - Arab as well as non-Arab Muslims - were inclined to believe the war
was the result of an unwarranted Coalition. The Muslim position, on the whole,
could be categorized as anti-war, but not exactly "pacifist" in the same way in which
peace protesters in many cities were.

The Jewish position was, obviously, anti-Iraq. Iraq's Scud attacks on Israel further
inflamed the Jewish community in Australia.

Among the rest of the population there were those who believed Australia should
not send its forces to a faraway nation when its territorial interests were not under
threat. Included in this section of people were those who remembered the lessons of
Vietnam. There were also those - probably in the majority - who believed Saddam
was evil and should be punished. (Bush was constantly addressing this section of
people from his podium in Washington.)

Other local angles to be pursued involved the departing armed forces personnel and
their families, the security risk from "terrorists", the stock market and other

businesses and the various spokespeople representing sections of the community
which were in one way or another affected by the war.
Certainly there was no dearth of diversity of local issues for the media. While the
treatment of a breadth of issues was home ground for television, the medium was not
ideally suited to dealing with complexity. Quick changes of visuals and brief sound
bites constitute the staple diet of television, but sitting with an expert to analyse a
complex issue, like the attitude of non-Arab Muslims towards Australia's
involvement in the Gulf war, would probably stretch the TV newsroom's conception
of its audience's attention span.
Thus we find that representation of diverse issues relating to the Gulf war was an
area in which the television scored well. Peace marches in the various cities. Bob
Hawke addressing the media about his talk with George Bush, Muslims in Sydney
voicing their fear of discriminatory attacks, airports implementing new security
measures, dissident MPs expressing their reservations on war, navy divers preparing
to embark for a mission in the Gulf, their families hoping for their safe return - these
events echoing Australia's involvement in the war were represented well on
television. In fact, television was drawing on an established expertise in the
portrayal of community reactions to a far-reaching event.
But why were some MPs reluctant to believe Saddam Hussein was a monster, as he
was being presented by the leaders of the English speaking nations in their television
addresses? What were the reservations of those who believed in neutrality in this
war? Were the pacifists marching because they were merely exercising their right to

be demonstrative? What did the industry hope to gain from a resolution of the Gulf
conflict? What was Australia's trade involvement in the Gulf region? How much did
the Australian television audience know of the politics of the Gulf nations, of the
history of Kuwait, of the nature of Kuwait's monarchy, of Saddam Hussein's past
closeness to the leaders of the oil producing nations? More importantly, how many
television news presenters could speak knowledgeably of the Gulf region? These
questions only arise in comparison with the depth of coverage given by the print
media.

7.4 War action

The media machinery which was brought to the Middle East region to cover the war
was more than adequate to cover the war. However, was the war adequately
covered? Adequacy of coverage is a question of definition and it is not a useful
exercise to compare the coverage accorded to one war with that given to another
under a very different set of operating conditions for the media. The Gulf war had
the semblance of a global war since it involved the military might of many nations.
But it was brief, lasting only 43 days to accomplish its objective. After the military
forces had congregated in the Middle East, there were two distinct phases in the war:
the aerial bombardment of Iraqi bases, and the ground war, during which the
Coalition forces marched their military hardware and soldiers into Kuwait to reclaim
it from the Iraqi forces.

The war, which lasted from January 17 until the declaration of ceasefire 43 days
later, was transparent in the sense that the Coalition forces made their moves clearly.

visibly and with a statement of intention preceding every move. First there was the
din of war soon after Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, the din grew in volume,
until it was legitimised through the UN into an act of wan There was a
well-publicised movement of forces into the war arena. Then a deadline was issued,
on the expiry of which the attack began. Though the precise strategy of war was not
revealed, there was ample speculation on the duration of aerial bombardment with
predictions of ground war or an amphibious attack. Meanwhile, there was a count on
the number of bombing sorties into Iraq and Kuwait.
Before the ground war began, the statement of intention was issued: a deadline for
the withdrawal of Iraqi forces was announced, failing which the ground war was to
start. The ground war was over in 100 hours and a ceasefire was proclaimed.
The Iraqis too moved in a visible fashion, attacking Israel and Saudi Arabia with
missiles, moving troops into Saudi Arabia to take the town of Khafli, and finally
retreating (or withdrawing, from their perspective) their troops from Kuwait amid
blazing oil wells.
Unresolved question marks hang over the cause of the flight of Iraqi planes into Iran
during the war, and the oil spills into the Gulf
This, in sum, was the "plot" of the war. What could be termed as war action was
confined to these intentions and purposes. The broad movements of war were clearly
seen through the television coverage. The statements of intention were captured as
sound bites with sufficient clarity for anyone going through the war coverage tapes
at a future point in time to put together a clear picture of what constituted the war.

But what was not seen by the camera was the effect of war, the human consequences
of these movements. The camera was too far away to see who was affected by the
bombings or how many were hit. There was no body count. There wasn't a single
dead body seen by the camera that the military authorities did not wish the media to
see. There wasn't a shattered building captured on film that was not part of a guided
tour of the ruins conducted by the military minders of Iraq or the Coalition forces.
There was unusual technical wizardry on display, with the bombs which fell on
target beaming back the pictures before destroying the camera along with the target
and the bombing planes equipped with cameras capturing the precision bombing of
targets. But it was not a reporting coup. The military authorities had arranged it. For
the audience, it was probably immaterial who provided the "precision bombing"
pictures: the television was credited with bringing the images to the viewers. From a
journalistic point of view, it was a hand-out, the camera equivalent of a press
release, that performed the role of live imaginative reporting. These pictures, handed
over to the news pool as a "takeaway" press kit, camouflaged the absence of any
battlefield film footage.
The bright lights in the night sky over Baghdad (tracer bullets) symbolised the
thousands of sorties (averaging around 2000 a day in the first one week) undertaken
by the Coalition bomber planes. They were enduring images, powerful symbols,
nevertheless, to warrant a later repetition in several television programs. The fact
that these images were captured by television crew inside enemy territory made
them a valuable piece of evidence of journalistic daring during the reporting of Gulf

war, though they were by no means a substitute for showing the viewers the
devastation wrought by the bombs.

Iraqi attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia fared no better, with the reporter prevented
from getting close to the scene of damage by the authorities. One report interviewed
a woman whose house was damaged in the attack, but it wasn't an opportunity that
the reporters got too often. The camera focused on angry Israeli residents seeking
revenge, and the political leaders who warned Iraq, in the hope that Saddam Hussein
was watching television in his bunker, that the next attack would not go unpunished.
The camera crew in Australia took over, interviewing Australians of Jewish descent,
whose distress was compounded by their distance from "home land". The reporters'
interpretation that Saddam Hussein was baiting Israel and attempting to divide the
Arab partners in the Coalition by provoking an Israeli counter-attack was once again
a hand-out from the military authorities, though it was not an implausible
explanation. The Coalition military minders were proving to be adept at foreseeing
the needs of a curious media without giving too much leeway in access to the
battle-affected areas.

The cameras could not get as close to the missile-damaged areas in Saudi Arabia, a
nation which was known for strict media controls and where reporters were made to
feel the restrictions were a cultural necessity. The media took a strangely uncurious
approach as it seemingly understood the need for denial of access in Saudi Arabia.
Those interviewed appeared to be expatriate workers who did not elaborate a great
deal beyond predictable answers. The camera's favourite position in Saudi Arabia
seemed to be on the horizon, resigned to the inability to get any closer. A Patriot

missile neutralising a Scud missile was seen as a brief flash in the sky, as nine Scud
missiles were fired against Saudi Arabia on January 20 (Day 4 of the war).
According to the US command, all were intercepted by Patriots, except one, or a part
of it, which landed near the Saudi defence ministry in Riyadh.
Iraq fired over 35 Scud missiles on Israel, most reportedly intercepted by the Patriot
missiles, but the few that caused damage and took a toll were treated by the media as
a symbolic gesture by a defiant and taunting Iraq. The main reason for an
interpretive and analytical look at these attacks was the denial of closer access to
damaged areas. The television reporters repeatedly observed that the Scud was an
imprecise weapon of war.
On February 25, Day 40 of the war, an Iraqi Scud missile hit US army barracks near
Dhahran, killing 28 and injuring over 90. The US conceded the toll from this attack
amounted to a third of all the American deaths in the war up to that point. However,
no bodies were allowed to be seen, and the reporters did not get closer than talking
to army personnel who claimed to have witnessed it.
In the battle of Kha^i, on January 30, which was also given a symbolic significance
by the media, very little of the battle was seen, even though the Allies claimed they
lost 11 US marines and a Pentagon official was quoted as saying the Iraqis lost up to
500. Artillery and air attacks were described sketchily from second-hand sources,
reporters being unable to witness the fighting or talk to witnesses who could
describe or assess the casualties inflicted.

Television reporters' assessment that the battle of Khafji was a symbolic show of
strength by Saddam Hussein reflected the thinking of the Coalition military leaders.
But in a war that started with a 24-hour media coverage, more visuals of the biggest
land battle up to that point would have been a routine expectation.
The scenes of war were not more visible from the Iraqi side. With the exception of a
few Russian and Jordanian journalists and two well-known western journalists - one
from the US and another from Spain - there was no outside media presence in Iraq
between January 20 and January 31. Of these only Peter Amett of CNN had
communication links with the outside world. He saw what the Iraqi minders
allowed, and indeed wanted, him to see. The coverage of "live action" was mostly
reduced to a radio description of what was seen and heard from the hotel room and
what the Iraqi minders showed him. In fact, there never was any "live" coverage of
war. What was seen was an ongoing "talk" of war and war-related events.
The news that war had begun was brought by satellite telephone, while
CNN was reduced to screening a composite logo - 'Peter Amett, CNN,
Baghdad'. When at last they succeeded in restoring their satellite vision
link, we did indeed see the tracer over Baghdad 'live', shot through hotel
windows. From Jerusalem or Tel Aviv reporters gave 'live' accounts,
backed by the audible wail of ambulances, of the distant landing of
Scuds. All we actually saw was the reporters themselves, or, rather, their
elephantine gasmasks. And occasionally a lucky correspondent
succeeded in establishing a live link to his network just as a Patriot
soared over Riyadh to intercept an incoming Scud. The streak of light
through a black sky, the brief glow behind the clouds, were spectacular
only because we were told what we were looking at. In themselves, they
were less impressive than a single rocket in an Australia Day fireworks
display. (Holmes, 1991, 194)
There was very little war action in the television coverage of the air war as well as
the ground war. The scenes of Iraqi soldiers surrendering towards the end of the

ground war, the images of Kuwaitis celebrating as the Allied forces marched into
free Kuwait, and the abandoned tanks and weaponry of war on the desert sands were
testimony to the ground battle which claimed thousands of Iraqi lives and which was
waged over 100 hours. The war coverage started in January with an ongoing 24-hour
television blitz (albeit a blitz of "experts" voicing their prognostications of war), and
it ended with a surrender by the media.
The television crews and the army of over 1000 journalists who had assembled near
the war zone to "witness" the war saw a few scenes of weary Iraqi soldiers pleading
for mercy at the feet of the US soldiers as evidence of Allied victory. The images
might well have struck a chord in the journalists whose capitulation to the Allied
armed forces was just as complete.
7.5 Saddam, Bush and other leaders
In a war which was characterised by a severe curtailment of access to action, the
leaders of Coalition forces and Iraq naturally assumed centre-stage. Amid the
armchair critiques of war by the "experts", and the descriptions of war scenes from
the reporters grounded by restrictions on media's movements, the speeches by the
political leaders of the nations which were engaged in war provided much-needed
material for the news angle-seeking television, which was searching for both visuals
and sound bites. Speeches by George Bush, John Major and Bob Hawke formed
some of the highlights of war coverage.
In his speech announcing the beginning of military action on January 17 (Australian
time), George Bush said:

Five months ago, Saddam Hussein started this cruel war against Kuwait.
Tonight the battle has been joined.
There was no television station in Australia (presumably, anywhere in the world)
which paraphrased that. It was good television to let the leader speak. Obviously the
speech was well-written.
Some may ask, why act now? Why not wait? The answer is clear. The
world could wait no longer... While the world waited, Saddam Hussein
systematically raped, pillaged and plundered a tiny nation, no threat to
his own. He subjected the people of Kuwait to unspeakable atrocities
and, among these, maimed and tortured innocent children.
While the world waited, Saddam sought to add to the chemical weapons
arsenal, he now possesses an infinitely more dangerous weapon of mass
destruction, a nuclear weapon. And while the world waited, while the
world talked peace and withdrawal, Saddam Hussein dug in and moved
massive forces into Kuwait...
Saddam clearly felt that by stalling and threatening and defying the
United Nations, he could weaken the forces arrayed against him. While
the world waited, Saddam Hussein met every overture of peace with
open contempt. While the world prayed for peace, Saddam prepared for
war...
The television listened, the cameras stilled by the rhetoric. It did not matter that the
camera could not film any significant movement of the more than 700,000 Allied
troops in the war zone or catch any of planes actually embarking on one of the more
than 70,000 bombing sorties into Iraq. The theme of war was encapsulated in the
speeches, with clear signs posted over "the good" and "the bad", the "just" and the
"defiant".
The camera piece by Bush was echoed by the other leaders of the Coalition, in

Australia most notably by Bob Hawke, so far from the scene of action and yet so
seemingly participative. Committing Australian forces to war, Hawke read out to the
camera:
We all wish for peace, but we cannot have peace just by wishing for it or
just by talking about it; we have to work for it, and, sometimes,
tragically, we have to fight for it...
If denial of access was going to restrict television coverage of war to a war of words,
at least we had some quality speech writing.
The television turned to images of Saddam Hussein and his quotes to the Iraqi media
as well, though the Iraqi leader did not fare so well in translation. Every leader is
Julius Caesar in his own country, and he must have had his speech handcrafted to
suit his audience. Before the start of the ground war, on February 24, Saddam told
his people in a speech broadcast over Baghdad Radio:
At the time when the UN Security Council decided to discuss the Soviet
peace initiative, which we endorsed, the treacherous committed
treachery. The despicable Bush and his treasonous agent (Saudi King)
Fahd, and all those who supported them in committing crimes, shame
and aggression, committed the treachery...Fight them, oh brave, splendid
men. Oh men of the mother of all battles. Fight them with your faith in
God...
"The mother of all battles" made news on television, though the rest of it lost the
battle of rhetoric in the translation. The obvious difficulty for the television media
was to pin him down to a location and hence the use of old film footage of Saddam
Hussein to accompany paraphrased quotes from his speeches. The Iraqi leader's
lengthy interview to CNN reporter Peter Amett compensated for the absence of

"live" footage showing the leader speaking to camera before or after that. However,
the Iraqi leader's measured words and his cautious tone, which were almost entirely
devoid of threats, posturing or any of the "villainous" qualities which had been
ascribed to him by Bush and other leaders, were at variance with his media image so
far. Predictably, the scenes and quotes from this exclusive interview were not
re-used to illustrate other stories involving the leader in the following days.

The demonisation of Saddam Hussein was a recurring theme of sound bites from the
Coalition side. As one-liners in English sounded better on television, there was little
to be gained by a sense of fair play giving Saddam Hussein the right to reply to an
assessment like this, from General Schwarzkopf:

He (Saddam Hussein) is neither a strategist nor is he schooled in
operational art, nor is he a tactician, nor is he a general, nor is he a
soldier. Other than that he's a great military man.

General Schwarzkopf, who was speaking to camera as the ground war was close to
victory, also discovered he could fill the frame adequately when television crews
were eager for war footage. He described the battles to the media during his
briefings at the Coalition headquarters in Saudi Arabia, providing video film where
necessary of "precision bombing" successes. As the ground war was concluding.
Gen Schwarzkopf was the narrator who made the television crews "see" the war:

We have heard that they took up to 40,000 (Kuwaiti people taken to Iraq
by departing Iraqi soldiers). There was a large, very large number of
young Kuwaitis - male - taken out of the city within the last week or so.

It is generally accepted that television acts as the eyes and ears of the viewers.

During the war, Gen Schwarzkopf and his team of briefers, and occasionally, the
White House officials in Washington, acted as the eyes and ears of television during
the war. They described the scenes of battle, conjectured on the losses and gains,
exulted over the victories, surmised on the war strategies of the enemy, and
exonerated the Coalition forces from their mistakes.
After the missile strike on a Baghdad air raid shelter in Amiriya (on February 13)
which killed over 500 civilians, US military spokesman Brigadier-General Richard
Neal insisted the shelter was a legitimate military target:
I am here to tell you that it was a military command and control facility.
I have no idea why there were civilians in the bunker at 0040 in the
morning...it defies logic. But from a personal point of view, I am
outraged that civilians were put in harm's way, and I lay the blame for
that on the Iraqi leadership. (Bickerton and Pearson, 1991, 124)
Political leaders and military officials were in focus not merely for the explanations
they gave for the events, they were also the only source of factual information for a
media which was tied to a military outpost in Saudi Arabia. Major movements in the
battle, estimates of military hardware destroyed, missiles launched, targets hit, or
interpretations of the outcome of battles had to come from these sources.
The media's complete dependence on the authorities - political and military - for
intelligence about every phase of war brought them automatically into focus. The
battle was launched when the political leaders said so, the battle progressed when
the military authorities declared it, and the battle was won when the political and
military officials proclaimed it. The enemy was taken prisoner, their tanks were
destroyed, their armies routed, their Scud launchers hounded, their targets hit, their

military facilities taken out, their elite Republican guard made to beat a retreat when
the Coalition authorities appeared in front of the news cameras and solemnly
declared it. It was not confirmation of news, it was usually the first information as
well as the only confirmation.
The authorities were also in the news for one very important reason: for several days
during the war, there was no other news except their comings and goings. George
Bush going to church, Tariq Aziz visiting Russia, a Russian diplomat visiting the
US, Mikhail Gorbachev meeting the foreign ministers of Kuwait and Iran, Iranian
foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati speaking in Bonn on Iraqi readiness for
withdrawal of troops from Kuwait, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater saying
the US is studying Moscow's peace plan and Saddam Hussein accusing the Allies of
killing civilians and destroying property - the television had mainly these
movements to report during the dull phase in the war between the battle of Khafli on
January 30 and George Bush's ultimatum for the beginning of ground war on
February 22. It seemed as though the tanks had ground to a halt, the soldiers had
gone home and the airplanes had stopped flying so that the political arena could get
busier.
But, in fact, the war was still going on, the aerial bombardments were still
continuing. Only the battle was even more invisible than before. General Norman
Schwarzkopf said on February 19 that the Iraqi army was losing more than 100
tanks a day. The television crew did not get to witness a single one of those tanks
being "taken out".

Despite the large number of faces representing authority which we saw, there were
significant faces which we did not see: King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, the Emir of
Kuwait, the rulers of the Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, most notably.
They were underwriting the war, paying for expenses incurred, and were the
invisible prime movers in the war. Their nations perceived the threat of Saddam
Hussein's aggression, they controlled the production of most of the oil produced
from the region and their authoritarian regimes and control of oil wealth were
ideologically challenged by the coup d'etat inflicted by Iraq on Kuwait. They did not
have a word to say to the media and their whereabouts were largely unknown during
the war. Perhaps they would not have provided the kind of sound bites which
George Bush, John Major, Bob Hawke, or Saddam Hussein voluntarily gave the
media, but it would certainly have added another dimension to the coverage given to
the leaders during the Gulf war. But, realistically, the Gulf rulers of the oil
producing nations have never had a freewheeling media in their own countries, they
had never felt the need to explain anything to their own citizens let alone the rest of
the world, and they were not going to buck the trend now, merely to provide
interesting war-time programming. But if they had, we would at least have known
what the Coalition was fighting for.

7.6 The other side
The overriding example of journalistic bravado during the war was the decision of
CNN joumahst Peter Amett, the only western journalist with a communication link
with the outside worid, to stay put in Baghdad when all the other journalists had left
Iraq three days after aerial bombardment of the nation by the Coalition forces began.

He was hailed and criticised, discussed and reviled by the rest of the media as he
began to speak to his network headquarters from Baghdad. It now appears quite
certain that Iraq had factored in the propaganda value of letting him stay on and
witness the war from the beleaguered side, as is evident from a reading of Amett's
book, Live From the Battlefield : From Vietnam to Baghdad - 35 Years In The
World's War Zones (1994). Saddam Hussein's unusual decision to grant a lengthy
interview to Peter Amett was as much Amett's strategic move to propel CNN's
ratings as it was a tactical master stroke of Saddam Hussein to make himself heard
in the West.

From the point of view of television coverage, Peter Amett's decision to stay back in
Baghdad, despite accusations of toeing the Iraqi line of propaganda (which he had to
do, with media minders constantly monitoring his reports and movements), gave a
continuity of information from the "other" side. The war coverage from the
Coalition side of events was largely one-sided, with hardly any Iraqi joumalist
making his voice heard in the western media. It was vital that the war be seen from
the Iraqi side, despite the physical danger it posed to the joumalists and the risk of
being a propaganda tool.

This was probably why there were 45 westem joumalists in Baghdad by the evening
of January 16, one day before the beginning of the war. Until most of them were
ordered out after three days of war, their television coverage had an element of
drama in it.

The first few reports from Baghdad, as soon as the war began, betrayed the

excitement of the journalists as they viewed the tracer bullets lighting up the night
sky. Any hopes that the reporters would be valuable witnesses to war damage were
soon dashed as most of them were soon up against strict censorship and media
management, which was ironically being practised on the other side of the battle
lines in Saudi Arabia as well Iraqi officials escorted the journalists to various sites
when they were given permission to travel outside Baghdad. Invariably, the
journalists saw what the Iraqi minders wanted them to see. The journalists faced the
high probability of becoming willing tools of Iraqi propaganda, the main thrust of
which was to tell the western audience that the Coalition forces were targeting
civilians. This explains why, despite the presence of many journalists in Baghdad,
there wasn't any incisive reporting from them. The few reports which were sent from
Iraq by western journalists contained a warning that the reports had been subjected
to Iraqi censorship. In effect, broadcasting reports within the parameters of Iraqi
censorship became a pointless exercise. The warnings that informed the audience of
the conditions under which the journalists worked also undermined the credibility of
the reports. It was clear that the presence of western journalists within Iraq was
largely symbolic, serving only to pay homage to the dictum that both sides of a
conflict should be seen.

Despite the apparent futility of reporting from Iraq, there were a few significant
reports. In spite the journalists' awareness that the Iraqis were getting propaganda
mileage out of their presence, there were at least three instances when their reports
made an impact despite the censorship warning.

One was Peter Amett's report on January 23 concerning the bombing of what

appeared to him to be a milk factory. The Coalition forces insisted it was a military
facility, but the reporter, who was escorted to the site by Iraqi minders, thought
otherwise.
At 8.30 that night, January 23,1 broadcast my first report on the factory's
destruction. I gave details of what I had seen and quoted officials as
saying it was the only source of infant formula for Iraqi children. I had
seen no evidence that the factory had been used for any other purpose.
(Amett, 1994, 397)
Verification of Peter Amett's findings was impossible and there was no second
opinion as he was the only western journalist present, and as such, the report had the
usual air of Iraqi propaganda. But it left the first shades of doubt as to whether the
Coalition forces could not have made a mistake in choosing their targets for
destruction.
The second instance was television coverage given to the February 13 bombing of
an air raid shelter in Amiriya in Iraq which killed at least 500 people.
The Iraqis lifted all censorship restrictions as daylight revealed the sheer
extent of the horror...Fihn crews scrambled around the tragic scene as
Iraqi minders pointed them towards the charred remains and the grieving
relatives. When they returned to the Al-Rashid hotel to transmit their
pictures, they found that their minders were happy for them to say
whatever they liked about what they had seen. When the pictures
themselves were so expressive, words would be superfluous. (Taylor,
1992,187-188)
The genuineness of the images of grief from Amiriya in fact fiirthered the doubts
over Coalition claims of smart-bombing and focused attention on the unseen war
that inflicted "collateral damage".

The third instance of reporting from Iraq which managed to overcome the
propaganda tag was, of course, the interview given to Peter Amett by Saddam
Hussein. There was no question that it was allowed to be broadcast because the Iraqi
leader realised it might help clear some of the smear campaign unleashed on him by
western leaders, notably by George Bush. He had been compared to Hitler. He was
perceived as the villain in this war, and this was his soliloquy, his chance to open his
mind to the audience. Whether or not he managed to convince the world he was not
evil is debatable. But the interview gave the Iraqi leader over an hour of air time on
western television channels, with the possibility of being quoted and assessed for the
duration of the war and thereafter. During the entire war, it was the only occasion
when Saddam Hussein addressed a western television audience through a western
reporter. For those who had believed the Iraqi leader was afraid of being seen for
fear of being targeted by bombing raids, it was also proof that he was wily enough to
engineer to be seen and heard by the rest of the world.
Apart from the reporting by western reporters, the television networks also
occasionally used footage from Iraqi television for whatever it was worth, with the
commentary clearly stating that the source was not known for authenticity. Film
showing Saddam Hussein being greeted by admirers, mingling with his soldiers and
conferring with his military officials was shown on Australian news programs with
the reporter wondering if these pictures were spontaneous and recent.
While the Iraqi propaganda machinery was believed to go to any lengths to achieve
its objectives, a similar belief about the Coalition forces was stated with more
discretion and circumspection, when it was stated at all. There was, in fact, very

little spontaneity about the interviews with pilots returning from bombing sorties, or
about the film showing planes taking off and landing in Saudi Arabia after their
missions. Coalition military claims that the Arab nations' soldiers were leading the
assault into Khafli and the march into Kuwait were also equally suspect, but it was
not until much later that they were revealed to be exaggerated claims aimed to boost
the morale of Arab soldiers.

Regardless of the differential treatment accorded to the Iraqi and Coalition minders
by the journalists in their reports, the television crews' tenacious presence within
Iraq served as a statement of media intentions to report both sides of the story.

7.7 Censorship and propaganda

Censorship during the Gulf war was a fact that the media was resigned to from the
outset, when the media pools were being formed. Containing the flow of information
was one of the unstated objectives of media management, as was evident from the
US political and military leaders' obsession with exorcising the Vietnam Syndrome,
which was a euphemism for "victory for the media and defeat for the armed forces".

It was a war in which the censorship was felt through its effects, its range and its
consequences. And yet, paradoxically, the censorship during the Gulf War did not
cripple the coverage of war. It did not affect the continuity of news flow. What we
saw during the war was not the whole story, nor would all of it pass the test of
veracity in a second look, yet the semblance of progression in the war was kept up.

The television coverage started with a film and video blitz, providing great diversity
of datelines, switching from one location to another, from one reporter to another,
from one armchair critic to another, and from one source of authority to another,
cutting across continents and cultural and linguistic barriers. It was a mighty show of
media presence all over the globe. The event and the time were ripe for picking.

The media's technological and professional capability to be quickly "airborne" with
the images was never underestimated by the authorities. Unlike in the previous
limited conflicts, the authorities were forthcoming with "news". From the point of
view of the media managers, it was a logical progression to establish the lessons of
media containment learnt during the previous limited conflicts. To black out news
completely was not merely possible, it was easy. But then, the media would be free
to draw its own conclusions, which, once again, would only aggravate the Vietnam
Syndrome. It would be much more rational to provide a continuous and severely
limited access to news, especially since the war was going the Coalition way even
before it started. There was a possibility that Iraq could inflict casualties on the
Coalition forces and embarrass the nations which had come together to rout Iraq.
There also existed the possibility of overkill, of Coalition forces hitting too hard and
killing too many. But, with a careful mix of censorship and propaganda, precise
figures would never be known. As it turned out, the US and British experience in
containing media's curiosity in previous conflicts paid off Not only was there a flow
of news to keep the media momentarily occupied, there was no leak of information
in areas which were cordoned off These areas related to casualties.

And for the first time, the censorship on the Coalition side perfectly matched the

censorship on the Iraqi side. For the same reasons, there were no precise figures on
casualties from the Iraqi side. Revealing a very high loss would affect the Iraqi
people's morale and the leader's credibility, and putting the loss at a very low figure
to save face would be vigorously contradicted by the enemy. The Iraqi losses were
roughly estimated at between 100,000 and 200,000. It could take a very long time to
count from 100,000 to 200,000 but no one seemed to mind the guesstimate.
If the media managers on the Iraqi and Coalition sides had swapped places, the
media perception on either side would not have been very different. The media
containment objectives on either side were similar, though the Coalition censorship
was more subtle, and, on the Iraqi side, it was an extension of peace-time policies.
Managing the news was nothing new for the Iraqis, the Saudis and the other Arab
Coalition nations, where the media was mostly an arm of the government, but for
America, it was a tool that was being perfected. The judicious mix of censorship and
propaganda was a discovery even for Kuwait's ruling family, which hired a
Washington public relations firm to ensure media coverage that would facilitate the
legitimacy of their return to power.
The media had, sensing discretion was the better part of valour and realising a flow
of news was better than no news at all, completely forsaken its mission to inquire
and pursue the facts independently. It was a willing and ready media, glad to be
shown anything related to the war and capable of transmitting quickly and
efficiently whatever it heard. It was as if the media had decided to broadcast
whatever was available, leaving it to posterity to discuss what was missing and

inaccurate. Here, the total dependence on authority was a convenient modus
operandi: if anything proved to be false, it won't be a reflection on the media, it
would be because the media was at the receiving end of misinformation.
Far away from the battlefront, on every level of authority - military and political there was a general consensus that the media had to be kept on a leash. Hence, Bob
Hawke's direct attack on ABC for pursuing an independent line of inquiry, albeit
from an impossibly distant observation post on the war. Hence, George Bush's
invocation of the Vietnam Syndrome in the speeches just before and after the war.
Those who asserted their freedom, found the war zone was not the place for it. Most
reporters, caught between authoritarian military minders and a hostile desert, chose a
more docile option, not wishing to lose their accreditation and the only chance to
report the war. A CBS crew which found itself across the border in Iraq was
captured, interrogated and sent to Baghdad. Any memories of Vietnam, which the
reporters might have cherished, soon vanished. It was a different terrain and a more
stringent media management.
Freedom of movement - media arrogating to itself the peace-time right of access was a crime and punishment was swift in its ability to act as a deterrent. The short
duration of the war also prevented the media from exploration of official channels to
lift or relax the censorship. The media's best bet was to be part of the pool and abide
by its rules of censorship and carry out the task assigned to it in a soldierly manner:
the task of transmitting the "news" given to it.

Propaganda went hand in hand with censorship. If censorship kept the media on a
leash, propaganda allowed it to go in the direction pointed to it. Censorship made
sure the media did not get anything which could embarrass the military authorities
later; propaganda ensured the media got something to chew on, even if it was the
wrong thing.

Propaganda worked from Day 1 of the war, when "successful" aUied bombings were
widely reported. The bombings in fact had not yet been proven to be a success.
Propaganda ensured the Iraqis were blamed for the oil spills, while the Coalition
bombings were also to blame, at least partially, for the extent of the pollution arising
from the spills. The pictures of dying cormorants, so graphically shown on
television, were later proved to be from another ecological disaster, not from the
Gulf war at all. Television also spread the lie about the impending Allied attack from
the sea, while in fact the Coalition forces were stepping up their ground offensive.
This was later explained as part of the Coahtion strategy of misleading the Iraqis. It
was an instance of television being used as a strategic weapon.

The truth about number of dead and the effects of bombings will probably never be
known, as the camouflage of war-speak provided a diversion for television.
Descriptions of smart bombing, techno war and enemy positions being "taken out"
prevented the tragic human dimensions of war from being known.

The propaganda was a continuation of the line of argument pursued by the US
during the months leading to the war, when the themes of Saddam-is-Hitler and
Iraq-is-evil were reinforced by those in authority through reports and stories of

doubtful authenticity. Stories of Iraqi brutality in Kuwait were repeated by the
President of the United States to the media to the extent that a quest for their
verification would amount to an unpatriotic act for the US media. Many of these
stories, including those about Iraqis leaving Kuwaiti babies to die in hospitals, were
later proved to have been fabricated. The extent of American propaganda was
revealed after the war coverage was over and the images of a "just" and "clean" war
had been reinforced through the television and the print media. It was also argued in
critical retrospect that the US leaders deliberately overestimated to the media the
size and capability of Iraqi army in order to justify magnitude of attack mounted on
Iraq. The missile war which we saw so little of but heard a lot about on television
didn't quite reflect reality either:
The Pentagon presented sanitized images of a new kind of high tech war
between machines, not men. We saw videos of outgoing Patriot(ic)
American missiles impacting on incoming Iraqi Scud missiles. However,
we only learned later in the war that the Patriots only hit the Scud
propulsors and did not destroy their warheads, which still hit buildings
and killed people. We also were not shown that both missiles fell back to
the ground to cause damage. Indeed only on April 18 did the IHT reveal
that "he Patriot may have caused as much damage as it prevented".
(Frank, Summer 91, 80)
As for ecological damage caused by the Iraqis,
wildlife conservationists now estimate that half of 1 per cent of the birds
in the area were affected. The percentage of Iraqi people killed was very
much larger, but their pictures did not go around the worid. As to the oil
slicks themselves, Claude-Marie Vadrot of the Paris Journal de
Dimanche (Feb 3) writes "none of the existing slick in the Gulf has
resulted from voluntary action or piracy, and four out of five are the
responsibility of allied forces." (Frank, ibid, 84)
Yet Saddam Hussein was portrayed as a Hitler, an environmental terrorist, and a

ruthless political leader who would not hesitate to use chemical weapons. Except for
the Scud missiles, which became useful tools for the Coalition forces to justify the
use of their weapons of mass destruction, there were no reports on television of
Iraqis using any weapon of equivalent destructive power on the Coalition forces.
The smart bombs used by the Coalition forces were not as precise as they were
touted to be. Smart bombs only accounted for 7 per cent of the tonnage of bombs
dropped. Of the laser guided bombs, 40 per cent missed their targets. Not only were
the bombs not as smart as claimed, even the soldiers could have smartened up a little
more: of the American soldiers killed, 23 per cent were hit by their own side.
The television's constant focus on George Bush, his speeches, and his theme of a just
war showed its active role as an unquestioning consumer of American "policy" on
the war. Propaganda was part of this "policy", as indeed it is bound to be of any
nation which goes to war.
Television used all its available means to cover the war, and the authorities used all
their available means, including television, to portray the war as they wanted to. The
magnitude of media resources deployed in the Gulf did not get reflected in the
quality of coverage we received as television became an uncritical conduit of
Coalition propaganda. Gerald Long, a former director of Reuters, observed that the
media "sent an elephant to pick up a matchstick". {Index On Censorship 2, 1992, 7)
He blamed television's functional competence as a medium:
Information needs detachment, reflection, thought. Mass television does
not deal in such things, its function is to deliver instant feelings, the
stronger the better. This is not the essential nature of the medium, but it

is the way it is exploited in the USA and Western Europe at the present
time. Prime-time information is assimilated to entertainment: it has its
stars, the presenters. It confuses topicality, immediacy, direct
transmission, with information. (Long, ibid, 7)

7.8 Hits and misses
Obviously, faced with a great deal of censorship and propaganda, the war which we
saw wasn't quite what happened. Nevertheless, the television managed to show us a
war. Even today, many of the gaps in the television coverage have not been
explained. Some of the answers, particularly relating to the extent of health damage
to the Coalition troops, are still emerging. It is unlikely that all the facts about the
war will ever be known, but it would have raised the television's credibility a great
deal if it had plausibly posed at least some of the unanswered questions while the
war was being covered.
One of the most enduring enigmas of the Gulf war must be casualty figures from
both the Iraqi and Coalition forces. How many Iraqis were killed and how many of
them were civilians? How many Iraqi soldiers were killed as they were retreating?
Estimates of casualties need to be followed up, and given the television's fleeting
attention span even during the war, it is unlikely that a greater focus would be given
to Iraqi casualties after the war. The television's failure to follow the trail of human
destruction on both sides of the war, particularly on the Iraqi side, where the
casualties climbed by the thousands every day, led to an obfuscation of the nature of
war. The media missed the mark in its perception of what it was doing during the
war. It mistook the flow of information for accuracy of information.
So what kind of war was actually seen? Certainly not the war fought at

the point of perhaps its most critical action, namely the front line of Iraqi
troops. As the BBC's Mark Urban said after the war:
"I think it's undoubtedly true that the greatest failure in the reporting of
the war was the impossibility of showing the reality of what the air
forces were doing to Saddam Hussein's armed forces, because that really
was where the war was won, and that was the reality of probably
90-95% of the killing which went on." (Taylor, 1992,277-278)

The war was a highly unequal one: the Coalition forces were vastly superior in
power to the Iraqi forces they sought to crush. This was reflected in the highly
unequal number of casualties sustained: 240 Coalition forces killed in action
compared to Iraq's 20,000 (Iraqi version) to 100,000 (Coalition version of Iraqis
killed, with an admitted margin of error of 50 per cent). The war neither just (nor
was the Iraqi aggression, for that matter), nor was it clean. Most of the weaponry
used in the war was neither accurate nor "smart". The "collateral damage" - a
euphemism for unintended human casualties - during the war was substantial. The
leaders of war on either side engaged in presenting a picture of war which was later
proved to be unreal. The damage caused by the war, particulariy the environmental
damage and the human terror unleashed, was as much attributable to Coalition
actions as to Iraqi deeds. There was scant attention to the realistic number of Iraqi
soldiers in Kuwait, and to the disproportionately large number of Coalition forces
gathered to oust them.

Television told a story of war which did not include these material facts. The broad
outline of the war as heard on television was correct: over three quarters of a miUion
Coalition forces were air-lifted to the desert to drive out the Iraqi forces from
Kuwait. The was was fought over 43 days, mostly from the air. The war was not
merely fought to dispel the Iraqi army from Kuwait, it was also waged to cripple

Iraq's military might within Iraq and damage its potential to recover any semblance
of power, in spite of the casualties this might inflict on the civilians. The final 100
hours of the war, termed ground war, was staged to take physical repossession of
Kuwait. Thousands of Iraqis died as a result and a few hundred Coalition soldiers
died in action.
Though that was the war in sum, it was a story told in the oral tradition. We saw the
storytellers - the military and the political leaders of war - but we did not see the air
war or the ground war. A few fleeting images - of tracer bullets lighting the sky, of
planes taking off from the airfields, of a few soldiers (out of over 750,000 on the
Coalition side) talking to the camera, of tanks moving into the desert, of Iraqi
soldiers surrendering - were what we saw. The war generals talked a great deal to
the camera, which we got to see. They told a story of victory, which they extended
to the moral dimension as well, but this was not different from the vanquished
leader's story to his side.
There was a high degree of similarity on the broad outline as well as on the details of
the story as heard and seen through the various networks, as the pool system created
a uniform coverage. The media managers understood the medium they were seeking
to control and they ensured all the networks picked up just one thread of the story
and followed it through to its limited conclusion.

CHAPTERS. WAR OR WAR REACTION?

Content analysis of seven days' Gulf War television coverage,
from January 17 to 23 on Australian channels 9,10 and ABC.

8.1 Outline
Operation Desert Storm was a major television event. On the first day, news about
the progress of war was broadcast continuously on television and on subsequent
days the war occupied considerable air time on all channels in Australia.

The images of war, despite media constraints of official censorship, claimed for
television a pre-eminence as a news medium which it had not seen before. The
intensity of coverage led to the war being dubbed a television war, a view which
disregards the realities of human casualties and the violence of bomb attacks. While
the television was engrossed in the pursuit of war stories, there were few reflections
on the content of television reporting.

Basic questions on the coverage remain unanswered. How much of war did we see?
Did events in the United States dominate the coverage? Whose perspective of war
did we witness - the journalists', the politicians' or the war generals'? Did the war
mean an information leap for the media and was there a greater diversity of
coverage?

Some of these questions are perhaps best answered by a qualitative assessment of
the media. But content analysis and a quantitative evaluation are useful tools and
effective accessories in the process of judging the media coverage of war.

In fact, a closer look at the content of television presents a few insights and forms a
pattern on the basis of which a hypothesis could be formulated for verification by
other methods of study.
This study argues that television coverage of the Gulf War presented more of
reaction to the war than actual footage of war or war-related activities in the Gulf.
The viewers saw a war story which was restricted in its coverage of a range of data,
with large information gaps being filled in by a repetition of what was available and
close at hand for coverage.
8.2 Methodology
This study assesses the content of approximately three hours of war coverage
broadcast on channels 9,10 and ABC in Australia during the evening news bulletins
of January 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of 1991. The segment of television selected
for study is the evening news broadcast. No part of special war coverage programs
(like A Current Affair, for instance) is included. The segments chosen from each
channel compete with one another and therefore place a similar emphasis on the
leading stories of the day.
The dates chosen comprise the first one week of Operation Desert Storm. Channel 9
coverage of five days (Jan 17, 19,21,22 and 23) has been included in the study,
while Channel 10 has been included for two days (Jan 18 and 20) and ABC for two
days (Jan 17 and 18). Availability of video is the main reason for this. The study
could have been restricted to just one channel (Channel 9), but the inclusion of

coverage on Channel 10 and ABC at least for two days achieves a balance. Only
ABC covered the war from Jordan, and only Channel 10 covered the war
extensively from Iraq. Channel 9 reported mainly from Saudi Arabia, Israel and the
US. The diversity provided by Channel 10 and ABC, it is hoped, will assist in the
generalizability of coverage by neutralising the limitations of any one channel's
coverage. Out of a total of nine segments analysed over seven days, five are from
Channel 9 and four are not.
8.3 Coding
Television, unlike print, poses a few problems in coding. It is not often clear where a
report begins and where it ends. A television report, unlike a newspaper report
carrying a distinct heading, may contain several discrete messages and could form
the equivalent of several newspaper reports. At times, an entire segment from a
reporter may serve as no more than a series of captions for the visuals, with very
little message content, apart from conveying the spirit of the story.
This necessitated clear coding guidelines for all categories and distinct criteria for
coding. Categories and units for this study have been identified after an initial
informal study and keeping in mind the areas where variations could be quantified
leading to a conclusion. Some of the categories are:
(1) Dateline: Segments of tape are coded for the place of origin of reports. However,
the reports may not be about the place from where it emanates. For instance, a report
from Amman need not be about events in Jordan but may be about war preparations
in Saudi Arabia. Such a report is classified as dateline Amman, denoting the place of

origin.

(2) Visuals: This category specifies who or what is seen. Television visuals are
constantly changing, except when a reporter or studio anchor is speaking to the
camera, and various elements linger in the foreground and background where the
camera focuses momentarily. Though an area of classification difficulty, this
category mainly identifies three elements and the proportion in which they occur in
relation to the total footage studied: (a) studio anchor, (b) the reporter on the spot
and (c) war action visuals.
Other likely fmdings from this category which are possible, but which were not
made because of the limited quantity of film studied, relate to (a) the appearance of
leaders like Bob Hawke, George Bush and Saddam Hussein; (b) the scenes
involving peace demonstrators; (c) the use of "experts", and, (d) the scenes from
various nations.
(3) Immediacy of news: The four categories under this classification are hard news,
commentary, interviews and backgrounder. Hard news is identified as containing a
message relating to events which have taken place recently and which have not been
seen before. A viewpoint from a reporter is commentary, viewpoint from others is
interview and commentary for file film to press home a perspective is backgrounder.
Broadcasting visuals and messages which have been seen or heard before is
classified as repetition.
(4) Message: In this study, messages are analysed for repetition, a finding reinforced
by posing the question: has this message been broadcast before in the segments

analysed? When a report has only one message and it has been heard before, it is
classified as repetition. This classification also helps assess the level of noise
(repeated messages detracting from the flow of news) in the coverage.

(5) Voice-over: Whether the speaker whose voice is heard is out of vision (OOV, in
television terminology) or seen while speaking indicates the amount of face-gazing
the viewers go through. Also, the time taken by OOV is the time that viewers get to
"see" the events, the people or the places which make the news. Since the Gulf War
involved a number of nations and there was widespread interest throughout the
world, individual reactions were readily available for reporters and it was a matter of
choice whether television chose to show the events or faces of people who had
things to say. The two categories used are "voice-over" and "speaker seen".

(6) News value: This category is an attempt to find out why what is shown is shown
at all. The four categories of news value are war, reaction, consequence and analysis.
Other possible categories like local interest (when Australian scenes are shown) and
prominence (for instance, when Gorbachev is shown) are not used mainly to keep
the number of categories small and more broad-based. Gorbachev speaking, for
instance, is classified as reaction. Stock market prices rising or falling due to war
outbreak is classified as consequence. It could be classified as reaction, but in this
study reaction relates to people voicing their fears and opinions. The effort is to
isolate the amount of film which contains war as a distinctive news value. This
relates to film showing war, war vehicles and weapons, war preparation, war
damage and war-generated panic in the war zone. (People scurrying about in Israel
as the missile falls is classified as war but the expression of grief in US and Australia

is classified as reaction.)

(7) Air time: For the sake of convenience, the study uses the video counter instead of
the stop-watch.

8.4 Findings

Content analysis mainly yields quantitative findings. Before we come to these
results, it must be emphasised that a study of television content also gives insight
into aspects of television production. The structure of television narrative, the
process of reporting and organisation of news become clearer.

8.4.1 Organisation of news

War news comes in packages which the viewer unwraps, or rather, it is a series of
loops through which the viewer goes. The outermost loop is the studio anchor, who
announces the news and passes the viewer on to the regional bureau or the reporter
on the spot, who in turn slips the viewer into the final loop, the event being reported.
This transmigration of attention for the viewer is part of the "seeing" adventure that
television offers.

In a linear fashion, the news flow proceeds thus:

Studio anchor>reporter on the spot>news event.

The news reporter may or may not appear on the screen. Whether he does or not, his
presence is distinctly recognisable from the audio channel.

As the news relating to an event ends, the reporter may again use the prerogative to
appear on the screen, as a closing gesture, handing the viewer back to the studio
anchor, who will go on to the next report. The linear flow is repeated for the next
report.

During the war coverage, the studio anchor performs a crucial role, akin to that of a
war general planning the troop movements from the office headquarters. On the
screen, it is the studio anchor who delegates the job of news transmission to the
reporter and then takes charge again to announce the next development. The
organisation of news reporting thus takes on the air of a war operation in itself,
where the reporter debriefs the news sources and the studio anchor debriefs the
reporter.

There is also an element of drama in all this, with the studio anchor occasionally
choosing to talk to the reporter "live" via satellite and the reporter taking the time to
wear a gas mask in front of the camera or shouting, "outta here!" when he senses
danger. The narrative at times keeps pace with brisk commentary-style reporting for
what is mainly a visually oriented coverage. Unlike a newspaper, the television is
not fully committed to hard news. Its primary responsibility is to its function as a
highly visual-directed medium, mindful of its common ground with cinema.

The oscillation between news values generated by print journalism (where urgency,
recency and consequence of messages get precedence) and the demands of
appearing in front of a camera as in a movie (where the visual element
predominates) sometimes creates the dichotomy between the visual and audio

elements on television. A report may contain visuals from Iraq with voice-over from
London, and at times there is no evidence of the location of visuals or the voice-over
reporter. It is possible for television war to appear credible without making aspects
of the audio and video channels unambiguous. At times even credibility is not a
necessary factor for visuals being shown on television as the core component of a
report. Pictures of Saddam Hussein being cheered by his soldiers and people on the
streets of Iraq which were shown on Iraqi television form the main visuals of a
report in which the voice-over comments that Saddam could have stage-managed the
appearance. It is quite possible to make the same observation about quite a bit of war
footage from the Allied side, particularly those showing planes taking off in a
silhouette in the night bomb attacks or purportedly flying in the sky headed for Iraq.
These shots could have been taken weeks before the war during an exercise.
Considering the fact that shots such as these form the bulk of war action scenes,
television war lacks credibility of visual substance.

Another factor underlining the dichotomy of television's audio and visual channels
relates to the doubtful correlation at times between what is seen and what is heard. A
series of war action scenes doesn't guarantee a message relating to them. The audio
message could relate to a leader's reaction to the war with the action pictures merely
acting out the word "war". There is thus a dissonance of message between
voice-over and the visual. It is, however, a part of television's narrative technique.

Repetition too is part of the television narrative. Visuals may be repeated when the
message changes, as from hard news to an analysis of the war, or audio messages
may be repeated when fresh visuals make them necessary. Unlike the newspapers,

which make use of bold types for effect, the television war's bold types are created
out of repetition.

The quantitative findings in this study relate to the categories mentioned before.

8.4.2 Datelines (See Table 1)

The studio anchor, though in Sydney, is treated as a distinctly identifiable place and
counted separately. Of the total length of film viewed, 10.8 per cent is devoted to the
studio anchor. The first day of coverage, January 17, sees more of the studio anchor.
Both Channel 9 and ABC have 14 per cent of the Sydney studio anchor (Brian
Henderson for Channel 9 and Richard Morecraft for ABC). As the war progresses,
the studio anchor's visibility declines to around 8-10 per cent. This could be
attributed to the initial scarcity of film from the war front (as stated by Channel 9
about six minutes into the first day's news bulletin) which again could be due to
censorship delays.

Significantly, both Channel 9 and ABC accord the same importance to the studio
anchor on the first day, averaging about 14 per cent. On the second day, the
concurrence is repeated by Channel 10 and ABC, both devoting 10 per cent each for
the studio anchor.

The United States scores the same percentage, about 10.8, as the originating place
for reports. Once again, on Day 1, both Channel 9 and ABC give almost equal space
to US reports, 17.5 and 17 per cent, respectively. Channel 10 relied less on US
reports on the two days on which the channel's film was analysed, January 18 and

20. There seems to be no discernible reason in the film for this. The US hits a high
of 19 per cent on January 22 over Channel 9, mainly due to the coverage of US
reaction to the parading of POWs by Iraq on Iraqi TV. However, Channel 9 has no
reports at all from the US on January 20 and 23, devoting more space instead to
Israel and Saudi Arabia on those two days.

All channels have uniformly intense coverage of events in Australia, which accounts
for a total of 26.5 per cent as the originating place for stories. This total does not
include the Sydney-based studio anchor, who has already been counted as a separate
"dateline". The Austraha-datelined reports, unlike the deceptive London-based or
Jordan-based reports, deal with Australian events, showing the leaders' reactions.
Parliamentary proceedings on the Gulf War, anti-war demonstrators, oil and stock
market consequences of the Gulf War, and the impact of the war on the Jewish and
Muslim communities in the war. There are also reports dealing with Austraha's US
bases and their role in the war. The coverage is exhaustive and gives the Gulf War
on television a distinctive Australian perspective. Except on one day, January 22,
the coverage of Australian events scores over 20 per cent on all the days, hitting a
high of 32.5 per cent on the first day and the next highest of 30 per cent on the
second day, on Channel 9 and 10, respectively.

Australia is, in fact, the best covered nation on Australian television channels during
the war.
S^llHi Arabia, where the Coalition forces had their airbases and, where most of the
troops were stationed, is the source of 19.2 per cent of the coverage. Most of the

"war action", such as planes taking off in the night for bombing sorties and troops
marching, is seen here. Reporters were briefed by Allied military personnel in Saudi
Arabia, which was the centre of the journalists' pool. Saudi Arabia was part of the
war zone, receiving its share of Scud missile attacks, and an observation post as
well, where information on the progress of the war could be accessed by the media.
Justifiably, it is the dateline for nearly a fifth of the reports seen on television, hitting
a high of 42.5 per cent on January 22 on Channel 9. The reason for this is a long
analytical report filed by Peter Harvey, with the overriding message that the Allies
still had a long way to go in destroying Iraqi missile sites. The report shows war
action pictures which carry little evidence of recency or immediacy. They might
well have been recently released file pictures for the news pool.

Ismel, provoked by Saddam Hussein with Scud missiles, is the source of 11.6 per
cent of the coverage, most of it showing the damage caused by the missiles and the
reaction of the government and the people to it. There is also an interesting CNN
segment showing a reporter tracking a Scud missile from the window of his
Jerusalem office and facing the camera wearing a gas mask. War, apparently, has a
way of transmuting the observer into the observed. Israel gets the maximum
coverage, 30 per cent, on Channel 9 on January 23, when Scud missiles hit Tel Aviv
killing three. The reaction to the missile attack is also included in the report, making
it comprehensive.

Iraq registers a total of 10.2 per cent, but oscillates between a low of 4 per cent on
January 17 on ABC and a high of 23 per cent on January 21 on Channel 9. The ABC
pictures were from the file, showing Saddam Hussein inspecting troops, to

accompany the message that he was not the target of attacks. The January 21 report
was the last one filed by the media before Iraq baimed the despatch of visuals from
the country and asked all foreign journalists (with the exception of a few, including a
CNN reporter) to leave the country. The accuracy of bomb attacks (pool pictures
showing laser-guided bombs hitting their targets) also takes up some footage on this
day.

Other nations, like Britain, Jordan (the base for some of ABC's Gulf coverage), and
the Soviet Union (some reaction coverage showing Gorbachev and other leaders) are
not consistently shown on all the channels and segments studied. They average less
than 3 per cent each in the total and are not shown in the tables attached to the study.

8.4.3 War action visuals (See Table 5)

How much war action did we get to see on television? Who is more visible, the
studio anchor or the reporters on locations?

Of the total, 28 per cent comprises war action, reaching a high of 50 per cent on
Channel 9 on January 23 and touching a low of 9.4 per cent on Channel 9 on Day 1.
War action pictures in fact show a progressive rise in visibility from Day 1 to Day 7,
as the table shows. This could be attributed to the availability and the release of
war-related pictures to the news pool. Some war action pictures are used as a
backdrop for analysis by the reporter. At times, there is little hard news in the
pictures, the reporter matching words to pictures caption-style. War action pictures,
therefore, do not necessarily mean more hard news. Also, the definition of war
action, for the purposes of this study, is broad-based and includes footage of planes

and pilots, tanks seen moving, and footage provided by the military of "precision
bombing". There was little scope for the reporter's camera to "witness" the actual
action in the war.

The studio anchor is seen more often than the reporter, who totals 8.5 per cent
compared to the studio anchor's 10.8. The studio anchor breaks down the news,
ushering in the reporter to fill in the details and give the commentary for the visuals
accompanying the message. The reporter has the option to speak to camera, but
obviously uses it only when better subjects are not available as visuals. This
conclusion is justified by the table which shows the reporter's share on television
declining rapidly from Day 1 to Day 7, hitting a high of 17 per cent on Day 1 and a
low of zero on three days towards the end of the week. As war action pictures
became more available, the reporter was content to give a voice-over. (See also the
table for voice-over percentage, which shows a progressive increase from Day 1 to
Day 7.)

Voice-over (See Table 3) totals 68 per cent, reaching a high of 90 on the last day and
registering a low of 43 per cent on the first day. The first day is the day for
introducing the dramatis personae of the war coverage (incidentally, it was also the
day when war action pictures were not available in sufficient quantity) aad this
accounts for the regression of speaker seen category, from 57 per cent on Day 1 to
10 per cent on the last day, with figures in between on the days in between.

The speakers are seen on 38 per cent of the total video analysed. These progressive
figures also indicate that the television crew were getting their act together

progressively, using more dramatic devices to accompany the messages. The last
day's 10 per cent for the speaker seen category consists exclusively of the studio
anchor, with the reporter not putting in an appearance at all, except to a negligible
extent (below 1 per cent). The speaker seen category also includes people
interviewed and shown on television giving their reaction to events. As the figures
show, the last day's coverage does not include any interviews.
Harder to explain is a similar regression in hard news. (See Table 2) which totals 27
per cent of the coverage analysed. It shows a high of 52 per cent on Day 1 on
Channel 9 (ABC shows 45 per cent on the same day) and declines to a low of 10 per
cent on Days 4 and 7. Its decline appears inexplicable and leads to considerable
introspection on coding methods for classifying hard news.
This study assumes a message-oriented definition of hard news, and presupposes
that once the message gets exhausted the rest of the visuals are accompanied by
commentary. Visuals make good television but do not necessarily fall into the
category of hard news even if they have not been seen before. Two things follow as
a result of this coding:
(1) Commentary registers a progression, from 25.5 per cent on Day 1 to 90 per cent
on Day 7, with values in between on the other days. Commentary is 57 per cent of
the total.
(2) Repetition of messages (See Table 6) registers a high of 33 per cent of total
video footage. On Days 3 and 6, of all the visuals viewed, 50 and 58 per cent,
respectively, contain messages which repeat messages heard previously.

latgrviews average 15 per cent, declining from a high of 26.5 per cent on Day 1 on
ABC to a low of zero on Day 7. Backgrounder reports are seen only on Days 3 and
4, averaging 1.4 per cent of the total.
8.4.4 News value (Table 4)
Visuals and messages relating to conflict are deemed to contain war as a news value.
These include the studio anchor reading out news of war, planes taking off for
bombing, troops moving, missiles in the air, the "star-spangled display of force" on
Iraqi skies, and people scurrying for cover during Scud attacks. But war generals and
pilots speaking of their experience of war, leaders like Bush, Hawke and Saddam
giving their views on war, and peace demonstrators, parliamentarians, experts and
community spokespeople voicing their opinions are classified as reaction. Stocks
and oil market prices falling or rising as a result of war, curfew imposed and security
tightened due to war-related danger constitute consequence. The reporter's or the
expert's views on the capabilities of missiles and war planes and on the strategy of
war constitute analysis.
The findings on the basis of these coding criteria show a total of 40.5 per cent of
reaction, 33 per cent of war, 16 per cent of consequence and 10.5 per cent of
analysis.
These results are also justified by figures for reports emanating from the war zone.
Saudi, Israeli and Iraqi datelined stories total only 40 per cent. (Included from these
datelines are reaction stories as well.) Australian and US datelined stories total over

36 per cent, almost entirely consisting of stories which do not contain war as a news
value, but instead containing stories of war reaction or consequence.

The television, therefore, showed more of war reaction and consequence than the
war. Censorship and lack of access to the war zone could be the reasons for this.

TABLE 1: Dateline

Data in %

Date
Jan

17

17

18

18

19

20

21

22

23

Ch

9

ABC

10

ABC

9

10

9

9

9

14

14

10

10

9

10

8

9.5

10

10.8

32.5

25

30

22

28

25

21

19

25

26.5

12.5

15

17.5

8

17

34

30

42.5

35

19.2

4.5

10

16

10.5

11

9

18

30

11.6

United
States

17.5

17

4.3

13.5

14

4

Iraq

15

4

13.5

12.5

6.5

Studio

Total

Anchor

Australia
Saudi
Arabia
Israel

-

19

-

23

-

7.5

10.8

-

10.2

-

TABLE 2: Message
Date
Jan
Ch

17

17

18

18

19

20

21

22

23

9

ABC

10

ABC

9

10

9

9

9

Hard News

52

45

26

24

13

10

31

11.5

10

27

Commentary

25.5 28.5

52

66

74.5

79

69

75

90

57

Interviews

22.5 26.5

22

10

3.5

6.5

-

9

4.5

-

Background

-

-

-

-

13.5

Total

14.6
1.4

TABLE 3: Audio

Date
Jan

17

Ch

Data in %

17

18

18

9

ABC

10

Voice-oyer

43

50

Speaker

57

50

seen

19

20

21

22

23

ABC

9

10

9

9

9

61

69

84.5

83

92.5 85.5

90

68

39

31

15.5

17

7.5

10

32

14.5

Total

TABLE 4: News value

Date
Jan
Ch

17

17

18

18
ABC

19

20

21

22

23

9

10

9

9

9

9

ABC 10

War

24

26.5

46

25

31

43

46

Reaction

59

53

36

38

44

17

36

10.5

11.5

18

22

-

33

18

6.5

9

-

15

Consequence
Analysis

25

7

-

Total

57

33

41

15

40.5

17

28 16

-

42

-

10.5

TABLE 5: Visual

Date
Jan
Ch

17
9

Data in %

17

18

18

19

20

21

22 23 Total

ABC

10

ABC

9

10

9

9

10

8

9.5

Studio
Anchor

14

14

10

10

9

Reporter

17

17

8

12.5

2.2

9.4

20

31

29

26

War Action

-

3

-

34

39

39

9
10 10.8
-

50

8.5
28

TABLE 6: Repetition

20 21 22 23

Date
Jan

17 17

iÖ

18

Ch

9

ABC

10

ABC

9

10

9

9

9

26

7.3

20

50

42

39

58

25

Repetition of
message

40

Tofa/

33

CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION

9.1 Authoritarianism witliin libertarian press

The Gulf War was claimed as a victory for the Allied forces and a defeat for the
media. Though this may seem to be a negative assessment by diehard war
correspondents and those who had expected ground-breaking reporting from the
media, it captured the essential consequence of media management.

If the media had entertained notions of a free and accessible coverage of the war as
they were being sent to Saudi Arabia, it was being idealistic and impervious to the
lessons of history. Along with technological advances which have aided media
coverage and encouraged live coverage of events by satellite, the techniques of
media control have also progressed, perfecting an art which works well for the
authorities. In a way, these methods of media containment constitute a severe
erosion of objectivity of the media.

The media in a democracy assumes an operational degree of freedom of access and
active support from the authorities in its pursuit of information. Yet, a perfect
libertarian press, in which the journalist pursues facts and arrives at a perspective
which has a reasonable resemblance to reality, is practically non-existent. Systemic
and individual limitations (outlined in an eariier chapter in this study) reduce the
media's working level of freedom and determine its process of selectivity. If
authoritarian press can be defined as one in which selectivity - the media's ability to
analyse all available facts, apply the principle of verifiability, and codify them for

publication or broadcasting - is reduced to a level which is considered desirable by
the power elite, then it must be assumed a degree of authority already exists even in
a democratic press, only its effective control is not noticeable in ordinary
circumstances.

However, war is an anomalous situation which affects selectivity in two ways: on
the one hand, it enhances the biases and limitations with which journalists have to
work, and on the other, it empowers the authorities to tailor the work of the media to
suit their needs. Reporting is a process of mediation of reality. Aspects of reality are
described, shown, analysed and discussed in the media so that the end-consumers
can make informed decisions and choices in their reactions to reality.

During the Gulf war, this mediating role was lost.

When the authorities can speak directly to the audience via live
television, rather than indirectiy via the interpretations with which
journalists have traditionally informed their readers and viewers of what
was going on, the gap between the government and governed is
narrowed substantially. What role is therefore left for the media? In the
eighteenth century, the press emerged as an agent of liberty, defining a
role for itself as keeper of the public conscience. But when the public
and the government are at one, as they were in the Gulf War, what role
should the media adopt? (Taylor, 1992, 272)

The media could have had a mediating role, but this role was not given to it, nor was
it performed. Questions which a libertarian press would normally ask were not
asked, and answers which it would normally endeavour to get were not striven for.

The main reason for CNN's television coverage being singled out for a mention in
post-war analyses was due to its coverage of the war from Baghdad. Despite the

criticism CNN reporter Peter Amett faced from jingoistic politicians during the war
that his coverage was toeing the Iraqi hne, Amett emerged as a joumahst who
performed a difficult and essential task of journalism: informing the public from the
other side of war. Yet Amett as well as other joumalists have acknowledged the
severe restrictions and censorship that the westem joumalists had to face in Iraq.
According to New York Times television critic Walter Goodman:

The notion of American correspondents reciting reports approved by the
enemy is uncomfortable, but non-coverage is not an attractive
altemative. The best the journalist can do in enemy territory is to make
plain to viewers and readers the conditions under which he or she is
permitted to operate and try to slip in more information than the minders
have in mind. {CJR, May/June 1991, 30)

Ironically, a consolation of this kind would apply equally well for the American
correspondents' coverage of the American side of war as well A non-coverage was
not "an attractive altemative" and the best they could do was to inform the public,
through the television and the print media, of the conditions under which news was
gathered.

The American government's concem might have been the exorcism of the Vietnam
Syndrome - "our troops", as George Bush stated before the outbreak of war, "will
not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back" - but this objective
coincided with the overthrow and the utter rejection of the presumed freedom which
the media had during the Vietnam war. The battlelines were clearly drawn between
the goals of the military and the media when victory for one was spelt as being
synonymous with the defeat of the other. When military strength was so obviously
weighted in favour of the Coalition of nations fighting Iraq, perceived victory in the

war was very much dependent on making the media subservient to military goals.

Describing the workings of the Saudi Arabian press, Chicago Tribune reporter
Stephen Franklin, who spoke Arabic, interviewed the editor-in-chief of an Arabic
publication, Okaz:

The government relied on journalists like Hashem Abdu Hashem, the
editor-in-chief of Okaz, an articulate, confident and politically careful
man in his early forties. "There is no difference between the government
and the people. We have the same objectives and the same role to play,"
he says. {CJR, July/August, 1991, 25)

The same consonance of purpose was reflected, if not in the stated goals and ideals,
at least in the results achieved by the journalists of the libertarian press during the
Gulf War. The rule of authority appeared complete.

The fact that the mediating role of the media was rendered redundant because the
authorities could now address the public directly was reflected in the news polls
taken in America as the war was still going on, which showed that the audience
approved of government controls on media freedom during the war.

The rationale for independent journalism and freedom of the press seemed to have
been cut at the roots during the war. Not only did the authorities manage the flow of
information, the consumers of information seemed to approve of the way it was
being done. Despite the vast differences noticed by the media between the styles of
censorship by the Allied commanders and the Iraqi forces, a description of the
layered flow of information points to a commonality of intent. Sydney H.
Schanberg, who won a Pulitzer prize in 1976 for his coverage of the fall of

Cambodia, observed:
It's what has been added to these traditional ground rules, however, that
constitutes the muzzle. First, the only way a reporter can visit a frontline
unit is by qualifying for the "pool" system, whereby a handful of
reporters represents the entire press corps and shares the story with
everybody...It gets worse. Though the pool reporters are allowed at the
front, their visits are anything but spontaneous. The pools get taken only
where the military decides to take them. They are accompanied at all
times by an escort officer, even when interviewing troops, which means
that truth and candor on the part of the interviewees often become instant
casualties. When a pool gets back from a guided visit, all stories and
footage must be submitted to a "security review" - a euphemism for
censorship. {Washington Journalism Review, March 1991, 24)
The Western press, which symbolises the maximum operationally feasible freedom,
underwent during the war a system of control which was not unlike the peacetime
controls at work on the authoritarian press.
9.2 The Arab press and the libertarian press
The Khaleej Times, an English newspaper published in Dubai, is a typical product of
the authoritarian press. The newspaper covered the war events extensively, and, in
terms of volume, the reports were plentiful. Wartime controls were taken for granted
by the newspaper, because they did not exceed what the press went through
normally. The newspaper's coverage of local news was always non-adversarial, and
the war in Dubai's backyard was covered without the vital ingredient: the local angle
to the war. Iraq's anger against the UAE for overproduction of oil and for the alleged
sale of oil in the blackmarket undercutting Iraq's priceline was conveniently
overiooked by the few perspective stories which were published. Reports on the
whereabouts of the rulers and their thoughts on the war were conspicuous by their

absence. The newspaper made extensive use of wire services - copy filed by mostly
American and British reporters in the news pool - and reflected the common
drawbacks of news pool reporting. The local reporters had a peripheral role in the
war coverage, and local popular reactions to the war - apart from a show of routine
patriotism - were not strongly featured considering the proximity of Dubai to the war
zone. Being a commercial city, Dubai has a mixture of Arab and non-Arab
population, but the nature of authoritarian press made it impossible to report on the
fate of Palestinians and Iraqis who held prominent positions in the business world
and in the bureaucracy of Dubai administration. The fear of war and the fear of
pollution of the sea - Dubai's shores often get oil sludge from Gulf sea pollution were suppressed factors in war coverage. The viewpoints of the newspaper and the
expert commentary featured in the newspaper were keen to demonise Saddam
Hussein and failed to address the political problems that the Middle Eastern nations
faced as a result of the war.
The Sydney Morning Herald gave an extensive coverage to the war, using pool
reports as well as despatches from its correspondents. The local coverage reflected
every possible angle to the war and considered the impact of war news on the mixed
population in Sydney. The Australian government's reaction to adverse media
coverage, particularly by the ABC, and the reaction of Australian Muslims to the
war were prominently featured in the newspaper. To the newspaper's credit, it also
carried articles on the introspection of the media in the face of reporting restrictions
in the Gulf On the negative side, the theme of Saddam-is-evil which was set in
motion by George Bush was played out by the opinion pieces in the paper. Though

there was an attempt to update the casualty figures on an everyday basis, it was
reported more as claims by both sides of war than as credible figures. The articles on
Middle Eastern politics were illuminating. The lead stories were mainly dictated by
the military minders of the Coalition, and the total dependence of the print
journalists on the authorities for war news was an inescapable fact. Significantly, the
war did not produce any scoops for the newspaper.
A comparison between the Khaleej Times and The Sydney Morning Herald
prominently shows the differences between the two newspapers, particularly in their
approaches to local reporting and in the quality of conclusions drawn from an
observation of events. It is impossible to doubt that the two newspapers are
representative specimens of two different types of media, one exemplifying the
authoritarian nature of the government and the other the freedom enjoyed by its
journalists.
But the overall war picture had striking commonalities. The war was largely a
one-sided coverage. The intentions of war were not questioned, the local
government's particular interest in the outcome of the war was not revealed (except
as a crusade in a "just" war), the brutalities of the fighting and the violence of
bombings were not even hinted at in the reporting and, most of all, the scepticism
that normally characterises the print journalist was replaced by a gullible faith in the
stated objectives in the war rhetoric of the Coalition leaders.
The television coverage in Australia did not fare as well as the print media in the
country, considering the primacy of television during the war. After the "live"

coverage of the first few days, the news slipped from prominence, and was relegated
to second lead or third lead status as the war entered into a less active phase. The
television, which had the privilege of breaking the news first to its audience,
conveyed the limitations of access experienced by the journalists. Despite the overall
impression created of a television war, the war demonstrated the utter captivity of
the medium in the hands of authority.

9.3 The trend is set

It is quite likely that the media management of the Gulf War has established a
pattern of the controlled arrest of media freedom during a crisis. It set a precedent
that the authorities could follow when media containment becomes inevitable. It laid
the ground rules for involving the media in the coverage of events while selectively
excluding the journalists from chosen aspects of an ongoing crisis. Denial of access
and delay were identified as key parts of a policy of creating a controlled
information environment. Establishing a system of keeping over 1200 journalists at
bay while ensuring a flow of information must be deemed a proven show of
authority. News flowed from only one source: the controlling authority.

The operation of authoritarianism within the libertarian press could be considered
anomalous, but the repeatability of the exercise casts a doubt on the freedom taken
so much for granted by the libertarian press. Is it a privilege granted by the will of
authority? The breakdown of the walls between the authoritarian and libertarian
press also raises the question whether or not operational freedom of the press is not a
difference in degree. The fundamental distinctions between the two kinds of media -

working under a democracy and under authoritarian rule - momentarily disappeared
during the Gulf War, raising the possibility of a repetition of this exercise at a future
crisis.

The Gulf War coverage has lessons on media containment not merely during the
coverage of war, but during any conflict situation where the media has to be
selectively inducted into a point of view. The dirigibility of the media - even a very
large contingent of the media - points to a conclusion that the line dividing the
authoritarian and libertarian press is a thin grey one.
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